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Online matrimonial platforms have emerged as a way to take the highly 
institutionalized process of arranged marriages online while preserving the offline 
social, cultural, and gender norms. While there is a rich body of empirical work on 
online dating, the corresponding literature on online matrimonial platforms is sparse. 
My dissertation seeks to fill this gap.   
In my first essay, I look at mobile adoption's role in online matrimonial platforms' 
engagement and matching outcomes. The analysis shows that unlike the dating market 
where the market's transaction costs are eased by the ubiquity and personal nature of 
the mobile device for all users, here subgroups associated with strong endogamous 
preferences benefit with mobile adoption. My work extends the mobile ecosystem 
study to the societal context where institutional norms take precedence and influence 
mobile adoption outcomes. 
  
In my second essay, I study how the search frictions, social norms, and 
disempowerment that results from the gender skew in online matching platforms can 
be mitigated by using appropriate market design. I use a quasi-experimental 
methodology by relying on two interventions designed by the platform to reduce 
women's cognitive load.  The interventions improved the overall well-being of women 
on platforms. My work here aims to increase awareness on the role platforms needs to 
play to improve women's well-being while ensuring that online platforms do not 
unravel.  
In my third essay, I look at whether the sanctity of institutional norms and traditional 
markers of status - involvement of multiple stakeholders through parental involvement 
and social norms related to endogamy and gender roles are retained in online 
matrimonial platforms. I find that "platformization" leads to institutional unbundling, 
with outcomes guided by more liberal ethos. This essay extends the platform literature 
on institutional contexts and shows that transition to online settings may not be 
seamless. 
My dissertation thus contributes to the literature on Information Systems by 
highlighting the need to consider the societal, cultural, and gender norms to further our 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The process of arranging marriages in most Asian societies is heavily 
institutionalized, with procedures for identifying potential partners and vetting them 
based on traditions and norms that go back decades. Decisions about marriage in 
collectivist societies like India are made in multi-stakeholder contexts where family 
members and extended community members have a strong (Agrawal 2015; Kamble et 
al. 2014; Mathur 2007; Medora et al. 2002). In such contexts, marital preferences are 
significantly shaped by endogamy (Desai and Dubey 2012; Fuller and Narasimhan 
2008b),  i.e., preferences for staying within the community as defined through religion, 
community, kinship, or caste. There are also well-defined terms for acceptable behavior 
with respect to marriage based on gender norms. In recent years, there has been a 
systematic move towards transiting search and match process of marriages to online 
matrimonial platforms. These platforms have replaced, complemented, or even 
augmented the institutional process of arranged marriages, representing the advent of 
new technology into the complex social dynamics that support the institution by 
enabling efficient and systematic search across a vast pool of potential spouses (Seth 
2011). As a precursor to online matrimonial matching platforms, dating platforms 
provide an interesting and valuable analog. However, while empirical work on dating 
platforms is relatively well-developed, the corresponding literature on matrimonial 
platforms is sparse. Online matrimonial platforms significantly differ from online 
dating platforms in terms of how institutional, social, cultural, and gender norms affect 





essays therein, represent an early attempt to fill this gap in the IS literature. In 
collaboration with a leading matrimonial platform in India, I present three essays that 
combine econometric analyses, network analyses, and quasi-experimental methods to 
answer specific questions within this context. Each of these essays is described in brief 
below, while subsequent chapters provide the complete essays.  
In my first essay (chapter 2), I look at mobile adoption's role in online 
matrimonial platforms' engagement and matching outcomes. The combination of 
mobile app adoption and matching platforms has fundamentally transformed many 
spheres of economic activity, building on the mobile device's ubiquitous and personal 
nature. One such area that has been transformed is the dating platforms, where research 
shows that mobile adoption leads to greater engagement with the platforms as well as 
a greater number of matches made through the platform. However, little work has 
addressed the matrimonial matching market. In this essay, I study how mobile adoption 
affects matrimonial matching platforms' engagement and efficiency. The analysis 
shows that unlike the dating market, the mobile device's adoption does enhance 
engagement with the platform but does not necessarily lead to greater matches. While 
the transaction costs of the market are eased by the ubiquity and personal nature of the 
mobile device in terms of engagement, institutional factors still affect the resulting 
matches. A closer look at how this behavior varies across institutional factors reveals 
some interesting nuances for subgroups that are associated with strong endogamous 
preferences (Brahmins and Muslims). On average, I observe that these subgroups show 
a positive, significant increase in matching outcomes on adopting the mobile channel. 





been unexplored in the matching and dating literature. It shows that societal and 
institutional norms emerging from the offline context take precedence in mobile 
adoption outcomes in certain contexts.  
In my second essay (chapter 3), I focus on gender norms and the worsening 
gender skew that manifests in most matching platforms online. The presence of this 
gender skew is particularly damaging in the context of dating and matrimonial 
matching platforms, since it affects the well-being and user experience of women 
participants. In this essay, I study how the resulting search frictions and 
disempowerment that results from a gender skew, and the associated congestion issues 
that women face, can be mitigated through the use of appropriate market design. I 
consider interventions based on social norms prevalent in the offline setting that may 
help reduce the effects of gender skew for women. Social norms prevalent in the Indian 
matrimonial setting dictate that women marry someone who is older in age, 
educationally more qualified, and earn more while imposing no such strong conditions 
for men. The relaxed social norms for men, and strong gender skew in online 
matrimonial platforms accentuates certain behaviors in men. Men tend to be a lot more 
active and send out more expressions of interest to women in a relatively indiscriminate 
manner. My data indicates that for every expression of interest that men receive in the 
platform, women, on average, receive 40 expressions of interest. This resulting 
congestion for women can cause significant cognitive effort to process while also 
leading to less-than-salubrious user experience for women in general. Reduction in 
congestion for women involves addressing the search frictions that tend to arise from 





congestion for women improves their well-being and user experience on the platform. 
In a related question, I also study if the subgroups of women who benefit from the 
platform's interventions choose to improve their well-being when given the ability to 
do so, rather than having the platform roll out these changes en masse. I use a quasi-
experimental methodology to study these questions based on two interventions 
implemented by the platform. The first intervention – which I term platform-level 
intervention – restricted the visibility of women to counterparties (men, here) based on 
age, education, income, and marital status. The rationale here was that one way to 
reduce congestion for women was to restrict those who are able to view their profiles 
ex-ante, by only allowing those counterparties who are more likely to be acceptable to 
the focal person. The results suggest that this platform-level intervention had the 
desired effect – women in the treatment group received fewer unwanted requests for 
contacts, experienced more matches, and initiated more contacts themselves, 
representing a better user experience in summary. In the second intervention, women 
were given the ability to set these parameters themselves, thereby adding agency. The 
results showed that not all women were willing to make these changes upon registering 
on the platform, but older and more educated women chose to do so once they have 
observed behavior on the platform for a few days. My work here aims to increase 
awareness of improving women's well-being on online platforms, if online dating and 
matrimonial platforms have to survive, and flourish.  
In my third essay (chapter 4), I look at whether the sanctity of institutional 
norms is maintained when transitioned to an online platform, in the context of arranged 





economic activities which were traditionally managed offline. Early platform adopters 
focused on activities that were easily codifiable and modular. As "platformization" 
becomes more prevalent, activities from highly institutionalized contexts are likely to 
move online, raising questions about how seamless the transition is likely to be and 
whether it will capture the offline environment's full essence. We specifically 
investigate if the traditional markers of status - involvement of multiple stakeholders 
through parental involvement, and social norms related to endogamy and gender roles 
are retained in online matrimonial platforms. I introduce a novel measure of network-
based group norms, based on endogamy, which uses the caste preferences for partner 
provided by the individual during signup. As part of this work, my analysis shows that 
move online, attenuate, and even remove traditional markers' impact, which is highly 
influential in offline settings. Profiles managed by parents have lower profile appeal, 
deviation from group norms that invites sanctions offline, and are viewed positively 
online. Thus, "platformization" leads to institutional unbundling, with outcomes guided 
by more liberal ethos. This essay extends the platform literature on institutional 
contexts and shows that transition to online settings may not be as seamless. 
In summary, the three essays contribute to the literature in Information Systems 
in multiple ways. I bridge the gap of our understanding of online matrimonial 
platforms. My work highlights the need to consider the societal, cultural, and gender 
norms to further our understanding of the market design and technology adoption in 
highly institutionalized contexts. With more such institutions coming online, it is 
imperative to understand the effect of norms that guides these institutions. In the next 





Chapter 2: Close, But No Cigar? The Effect of Mobile Adoption 
on the Efficacy of Matrimonial Matching Platforms in India 
 
Introduction 
India is home to more than 1.2 billion people and over 1.18 billion mobile connections. 
Despite these high numbers, the low usage of mobile data per capita suggests that large 
segments of the market remain unconnected. The introduction of Reliance Jio, a service 
started by Reliance Industries in 2016, led to a radical increase in data consumption in 
India, from 256 MB per consumer to over 3.2 GB in the last three years, paving the 
way for a significant increase in the adoption and diffusion of mobile and app-based 
services across multiple sectors. One such sector that has seen a tremendous increase 
in mobile and app adoption within the country, while remaining unexplored in the 
extant literature, pertains to online matrimonial matching platforms.  
Matrimonial matching platforms are relevant, mainstream, and highly popular, 
existing, and operating within the highly institutionalized context of matrimonial 
arrangements in India’s traditional society. The size Indian wedding market is non-
trivial: 11 to 13 million marriages happen every year, with a value of $40-50 billion 
(Dar 2017; Pandit 2017). As of 2016, 6% of the marriages in India were facilitated 
through the online matrimonial matching platforms, a number which is growing (Dar 
2017). Our interest in matrimonial platforms lies in understanding how the growth of 
mobile adoption impacts the matrimonial matching process as this process is shifting 
online.  That is, we analyze how adoption of the mobile channel by individuals utilizing 





do this, we build on existing literature in Information Systems that looks at online 
dating markets (Jung et al. 2019).  
Recent work set in the online dating context has considered the effect of mobile 
adoption on how user behavior changes, given that the mobile channel allows the user 
to be more socially engaged. Jung et al. (2019) find that increased social engagement 
with the platform, as measured by key metrics like profile visits and messages sent, 
also leads to enhanced matching outcomes, i.e., more people find dating partners 
through the mobile channel. We draw from this work but argue that findings in the 
online dating context in North America may not generalize to other contexts where 
institutional factors like caste and religion are critical to the matching process and may 
be instrumental in impacting the efficacy of the matching platform. We argue that in 
contrast to online dating, while individuals looking for a matrimonial match may be 
more engaged on the platform thanks to enhanced ubiquity and the ease of access 
provided by mobile devices, the effect of mobile adoption on eventual matching 
outcomes on an online matrimonial platform in a context with highly endogamous 
preferences is likely more ambiguous. We contend that in the Indian context matching 
outcomes will continue to be guided by strong institutional norms and logics, the lower 
transaction costs engendered by the mobile channel notwithstanding.  
Indian society has long been known for its system of ‘arranged marriages’ – 
marriages that are a product of careful negotiation and “matching” by elders in the 
family – that suggest a decision-making process driven by multiple stake-holders 
(Agrawal 2015; Annavarapu 2018). Offline matrimonial matching in this context has 





networks, marriage bureaus, and “word of mouth” (Titzmann 2013; Titzmann 2015). 
The influence of these factors is likely to be preserved even as the overall marital 
matching process has moved online in spite of the ubiquity and ease provided by mobile 
devices, as they are guided by long-standing, relatively inelastic social norms.  
The literature on marriages in the Asian context, and specifically in India, has 
primarily focused on discussing sociological aspects of the marriage context and is 
based largely on ethnography. This research has sought to address questions regarding 
the disintermediation of community networks and the reduction of search costs (Seth 
2011), propagation of conventional preferences (Agrawal 2015), and the role of caste 
and religion (Titzmann 2015). However, pursuant to the significant influx of mobile 
and online matching in this sector, it is striking that there is little systematic study of 
how technology adoption or mobile adoption has affected matrimonial matching 
outcomes. 
We address the gap in the literature through this study by building on the 
existing literature in online dating as well as prior work that addresses the institutional 
factors of marriage within the Indian context. We pose the following research question: 
1) what is the impact of mobile adoption on user behavior on the matrimonial matching 
platforms? We consider two sets of outcomes here– platform engagement, i.e., the 
number of times the user logs in as well as the number of other individuals contacted, 
and matches, captured by the number of dyads actually formed on the platform. In 
addition, we are interested in how mobile adoption may impact behavior differently 
than in the North American online dating context. It is possible that given the presence 





show significant evidence of endogamy, i.e. desire to marry within the same 
community. These preferences vary across segments of society, representing 
institutional factors that can induce variations on how the adoption of mobile devices 
may be influential. Thus, we also examine the following research question: 2) Beyond 
the effect of mobile adoption, how do institutional factors particular to the Indian 
matrimonial context moderate the impact of mobile adoption on user behavior on the 
matrimonial platform?  
We rely on the literature studying Asian marriages to identify two critical 
institutional factors that may influence user behavior on the matrimonial platform, and 
thereby moderate the role of mobile adoption on platform efficacy - religion and caste. 
These two factors have been studied extensively in the literature on marriages in India 
(Seymour 1999), an institution that is still guided by cultural beliefs and rules that shape 
the cognition and the behaviors of the actors involved. In traditional Asian societies, 
the marriage process is shaped by endogamy perpetrated through religion, community, 
kinship or caste, the traditional roles of gender in the society, and role of the family in 
propagating the rituals related to marriage. Thus, in the matrimonial context, deep-
rooted social and community norms become critical to understanding the process. In 
Asian societies even today, parents or family members often assume the primary role 
of selecting marriage partners for their children (Yeung et al. 2018). With increasing 
educational levels, there is clearly increasing involvement of the bride and groom in 
the matrimonial process, thereby making it a joint decision process (Allendorf and 
Pandian 2016). The presence of multiple stakeholders in the decision-making process 





respond when they adopt the mobile channel. We therefore consider two sources of 
deeply entrenched endogamous norms here – caste and religion.  
We consider how caste and religion affect behavior using two groups that 
represent the most conservative communities in terms of social practices - members of 
the Brahmin caste and the people adhering to Islam. The Brahmin community, a group 
of castes spread across India, is generally associated with conservatism, higher 
education and incomes, greater social connections, and adherence to strict social norms 
when it comes to marriage, with a specific emphasis on endogamy (Desai and Dubey 
2012). The Indian Muslim community is also spread across the country and is 
associated with strict norms for endogamy as well as an equal emphasis on 
conservatism (Mukherjee et al. 2007) although socioeconomically, this community 
differs significantly from the Brahmin community as well as from population averages 
in India. In considering these two similar yet distinct communities, we delve deeper 
into how mobile adoption may influence user behavior leading to platform engagement 
and matching.  
We conduct our analysis of matrimonial matching on a unique dataset acquired 
from an Indian online matrimonial platform considered to be a market leader in this 
segment. The platform provided us with roughly nine months of data from 2016-2017 
on new customers who signed on, including their login behavior, potential partners they 
reached out to as well as the responses they received from these counterparties; our 
analysis is based on this archival data. The platform is available through PC-based 
browsers as well as a mobile app accessed through mobile devices. Our primary 





mobile customers, and how these differences are moderated by institutional factors. 
The ideal identification here would be a randomized experiment wherein the channel 
condition is assigned to different customers exogenously; unfortunately, this is 
unrealistic and infeasible in our context. Instead, we use a combination of coarsened 
exact matching and a difference-in-difference analysis as our identification strategy. In 
robustness tests, we consider alternative forms of matching, such as the look-ahead 
matching method between immediate mobile adopters. We also run a set of falsification 
tests to establish robustness, all of which support the broad set of results we obtain 
through our primary analysis.  
Our results show that consumers who adopt the mobile channel do engage more 
with the platform, facilitated by the ubiquity of the mobile device, and consistent with 
prior work from the online dating context (Jung et al. 2019). However, our results 
deviate significantly from online dating literature when we look at the impact on 
matches. Specifically, the effect of mobile adoption on the actual number of matches 
made does not increase proportionally. A closer look at how this behavior varies across 
institutional factors reveals some interesting nuances for subgroups that are associated 
with strong endogamous preferences and strict social norms (Brahmins and Muslims). 
We see that these subgroups with endogamous preferences, on average, show a 
significant increase in matching outcomes on adopting the mobile channel. Mobile 
adoption within the matrimonial setting appears to work for those with strong 
endogamous preferences, in contrast to online dating where such institutional pressures 






Our work brings to the fore the role of institutional factors and endogamous 
preferences in determining how technology adoption, specifically mobile adoption, 
may lead to greater success on matching platforms. While increased engagement is no 
doubt desirable and can be achieved through the ubiquity of the mobile device, platform 
owners need to consider how the equally important outcome of actual matches may not 
follow from mobile adoption as seamlessly. Marriages in most societies involve long-
term decision-making, with multiple stakeholders, and are associated with risk aversion 
as well as fears of the loss of reputational capital (Fuller and Narasimhan 2008b). In 
such settings, platform owners should rightfully consider the important role of local 
institutional norms and social mores, and their interactions with the adoption of 
technology, in forming expectations of outcomes on the platform. Our work here 
extends the study of mobile adoption to such an institutionalized setting where social 
norms and technologies interact in interesting and unpredictable ways, with many 
implications for theory and practice.  
Theoretical Background  
Arranged Marriages in Asian Societies 
Arranged marriages, as an institution, remain relatively common in Indian society, in 
both preference and practice (Fuller and Narasimhan 2008b). The process by which 
such marriages are consummated is long, elaborate, and involves not only immediate 
family (parents and siblings), but also extended family, community members, and 
friends. The family of the prospective bride/groom initiates the marriage matching 
process at the appropriate time (anecdotally, early 20s for women, mid-20s for men 





the family reaches out to extended kinship networks and friends to help locate potential 
alliances for the focal individual. In addition, it is also common to enlist the services of 
matrimonial agencies (“brokers”) specializing in a specific caste or community. 
Finally, for initial leads, it is also acceptable to use newspaper advertisements, although 
this practice is waning due to the advent of online matrimonial services. From the initial 
candidate set of counter-party profiles generated in this manner, certain profiles are 
shortlisted for a more detailed screening process.  
Different screening mechanisms are used in this context, most of which tend to 
be informal “background” checks of the potential partner and the extended family 
through common kinship networks and extended social contacts to assess the prospects 
of the counterparty. Unique to India, an acceptable form of screening occurs through 
the matching of horoscopes, based on elements of Hindu astrology that provides a 
measure of compatibility between any two individuals. Post these screening processes, 
families of the prospective partners initiate contact and maintain communication 
through multiple channels (phone, online chats/messages, face-to-face meetings) to 
further assess compatibility. Once there is agreement on all sides, across families as 
well as potential spouses, the “match” is viewed as confirmed, and all conversations 
with other potential partners cease. The search process culminates in the final wedding 
ceremony which can extend over several days, with active participation of family and 
the kinship network (Seth 2011).   
Online matrimonial platforms have replaced, complemented, or even 
augmented the process described above, representing the advent of new technology 





descended from newspaper matrimonial columns and started as a profile listing service. 
Three major platforms – shaadi.com, bharatmatrimony.com, and jeevansaathi.com, 
were launched in the late 1990s, evolving beyond listings to providing algorithm-driven 
matchmaking services that remain popular even today. They serve by retaining some 
idiosyncratic elements of the Indian marriage process (horoscope matching, for 
instance) while also providing families with the benefits of digital platforms and online 
matching. Since these are similar to online dating platforms that have been studied in 
the literature, we study their contrasts below. 
Matrimonial Platforms and the Pursuit of Endogamy 
Dating platforms and those associated with matrimonial matching create value by 
reducing search costs in their respective markets (Agrawal 2015; Bapna et al. 2016a; 
Hitsch et al. 2010a; Titzmann 2013), enabling individuals to access profiles of 
counterparties that may not have been seen otherwise. Moreover, both types of 
platforms facilitate communication and interaction, allowing transaction costs to be 
further reduced (Agrawal 2015; Finkel et al. 2012). Users within both sets of platforms 
are likely to exhibit strong sorting patterns along attributes like age and education, in 
addition to physical traits such as looks, height, and weight (Hitsch et al. 2010a; 
Titzmann 2015). Both types of platforms arguably help increase diversity in matches 
by extending an individual’s reach within the search space for partners (Jung et al. 
2019).  
There are also some important differences between dating and matrimonial 
matching that are worth noting. In terms of motivation, dating platforms consist of a 





(Hitsch et al. 2010b), while those on matrimonial platforms do so with the full 
knowledge that they are looking for a long-term marital alliance. Casual dating is 
discouraged and socially proscribed in such platforms. Further, the marriage market is 
guided not only by the individual’s preferences but also by social norms relating to 
what is viewed as legitimate and suitable, which vary by individual communities in a 
diverse country like India. The preferences of larger family units as well as extended 
kinship networks are also partially reflected on such platforms (Seth 2011; Seymour 
1999). As a result, a significant difference between dating platforms and matrimonial 
platforms pertains to how the latter involve community members that social and 
cultural customs, thereby becoming an instrument for the perpetuation of endogamy.  
 Endogamy refers to the practice of marriage within a group and is an indicator 
of group cohesion as well as a mechanism of social isolation from other groups (Gordon 
1965; Rosenfeld 2008). Endogamous marriages perpetuate shared identities through 
the active involvement of families in the decision-making process. Kalmijn (1998) 
argues that marriage patterns are dictated by three social forces – first, the preferences 
expressed for certain characteristics in a spouse, which are influenced by the 
homogenous network of the individual and shares similar social characteristics. 
Second, the influence of other members of the social group, such as the extended 
kinship networks. “Mixed” marriages may disrupt internal unity and homogeneity 
within a group, thereby leading members of the group to regulate marriages either 
through sanctions or through instilling a strong sense of group identity. Finally, 
marriage patterns are influenced by the constraints of the local marriage market, such 





(Pierre‐André Chiappori et al. 2002). Given the interplay of socioeconomic and 
cultural factors, matrimonial matching reflects strong endogamy, i.e., individuals prefer 
to marry someone with similar cultural backgrounds, enabling them to develop a 
familiar lifestyle that is likely to produce social confirmation and affection. In the 
Indian context in particular, there is a strong baseline preference for endogamy offline, 
which transfers to the online context. How does mobile adoption affect user behavior 
in the presence of this baseline endogamy? We address this question more specifically 
next. 
The Effects of Mobile Adoption 
A growing body of work has documented how the adoption of mobile devices has 
influenced user behavior. A primary theme within this literature pertains to establishing 
the differences in user behavior between the mobile and PC channels. Three significant 
factors have been implicated in this work: first, the smaller screen size on most mobile 
devices, relative to the PC, has implications for overall search costs, which influence 
how users interact with the technology (Ghose et al. 2013). Second, the smaller form 
factor of mobile devices accords significant portability, leading to ubiquity (Lee et al. 
2016). Finally, by virtue of ubiquity, the mobile channel provides timely access to 
information (Ghose et al. 2013). When viewed through these factors, the mobile 
channel effectively complements the PC channel and increases the overall activity in 
multi-channel platforms (Einav et al. 2014; Xu et al. 2014). Mobile devices therefore 
offer access to information, anytime, anywhere (Balasubramanian et al. 2002; Watson 
et al. 2002), are universal, and help remove constraints related to time and space. 





multiple dimensions: offering continuity (always on), simultaneity (ability to 
multitask), immediacy (responding fast), and portability (providing time-place 
independence). These characteristics deliver increased searchability using contextual 
information (Pascoe 2000) while also making the mobile user easily reachable (Junglas 
and Watson 2006). 
 These benefits notwithstanding, the mobile channel also presents challenges to 
users and platforms alike. The smaller form factor and screen size increase the burden 
on users in terms of information gathering, leading to higher search costs, especially 
for complex searches (Ghose et al. 2013). Thus, when users are faced with choices 
involving complex decision making, or purchases involves idiosyncratic products 
which may require careful inspection, the mobile device may not be the preferred 
channel (Maity and Dass 2014). Indeed, research shows that mobile users tend to use 
the channel for the purchase of low-risk, habitual purchases rather than larger and more 
critical services (Chae and Kim 2003). However, in the retail sector where 
recommender systems may help mitigate search costs, the mobile channel appears to 
provide higher sales (Lee et al. 2016). Furthermore, prior research shows a pronounced 
ranking effect within mobile devices - most people start browsing from top of lists and 
therefore, products or services ranked higher receive significantly more attention from 
users (Ghose et al. 2013).  
 In our specific context, the search for a marital partner represents a complex 
and multi-stage decision-making process, where endogamous norms drive decisions, 
and therefore where the benefits and costs associated with mobile can play out in 





The Effect of Mobile Adoption on Engagement and Matching on 
Matrimonial Platforms 
Our interest in this paper is understanding how mobile adoption impacts engagement 
and matching on matrimonial platforms. We define two forms of engagement here: 
first, the user’s engagement with the platform could be passive, measured in terms of 
the number of logins. In contrast, active engagement is measured by the number of 
counterparties that are contacted (number of “interests” expressed) by the focal user, 
representing purposeful action on the platform. The ubiquity of the mobile channel, 
when added to the enhanced searchability offered by mobile devices and their personal 
nature suggests that mobile adoption by a focal user should be associated with increased 
engagement on the platform (Ghose et al. 2013; Jung et al. 2019). Thus, users that adopt 
mobile are more likely to log in more often and reach out to more counterparties, i.e. 
send out more “expressions of interest.”   
With respect to the actual matched formed, which remains the most important 
metric of performance in this context, we argue that prior work related to dating 
platforms may not apply equal measure here. Prior research in dating has argued that 
the mechanisms of ubiquity, impulsivity, and disinhibition lead to more matching 
outcomes as a result of mobile adoption (Jung et al. 2019), in addition to enhanced 
engagement. However, we contend here that within matrimonial matching, these 
dynamics are less likely to show up as a result of mobile adoption. It is first useful to 
establish what a matching outcome represents in the context of matrimonial platforms. 
A positive outcome, i.e., a matched dyad, can occur in two ways. First, it can occur 
through the action of the focal user sending an “expression of interest” (EI) which is 





another person that is then accepted. We term the former effect the direct effect of 
mobile adoption, since the adopter generates the initial contact. The second path 
represents an indirect effect of mobile adoption, since the initial contact is largely 
independent of the focal person’s mobile adoption decision.  
 In matrimonial contexts, the long-term nature of the sought alliances and higher 
levels of risk-aversion and reputational loss aversion that is associated with the 
institution is likely to reduce the actual formation of a dyad. When decisions are 
collective and made under a set of preferences that are reflective of strong social norms 
that dictate how and when matches may be made, the effects of disinhibition and 
impulsivity provided by the mobile device are less likely to affect outcomes. More to 
the point, responding to EIs instantly introduces multiple stakeholders into the process, 
where a clear record of interest that is observable by many others is established. As 
established earlier, marriage is a long-term decision with significant consequences. The 
formation of a dyad thus indicates the first serious step towards a formal offline process 
initiation, raising social costs for both parties as well as the risks of reputational loss if 
the process does not proceed positively (Banerjee et al. 2013). Thus, the value of mobile 
adoption may not manifest in more dyads being formed. 
These dynamics can affect the possibility of dyads forming both directly and 
indirectly. In the case of direct matching outcomes, a focal user sending out an EI is 
likely to receive a response to his/her interest based on assessments of social 
acceptability and endogamous preferences, which are likely to be largely independent 
of whether the mobile device is adopted or not. Similarly, in the case of indirect 





decision-making, which again is unlikely to be influenced by the mobile channel and 
the associated mechanisms of impulsivity and disinhibition. The central role of 
collective decision-making and stable preferences counters the value that is otherwise 
provided by mobile adoption. Therefore, we expect mobile adoption to be associated 
with greater engagement but not necessarily greater matching outcomes, measured as 
the formation of dyads. However, the effect of mobile adoption on matching may be 
more visible in specific subcommunities where the search process may be structurally 
different. We explore these arguments below.  
The Effects of Enhanced Endogamy 
While the overall effects of mobile adoption in the population may not lead to a positive 
effect on matching outcomes, it is worth considering how these may be different for 
specific communities that display highly endogamous preferences. While the process 
of searching for a partner involves several factors - looks, education, occupation, and 
social compatibility, among others. In most contexts, search predicated on multiple 
factors is associated with substitutable preferences (Blair 1988; Kelso and Crawford 
1982; Roth and Sotomayor 1990), i.e. one factor can substitute for another in terms of 
the utility for the person making decisions. However, in the case of highly endogamous 
preferences, there exist relatively rigid requirements about certain factors that drive 
endogamy. These rigid requirements cannot be substituted for in any way since any 
deviation from social norms established with the community is proscribed (Seth 2011). 
Thus, communities exhibiting enhanced endogamy display lexicographic preference 





have to be matched successfully before the next set of factors can be gauged, with little 
scope for variance in terms of what constitutes an acceptable match.  
 In the Indian context, enhanced endogamy is often displayed along specific 
dimensions like religion, caste, or language, and thus may exhibit lexicographic 
preferences along these dimensions. The focal party has a sequence of criteria in their 
mind that helps them in assessing the choice set of counterparties. Priority order in the 
sequencing is assigned to factors governing endogamy, i.e., the first dimension that 
needs to be matched pertains to the factor determining endogamy, with little or no 
substitutability. Thus, we argue that preference substitutability is low for groups whose 
choice sets are strictly lexicographic, such that caste, religion, and subcommunity 
membership become non-negotiable search parameters.  
The ease of use and ubiquity provided by the mobile device can help in cases 
with low preference substitutability, since search costs associated with a narrow and 
well-defined search process are more easily handled; prior research suggests that more 
well-specified and structured tasks are easily carried out on the mobile device (Ghose 
et al. 2013). Furthermore, in highly endogamous communities with lexicographic 
preferences, there is shared understanding of when incoming queries of interest from 
individuals within the same community are likely to be received positively, since the 
partner preferences on both sides of the dyad are similar. In such communities, both 
the sender and the receiver of EIs tend to have the same clearly defined preferences. 
Thus, we expect that in highly endogamous communities, the adoption of the mobile 





consider two communities that are typically associated with enhanced endogamous 
preferences, described below. 
Enhanced Endogamous Preferences on Religion 
Inter-religious marriages are rare in India, more so in case of arranged marriages where 
religion-based endogamy is very common. In some religious groups, marriage outside 
the religion is discouraged, to the point where an inter-religious marriage can only 
occur when one of the parties undergoes conversion, making the process particularly 
complex (Grover 2018). Group-based group sanctions are particularly high for inter-
religion marriages, with the threat of being excommunicated from the group(Grover 
2018; Jaiswal 2014). We focus attention on one religious group that has arguably the 
most clearly defined and strong endogamous preferences – the Indian Muslim 
community.  
 Indian Muslims, as a community, represent a highly conservative and religious 
subpopulation. As a minority community within the country, there is strong adherence 
to the basic Islamic principles across the country. Thus, while marriages within the 
broader Muslim community across the country are acceptable, marriages outside the 
faith run counter to this viewpoint. In effect, members of the Muslim community show 
preferences that are highly endogamous in nature, especially with respect to religion 
(Goli et al. 2013). If our conjecture is right, we expect to see the adoption of mobile 
devices in this community to be associated with more dyads formed, representing more 
matches on the platform, all else being equal.  





Caste in India is defined as a small and named group of persons, characterized by 
endogamy, with group membership based on hereditary rights, rituals and social norms 
shared by group members, and a common occupation (Béteille 1996). The word 
“Caste” encompasses two levels of an integrated system – Varna and Jati, the 
subdivisions within each Varna. Several studies show that assortative matching on the 
basis of caste in India is close to perfect (Bradford 1985; Deolalikar and Rao 1992; 
Dhar 2013). The Varna system consists of four social groups - Brahmins are identified 
as the learned; followed by Kshatriyas, the warriors; Vaishyas the traders; and the 
Shudras, involved in labor (Dhar 2013; Raina 2004).1 However, in modern India, it is 
the Jati which is more visible and utilized in social engagements. Every Jati member 
knows its exact relative positioning compared to every other Jati within the caste 
hierarchy (Gupta 2000). Regardless of the relative vertical positioning, Banerjee et al. 
(2013 find that caste preferences for marriages are strictly “horizontal” rather than 
“vertical”. There is little or no interest in “marrying up” the caste hierarchy. Online 
matrimonial platforms also reflect these societal norms related to caste and have sub-
platforms or properties along caste and community line. The registration and search 
options within the platforms are also based on caste and community.  
 Within this system, one specific community is particularly noted for its strong 
preference for endogamy – the Indian Brahmin community. The Brahmin community 
is a collection of castes falling under the same Varna. While socioeconomically 
successful, this community also shows higher levels of educational attainment than the 
population (Desai and Dubey 2012; Ramesh Bairy 2010). Clearly, the engagement 
 
1 There are many communities that remain outside the orthodox Varna system. In Modern India, these are 





levels of this community on the online matching platform would be high, as would be 
the effects from mobile adoption. However, this community is also associated with 
strict endogamy; while marriages within the Brahmin community are legitimate and 
common, there are relatively few instances of marriage outside the community (Fuller 
and Narasimhan 2008b). Such marriages outside the community are disapproved of 
and a source of embarrassment, even leading occasionally to censure (Ramesh Bairy 
2010). Thus, strict endogamy is associated with the Brahmin marriage process, and is 
a common knowledge among other groups. Here again, we expect mobile adoption to 
be associated with better engagement and matching outcomes, given the presence of 
enhanced endogamous preferences. 
Data and Methodology 
Research Site - Online Matrimonial Platform  
To conduct this research, we obtained data from one of the leading online matrimonial 
platforms in India. This platform serves users based out of India as well as members of 
the Indian diaspora. Users within the platform reflect the diversity of India, with a 
multitude of religion, language, region, caste, and sub-castes represented. The platform 
can be accessed through an online version from a web browser on a personal computer 
or a mobile browser on a smartphone, or through an iOS or Android mobile app. The 
platform operates on the freemium model, i.e., it operates a two-tier business model 
that offers free access to the basic set of features or content, while charging for premium 
features (Anderson 2008)  The paid version of the platform comes with additional 
features, including the ability to view phone numbers and horoscopes of other users, 





Platform users provide their profile information and partner preferences with 
respect to age, height, education, profession, location, caste and religion parameters. 
The platform has invested in proprietary matching algorithms that match users to 
suitable partners based on the user’s expressed preferences. The platform also 
highlights the profiles of paid subscribers and provides them primacy in search results. 
The presence of single women on the platform could sometimes invite the attention of 
frivolous, non-serious users but the platform actively discourages non-serious users 
(Kaur and Dhanda 2014) ; the users undergo stringent verification process through 
online and offline mechanisms to weed out non-serious users to ensure the quality and 
integrity of the platform.  
 For our analysis, we identified new users who joined the platform over an eight-
week period between October 2016 and November 2016. We subsequently track their 
activity on the platform for a period of at least three months, or as long as they are 
active on the platform. We collected demographic data for this set of users, and also 
had access to a daily panel of behavioral and transactional data on the platform for each 
user, including the logins made from various channels (PC or mobile), expressions of 
interest sent out and received, and the total number of matches made.  We use this data 
to examine adoption behavior, i.e. when users start to use the mobile channel offered 
by the platform during the first eight weeks on the platform. The number of users on 
the mobile channel per week post-registration (Figure 1) shows that a majority of users 
adopt the mobile channel immediately upon joining the platform. Over subsequent 
weeks, additional users adopt the mobile channel in relatively smaller numbers. This 





First, we identify “immediate adopters”, i.e. those who adopt the mobile channel at the 
time of registration on the platform. Second, we see a set of “late adopters”, i.e. those 
who adopt the mobile channel at some point within the first 4-6 weeks. Finally, we also 
observe a set of “never adopters” who do not adopt the mobile channel even after six 
weeks on the platform. These discrete sets of users offer a set of counterfactuals, 
allowing us to estimate the effects of mobile adoption by comparing activities of 
“immediate adopters” to “never adopters.” We can also use tests of robustness to 
compare “immediate adopters” to “late adopters,” using a variation of the look-ahead 
matching procedure used by Jung et al. (2019). For the majority of users, the majority 
of activities on the platform tend to occur in the initial 2-3 weeks, unlike dating apps 
where users return frequently and linger for extended durations (Hitsch et al. 2010a; 
Hitsch et al. 2010b). Therefore, in studying the effects of mobile adoption on 
engagement and matching outcomes, we focus on first two weeks on the platform.  
Empirical Approach and Identification 
A randomized experiment would be the ideal strategy for identification of the causal 
effect of mobile adoption, wherein a population of users is randomly assigned to the 
mobile channel or the PC channel exogenously, and their subsequent behaviors 
recorded (Aral and Walker 2011; Bapna and Umyarov 2015). A variation of this design 
would include only those interested in the mobile channel, who would then be 
randomly assigned to either a mobile or PC channel. Since all users in this design would 
have expressed an interest in the mobile channel, any differences in their outcomes can 
be attributed to mobile adoption. Experiments such as these are not feasible, however, 





al. 2019). We, therefore, use a combination of matching and difference-in-difference 
analysis to create a pseudo-experimental design whereby we can account for channel 
selection and bias that this may induce in our analysis.   
 The purpose of using matching in our study design is to limit any ex-ante 
differences that may exist between those users who choose to adopt or not adopt the 
mobile channel immediately. To create a matched sample of such similar users, based 
on observable characteristics, we use Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) (Blackwell et 
al. 2009). CEM provides some benefits in comparison with propensity score matching, 
which has remained popular in the literature. First, CEM relies on algorithms for 
creating coarsened strata that are largely independent of any influence that the 
researcher may be able to apply, even involuntarily (Blackwell et al. 2009). Second, 
CEM limits the degree of ex-ante heterogeneity between treatment and control groups, 
thereby increasing the strength of the causal claim (Overby and Forman 2015). Third, 
CEM is more flexible than propensity score matching as it considers both univariate 
and multivariate imbalances between treatment and control groups (Burtch et al. 2018). 
Finally, CEM takes into account heterogeneity between treatment and control groups, 
thus ensuring that the treatment indicators are independent of other covariates.  
 In our matching procedure, the treatment group refers to “immediate adopters,” 
while the control group is the “never adopters.” We use k-to-k matching to ensure that 
the number of treated and control units is the same in all strata, using the default Null 
method which performs random matching within each strata to reduce bias. We match 
on observable demographics - gender, age, caste, religion, language, profile operator, 





variable indicating whether the user holds a minimum undergraduate degree. Post 
matching, we assess the imbalance between matched and control groups using the L1 
statistic, the difference between the multidimensional histogram of all pretreatment 
covariates in treatment and control groups (Iacus et al. 2012). Perfect balance is 
indicated by L1 = 0, while values over 0.8 indicate an imbalance, with the maximum 
being L1 = 1. The multivariate L1 distance in our case is 0.21 showing balanced groups. 
As seen in Table 2, which provides summary statistics across treatment (mobile 
adopters) and control (non-adopters) groups, the matching provides consistent statistics 
across observable demographics. We describe the individual variables next. 
Variable Definitions 
Table 1 provides detailed information on the variables used for analysis. Summary 
statistics and the correlation matrix are available in Tables 2 and 3, respectively.  
Dependent Variables  
We use engagement and matching outcomes as dependent variables. Passive 
engagement is represented by TotalLogin, which is the aggregate of logins made by the 
focal user in the given time period (two weeks, unless specified). Active engagement is 
represented by TotalEIs, which is the sum of all expressions of interest (EI) sent by the 
focal user in given time period. With respect to an actual match, defining such an event 
in online settings is a challenge. In the dating context, Hitsch et al. (2010a) identified a 
successful match when users exchange phone numbers or email address on the 
platform. Bapna et al. (2016a) defined a match based on a sequence of at least four 
messages between any two users. In our context, we conceptualize a match using two 





sending an EI. When user B accepts, a match is formed. In the second scenario, focal 
user A receives an EI from user B, which, when accepted, results in a match. Once 
these EIs are sent and accepted, ongoing conversations are usually taken offline, hence 
reflecting a “match.” 2 
 In the first scenario, the match is achieved when the counter-party accepts the 
issued EI by the focal user A. The counterparty cannot see the whether the focal user 
has adopted mobile or not. Therefore, the effect of mobile adoption by user A is not 
clearly associated with the formation of a match. We refer to these as indirect matching 
outcomes. We measure indirect matching outcomes by the total number of positive 
responses to the EIs sent by the focal user to others on the platform in a given period 
of time, referred to as TotalEIAccept.  
 In the second scenario, the match is achieved by focal user A since he or she 
exercises agency in accepting the received EI. We refer to these as direct matching 
outcomes since they are associated with the focal user’s mobile adoption decision. This 
variable is represented by TotalReceiveEIAccept, which is the aggregate of all 
acceptances made by the focal user in response to the EIs received. The reduced search 
costs, ubiquity, and ease of use of mobile phones should allow the focal user to achieve 
more such matches on the platform (Jung et al. 2019). The activities within the platform 
are aggregated across all channels for the purposes of our analysis – mobile app, mobile 
browser and the PC browser. 
 
2 Alternative methods for measuring actual matches have been tried by the platform– when users become 
inactive on the platform or delete their profiles, efforts are made to contact them to ask if they have found 







The main variable of interest in our study is MobileAdoption, a dummy variable for 
which 1 represents the treatment group (immediate adopters), and 0 represents the 
control group (non-adopters). In robustness checks using the look-ahead matching, the 
treatment group remains the same (immediate adopters), but with late adopters as the 
control group. Immediate adopters may access the platform through multiple channels 
- mobile app, mobile browser, and the PC browser, while the non-adopters access the 
platform through the PC browser alone. Individual dummy variables represent groups 
with strong endogamous preferences –Brahmin and Muslim, for which 1 represents the 
corresponding group, and 0 otherwise.   
Controls  
We control for factors that may influence the outcomes of interest, including the 
variables  used for the coarsened exact matching – gender, age, caste, religion, 
language, years of education, income, a dummy variable indicating whether the user 
holds a minimum undergraduate degree, and a dummy variable indicating paid 
subscriber status. We also control for the profile operator, which could be the focal 
person, family member, friend, or a relative. We include the controls for the city tier, 
where tier 1 refers to the major 6 metropolitan cities in India, tier 2 refers to mid-level 
cities, and tier 3 refers to large towns. We account for any systematic time effects by 
controlling for the week of joining the platform. These systematic time effects also help 
to account for the idiosyncratic beliefs and norms within specific communities that 
show up during different times of the year. For instance, for some communities, 





reasons. These are captured through time effects. In the interest of statistical power and 
to estimate the marginal effects of individual-specific characteristics, we do not include 
user fixed effects in the baseline regression specification.  
Estimation Procedure and Results 
Our main estimation equation is as follows: 
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1(𝑀𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖) +  𝛼2( 𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠𝑖)
+  𝛼3( 𝑀𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑥 𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠𝑖) + 𝛽𝐷𝑖 +  𝛾𝑡
+  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Where 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 refers to engagement or matching outcomes discussed above, and 
𝑀𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 is the treatment dummy variable.  𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠𝑖 refers 
to the endogamous groups that we argue may differentially influence the effect of 
mobile adoption on matching outcomes –namely, Brahmin and Muslim. The main 
effect of mobile adoption is provided by the coefficient 𝛼1, which captures the 
treatment effect. The coefficient 𝛼3 captures the hypothesized moderating effects of 
institutional factors. We cross-sectionalize the daily panel data on user behavior from 
the first two weeks of activity on the platform; thus, the unit of analysis is the focal 
user. In robustness tests, we estimate similar models for a four-week period, with fully 
consistent results. We control for 𝐷𝑖, demographic attributes of the user. We also 
control for the specific week within the 8-week period when the user signed up on the 
platform, to capture any external influences that may systematically influence all such 
users, represented by𝛾𝑡. In the regression analysis for active engagement, we control 
for total logins by the user, since more logins are likely to lead to further activity on the 





control for total logins, total EIs received, and total EIs read. For the analysis of indirect 
matching outcomes, we control for number of logins, and number of EIs sent. The 
models are estimated using OLS, with robust standard errors. In robustness tests, we 
also used models for count data to estimate the treatment effects - negative binomial 
regression, Poisson and zero-inflated models – and obtained results that are largely 
consistent with those reported here in terms of the observed effects. These are available 
upon request.  
Summary Statistics and Main Effects  
Summary statistics for the sample are provided in Table 2. Our sample consists of 79% 
men; this gender skew is typical in matrimonial platforms, and is also similar to the 
gender ratios observed in online dating platforms (Hitsch et al. 2010b). Nearly one-
third of the users come from the major metropolitan cities like Delhi, Mumbai, 
Bangalore, and Chennai (Tier 1 cities), with the representation of women from the Tier 
1 cities comparatively higher than in the full sample. Men on the platform have lower 
educational levels on average, with 73% reporting 3-year college degrees compared to 
91% in the case of women. Table 2 also provides summary statistics on engagement 
for the initial two weeks on the platform, measured by overall logins (Total Login) 
across multiple channels. Passive engagement, measured by logins, are higher for 
women (23.76) than for men (16.46). Active engagement, measured by EIs sent, is 
higher for men relative to women (10.38 versus 4.39). Women, in general, receive more 
interest compared to men at a ratio of 40:1, in spite of the 8:2 ratio in the full sample. 





and see higher odds of their EIs accepted when they initiate the interaction (4.39 vs. 
0.92) relative to men (0.1 against 10.38).  
Table 4 reports the estimations for the main effects of mobile adoption for 
engagement and matching outcomes. Columns 1 and 2 provide the results for active 
and passive engagement, respectively, while columns 3 and 4 provide the results for 
direct and indirect matching outcomes. We find a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between mobile adoption and engagement outcomes in general across the 
full sample. For the initial two weeks in the platform, on average, mobile adopters login 
26.26 more times and also send in 1.34 more EIs than non-adopters. We find that 
mobile adoption leads to an increase in the engagement outcomes relative to users that 
only use the PC channel, which is consistent with existing literature on online dating 
platforms. However, our findings diverge from existing work when we look at 
matching: these benefits in engagement notwithstanding, we do not see an associated 
effect on the number of matches (dyads) formed as a result of mobile adoption. 
Immediate mobile adopters are not statistically different from non-adopters on average 
when it comes to achieving matching outcomes on the platform. That is, mobile 
adoption does not lead to an identifiable increase in matching outcomes relative to users 
that only use the PC channel.  
The Role of Mobile Adoption in Enhanced Endogamy 
Recall that we argued that subgroups with enhanced endogamous preferences would 
actually benefit from mobile adoption even in matches achieved. In Tables 5 and 6, we 
show our analysis for the two highly endogamous sub-groups – Brahmins and Muslims. 





outcomes observable for Brahmin users, relative to the population of users on the 
platform. However, Columns 2 and 4 show significant interaction terms between 
mobile adoption and the Brahmin dummy variable, indicating that on average, 
immediate mobile adopters within the Brahmin community achieve better direct and 
indirect matching outcomes relative to others on the platform. For Muslim users, the 
direct matching outcomes are higher relative to the population of users on the platform, 
as seen in Column 1 of Table 6. However, the interaction term of mobile adoption and 
the Muslim dummy variable is significant in Column 2, showing that direct matching 
outcomes are enhanced for this endogamous group through mobile adoption. However, 
mobile adoption does not result in an increase in indirect outcomes for Muslims, as 
seen in Column 4 of Table 6. To summarize, we see overall positive matching outcomes 
for the highly endogamous groups, which supports our argument that mobile adoption 
has a positive effect on matching outcomes for groups that face a more structured 
search process. The twin mechanisms of enhanced endogamy and low preference 
substitutability that endogamy generates paradoxically render the mobile device more 
effective in improving outcomes associated with engagement as well as matching on 
the platform.  
The Effect of Mobile Adoption on Non-endogamous groups 
While we see how mobile adoption affects matching outcomes for highly endogamous 
groups, it is worth examining how mobile adoption may affect subgroups that display 
relatively weaker endogamous preferences. Would these users display systematically 
different matching outcomes, relative to the population? We identify a set of users on 





preferences for prospective partners, and specify explicitly that they do not wish to 
disclose their caste or community associations – we refer to these users as the DWS 
(Do not Wish to Specify) group. We use a dummy variable to identify users in this 
group, and repeat the analysis as before, shown in Table 7. As seen in Columns 2 and 
4 of Table 7, this group receives no systematic benefit from adopting the mobile 
channel, in contrast to highly endogamous groups where the matching process is 
actually helped by mobile adoption. The interaction of the DWS variable and mobile 
adoption is insignificant across both matching outcomes, as would be expected. In fact, 
the DWS group shows a small and marginally significant negative coefficient in terms 
of matching outcomes overall, relative to the population, which is not surprising since 
caste-based endogamy is a strong norm in this context. Individuals who explicitly buck 
the social norm are likely to and do receive a small penalty in terms of matching 
outcomes. Thus, this analysis also provides some indirect evidence for how endogamy, 
in particular caste-based endogamy, is a prevailing norm within the marital matching 
context here.  
Testing for Disinhibition and Impulsivity 
Recall that prior research identified disinhibition and impulsivity as key mechanisms 
for the mobile effect within the dating context (Jung et al. 2019) – these mechanisms 
are unlikely to apply in the marital matching setting. In this section, we report on tests 
conducted to examine if disinhibition and impulsivity are indeed muted here.  
 Jung et al. (2019) refer to impulsivity as the extent to which the focal user 
performs due diligence before responding to an EI from a counter-party – the user 





profile of the sender. We measure impulsivity in our context as the difference between 
the count of profiles which were checked for counterparties by the focal user when an 
EI is received (TotalReceiveEIRead) and the direct matching measure 
(TotalReceiveEIAccept). Users who act impulsively by accepting EIs received without 
even checking the details of the sending party will show negative values – they tend to 
accept invitations without checking their antecedents. In contrast, those who perform 
due diligence before accepting a request to correspond further will either show values 
of zero (all EIs that are accepted are first checked for some fit) or positive values (EIs 
are read first but not accepted). Figure 4 provides the average of the Impulsivity 
measure for men and women across the treatment and control groups for the full 
sample. Across all groups, we find the mean value to be positive, showing that 
impulsivity of the nature addressed by Jung et al. (2019) is largely absent here. Indeed, 
mobile users appear to be even more selective than non-adopters. Even after 
normalizing by the number of total EIs received, we see similar trends in Figure 5, 
providing evidence for why impulsivity may not be at play even when the user moves 
to the mobile channel.  
Unlike impulsivity, disinhibition in the dating context manifests in the 
significant relaxation of preferences that are typically exercised offline (Jung et al. 
2019). For instance, women using online dating sites are more willing to interact with 
people of a different race, less education, and men who are shorter than them, all of 
which may not occur in equal measure offline. Jung et al. (2019) argue that mobile use 
enhances disinhibition on the part of individuals, which leads to greater matching 





occur. A full-scale test for disinhibition requires information on all counterparty users 
who send an EI to all other users - unfortunately we do not have access to this complete 
dataset. However, we can devise a more specific test by considering the DWS group 
discussed earlier. Recall that the DWS group explicitly choose to not provide any caste-
based information in their profile. Arguably, these individuals should be attractive to 
most people on the platform since they are unconstrained by any caste-based 
preferences. Therefore, women receiving EIs from men in this group should, if 
disinhibition holds, be more likely to respond positively, regardless of their own caste. 
On the other hand, if disinhibition does not hold and caste-based endogamy continues 
to apply strongly, we should see DWS men receive fewer responses, all else being 
equal.  
We operationalize this test using two outcome variables: TotalReceiveEI, which 
refers to the total EIs received by a user, and TotalEIAccept. We only consider men in 
this analysis, since we are interested in the extent to which they receive positive 
responses from women on the platform (there are no same-sex dyads in the sample). 
As before, we include dummy variables for mobile adoption, DWS membership, and 
an interaction term to account for disinhibition from mobile adoption, consistent with 
Jung et al. (2019). The results for the analysis are shown in Table 7. As is evident, DWS 
men received fewer EIs than the population, on average, and the interaction term with 
mobile adoption is insignificant. The effects on indirect matching outcomes, shown in 
Columns 3 and 4, show that DWS men are accepted less, on average, than the 
population even after mobile adoption. These results support the argument that 





critical. We conducted the analysis separately for mobile adopters and non-adopters 
separately with similar results, available upon request. In summary, impulsivity and 
disinhibition are not likely to be influential in this setting as users move to the mobile 
channel, at least as far as caste-based endogamy is concerned.  
Robustness Checks 
We also conducted a set of robustness checks to complement the analysis reported 
above. First, we conducted the analysis by considering engagement and matching 
outcomes for the first week on the platform, as opposed to two weeks. The results for 
the one-week analysis are provided in Table 9 and are similar to those presented above 
qualitatively. We find an increase in overall engagement outcomes with mobile 
adoption as seen in the Column 1 (passive engagement) and Column 2 (active 
engagement); however, there are no changes in the results pertaining to direct matching 
(Column 3) and indirect matching (Column 4) outcomes. The matching outcomes for 
the mobile adopters and the non-adopters are almost indistinguishable.  
 We also use an alternative matching approach as a robustness test. We use the 
Look-Ahead propensity score matching (LA-PSM) approach used in Bapna et al. 
(2016b), which has been observed to outperform traditional PSM in dealing with time-
invariant unobservable characteristics that strongly impact both the decision to adopt 
and the outcomes. Jung et al. (2019) used this approach to match existing mobile users 
to existing PC users who have the same propensity score and but adopted the mobile 
app in the later time period. In our case, the treatment and the matched control group 
ultimately adopt the mobile channel at different times; using the Look-Ahead method 





unobserved time-invariant characteristics linked to the user's intrinsic propensity to 
adopt the mobile channel. The only difference here is that we used CEM, in lieu of 
PSM, to match “immediate adopters” to “late adopters”, who adopt the mobile channel 
at a later time. Late adopters adopted the mobile channel after the initial two weeks on 
the platform, thereby allowing us to study their behaviour in the first two weeks. We 
used the same observable variables to conduct the Look-Ahead matching. Post 
matching, the imbalance L1 statistic between the treatment and control groups was 0.36, 
showing balance, with 9681 observations each in the treatment and control groups. The 
analyses using this sample is shown in Table 10, and the results are largely consistent 
with those reported earlier. Engagement as measured by logins increases for the 
treatment group, but we do not see any increase in matching outcomes with the mobile 
adoption. The moderation tests using the endogamous groups also provide fully 
consistent results and are not shown in the interest of space but are available upon 
request from the authors.   
 As a final robustness test, we conducted falsification tests to rule out the 
possibility that we observe spurious correlations. First, we pooled the matched set of 
control and treatment groups and then randomly assigned the treatment (mobile 
adoption) to users in the sample in the same ratio (1:1), thereby creating a new sample 
where the treatment has now been randomly generated. We repeat this process 1000 
times, thereby creating 1000 samples with replacement, with the same ratio of treated 
to untreated observations. For each of these samples, we run the baseline regressions 
for engagement and matching outcomes independently. We then conducted z-tests to 





with those estimated from the analysis on the original dataset reported in Table 4. The 
results from the z-tests show that the coefficients obtained in our main analysis are 
statistically different from those obtained through the placebo samples (p<0.01), 
suggesting that the probability of our results being generated by chance were very 
small. Going one step further, we use only the control group, and randomly assign the 
treatment dummy to half of this group, while leaving the other half untreated. We then 
run the same baseline regression on this sample to see if the analysis renders significant 
coefficients. We expect to see no such significant coefficients here. However, if the 
control group is truly different from the treated sample in some unobservable way, it is 
possible for this placebo test to provide significant results. We repeat this process 1000 
times, and check the average of coefficients obtained in this manner. The results show 
that the obtained coefficients are not distinguishable from the null effect, based on a z-
test (p<0.01), indicating that the results from the full sample are robust. The detailed 
results of these placebo tests are available from the authors upon request. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Online and mobile platforms have received significant traction in India in recent years, 
thanks to the availability of cheap mobile data and a corresponding increase in the 
supply of platform-based business models for activities that were traditionally carried 
out offline. One such interesting yet understudied context that has made the leap online 
pertains to the matrimonial matching process. In this paper, we set out to explore how 
the frantic pace of mobile adoption across the nation influences the manner in which 
the heavily institutionalized process of finding marital alliances is carried out online 





in the Indian context for roughly two decades, it has mostly attempted to replicate the 
offline process, thereby preserving as many social norms as possible. Thus, the 
matching process remains a collective one where families are involved in every step. 
Social norms pertaining to caste-based kinship networks continue to matter, and 
endogamous preferences continue to dominate. Given these institutional factors, we set 
out to answer how the adoption of mobile devices, representing a personal, ubiquitous, 
and versatile channel, affects the efficacy of the matching process, thereby providing a 
contrast to the more familiar online dating context (Jung et al. 2019).  
Working through a collaboration with a leading Indian online matrimonial 
matching platform, we used data on all new registrants on the platform for a period of 
8 weeks to study how users are able to first, engage with others on the platform, and 
second, actually form matches (dyads). Conceptualized through the twin outcomes of 
engagement and matching, we studied how adopting the mobile channel affects 
engagement and matching outcomes for users on the platform. Moving to the mobile 
channel remains a strategic objective for the platform firm, since it is generally 
presumed to lead to better outcomes for all concerned (Ghose 2017). The ubiquitous 
and personal nature of the mobile channel should allow users to find matrimonial 
matches more expeditiously, while allowing the platform to provide more services 
through the mobile app while also converting more users to becoming paid subscribers. 
The benefits of mobile adoption have been studied in the literature on online dating and 
have been shown to enhance the benefits for both individuals and platform owner. 





like marital matching, where institutional factors are play and still affect how users 
operate when faced with technology. 
Building on prior work that has addressed the role of endogamy, social norms, 
and institutional factors like caste, we show that while mobile adoption leads to greater 
engagement on the platform for the average user, mobile adoption may not help the 
average user find more matches per se. Rather, due to prevailing preferences for 
endogamy and the presence of a collective decision-making process, matching 
outcomes are unlikely to improve radically as a result of going mobile. By contrasting 
behavior across matched samples of mobile and PC-based users, using coarsened exact 
matching, we are able to show these nuances in the effects of mobile adoption. 
However, what happens when specific groups are known to be extremely endogamous? 
In such cases, intriguingly, the search process for a counterparty is more structured and 
arguably less complex, since the preference set is narrowly defined. We show that for 
such highly endogamous settings, mobile adoption works well by enhancing both 
engagement and matching outcomes. Indeed, as users move away from explicitly stated 
endogamous preferences, such as in the case of DWS users, the benefits from going 
mobile appear to wane. The mechanisms identified in prior work, such as impulsivity 
and disinhibition (Jung et al. 2019), appear to have less influence here while endogamy 
and social norms appear to hold sway even as users move mobile.   
Our work thus shows that in certain contexts, societal and institutional norms 
emerging from the offline context take precedence, and this has implications for 
platform owners. In our conversations with senior management at the platform firm, 





while users were more engaged on the mobile app, they were not observing greater 
matches. Our analysis provides evidence that when catering to a large and diverse 
group of participants, it is important to acknowledge that the use of technology and 
resulting outcomes are not a simple function of channel adoption. The diverse groups 
the platform caters to are likely to have varying demands for preferences and adherence 
to social norms, leading to a more nuanced set of implications for the technology 
investments the platform must make to enable features that aid mobile transactions. 
Our findings have implications for other platforms as well that operate in contexts that 
are guided by strong social norms and have a basis in cultural or religious beliefs and 
any activities that propagate them. Our findings could be generalized across dating and 
matrimonial platforms where the focus is on matching users with highly endogamous 
preferences. For example, eHarmony has a sub-platform focusing on devout Christian 
singles and advertise it as a “relationship site” as against a dating site. Similarly, Jwed 
and JDate focus on marriage-minded Jewish singles; LoveHabibi prominently 
advertises and distinguishes different Islamic sects - Shias and Sunnis. Thus, our 
findings are not restricted to the Indian context but apply widely to settings involving 
endogamous populations, as well as where the diaspora has settled beyond their home 
country. In the final analysis, mobile technology may not represent an ideal choice for 
all areas of activity.  
Our work here is subject to certain limitations. First, like most empirical work 
using archival, secondary data, there are several pieces of information that we do not 
possess in our dataset, which limits the extent to which we can clearly rule out some 





variables in our analysis – we are able to control for observable attributes in our 
analysis, through the use of matching and as control variables. However, this limitation 
remains in our work. Second, we do not have information on all counterparties that 
correspond with the users in our primary dataset. This precludes our ability to control 
entirely for the characteristics of the formed dyads. A more complete dataset would 
allow us to augment our analysis and we hope to do so in future research. Third, while 
we argue that certain subgroups (Muslims and Brahmins) are more endogamous, we 
do not have a measure of endogamy with respect to the many dimensions on which 
endogamous preferences may be constructed (language, food habits, professions), We 
hope that such a measure will be developed in future research for online matrimonial 
matching platforms. Finally, while we account for channel selection through matching, 
we recognize that a randomized experiment would be the ideal methodology. This 
remains a limitation, and is consistent with the treatment of channel use in the literature 
(Jung et al. 2019).  
 In conclusion, our work studies the effect of mobile adoption on the efficacy of 
users on a matrimonial matching platform in India. Set within the institution of 
arranged marriages, which have been prevalent in traditional Asian societies for many 
generations, we study how the role of the mobile device interacts with social norms and 
institutional factors that are influential in this domain. We depart from existing research 
studying the adoption of mobile devices in matching markets, primarily in the dating 
context, by showing that endogamy is a critical feature that needs to be managed by 
managers of the research site. Effectively, endogamy sets out the boundaries of the 





endogamous groups, the mobile device assists the search process since the parameters 
of search are well defined. Mobile adoption changes user behavior on matrimonial 
platforms by initially boosting engagement. However, in other subgroups where 
endogamous preferences may not be as explicit and rigid, the benefits of mobile 
adoption on matches on the platform are not as compelling. Our work thus provides a 
cautionary note for the use of technology within heavy institutionalized settings, while 
also laying out where true value resides. As the mobile ecosystem becomes more 
mainstream, we believe more such work is needed for a fuller understanding of the 






Chapter 3: Profile Gating? Addressing Congestion to Improve 
Women’s Well-Being on Online Matching Platforms 
Introduction 
 
Online dating and matrimonial platforms face an interesting variation of the problem 
of plenty - plenty of men, but very few women to match. Men outnumber women 
dramatically on dating and matrimonial apps. The typical ratio observed ranges from 
between 60:40 to 90:10 on these apps3. These platforms thus face the twin challenges 
of a worsening gender skew combined with the odds-based approach practiced by men. 
Gender skew in the platforms accentuates certain behaviors in men. Men tend to be a 
lot more active and send out more expressions of interest to women in a relatively 
indiscriminate manner. As reaching out to multiple counterparties is seen as relatively 
costless and riskless, and with many platforms encouraging such an odds-based 
approach, men are not as selective as women. These twin challenges have the 
unfortunate consequence of significant congestion on the platform, even when there 
are significant numbers of parties present. Past studies in matrimonial platforms show 
that for every expression of interest that men receive in the platform, women, on 
average, receive 40 expressions of interest (Karmegam et al. 2020), which can cause 
significant cognitive effort to process while also leading to a less-than-salubrious user 
experience for women in general. If the vicious cycle of worsening gender skew and 
increased usage of men's odds-based approach is left unchecked, fewer women are 








leading to the platform unraveling. Amidst the question of congestion in platforms is 
the increasing realization that the well-being and equitable participation of women on 
the platform is paramount. 
Beyond equity and the user experience, the rampant gender skew on such platforms 
can also give rise to behavior that smacks of online harassment (Rudder 2014; Slater 
2013; Whitty and Gavin 2001; Whitty and Carr 2006). A 2016 Consumer's Research 
study found that 57% of women respondents reported being harassed on the dating apps 
they used.4 Things do not seem to have improved over time. In a recent survey 
conducted by Pew Research Center in November 2019, over 60% of the women users 
in the age group 18-34 expressed frustration that someone on the platform continued to 
contact them, even after indicating their lack of interest.5 Not surprisingly, more users 
(45%) have expressed frustration than hopefulness (28%) on dating platforms. The 
problems are not restricted to women - 43% of men have indicated that they have not 
received enough messages on the app, suggesting that not enough women are initiating 
matches or sending messages, thus leading to frustration at both ends of the market. 
However, there is no doubt that it is far more challenging for women than men. With 
increased technology adoption, women have become digitally vulnerable due to 
increased visibility, interconnectedness, and decreased cost of transactions for those 
with potential malintent. Women are subject to more technostress, cyberbullying, and 










platforms have unshackled women and empowered them to take the first step (Bapna 
et al. 2016a; Hitsch et al. 2010b; Jung et al. 2019). However, increased search costs 
and online harassment are disempowering women in terms of making the first move. 
These observations raise an important question: if matching platforms are to thrive by 
ensuring equitable and engaged participation, what can platform owners do to improve 
the well-being of women users on the platform? This forms the core research question 
we address in this paper. 
Online matching platforms are decentralized two-sided marketplaces, where users 
search for matches, and the transaction is deemed complete when one of the users sends 
a request and the counterparty accepts it. The number of matches formed on online 
matching platforms is commonly assumed to be a fraction of the product of numbers 
of agents on each side (Rochet and Tirole 2006). A study on the cross and direct 
network effects on e-commerce platforms found that the growth in sellers primarily 
drives buyers' growth (Chu and Manchanda 2016). Roth (2018) argues that for a 
marketplace to work effectively, it needs to account for a few crucial factors - provide 
thickness, overcome congestion, and make it safe for all participants. By providing 
thickness, the marketplace can attract a sufficient proportion of potential market 
participants. By providing enough time or enough alternatives the marketplace can 
overcome congestion. The marketplace can make it safe for the participants by ensuring 
that participants find more value in participating within the marketplace, and do not 





Applying these principles to the dating and matrimonial platform contexts, we argue 
that these platforms require more women to register and participate. Signing up more 
women or engage in strategies like "gender gating", where platforms 
incentivizes/disincentivizes users based on gender, could be a long-drawn process 
involving extensive advertising; hence, the focus should be on improving the well-
being and user experience of women on the platform by reducing congestion, 
increasing the efficacy of matching for women, and empowering them to make the first 
step on the matching platform. Reduction in congestion involves addressing the search 
frictions that tend to arise from market thickness. Low-productivity users, in this case 
men, in a thick market could crowd out more appropriate matches for the focal woman 
user, thereby significantly increasing search costs (Shimer and Smith 2001). Prior work 
on market thickness suggests that increased market thickness reduces overall matching 
rates (Li and Netessine 2020). The matching rate could depend on the individual's belief 
about market thickness; individuals are likely to be more selective when they believe 
that there are possible matches available and tend to be more selective when they 
believe that there is more competition (Yu 2019). While the above studies have looked 
at the overall matching rates, we focus on women's well-being as an interim step that 
can eventually lead to a better overall matching rate.  
Past research on the gender preferences on online dating and matrimonial platforms 
suggests that women prefer men within a specific age range - not too old, and not 
younger. Women also prefer someone with more or similar educational and 
occupational attainment. Platforms have focused on recommending the users based on 





visibility if the counterparty has set the preferences in a way that includes the focal 
person. Such an intervention may ensure that women are not in the consideration set of 
counterparties who are unlikely to be considered seriously by the focal user. Thus, one 
such intervention that may help enhance the experience for women on such platforms 
reflects a specific research question we address: given the gender skew in online 
matching platforms, can platforms improve the well-being of women by restricting the 
women's profile visibility? Since this intervention may have differential effects on the 
subgroups on which it targets, we pose a related question: Do the subgroups of women 
who benefit from platform-level intervention, make informed choices to restrict their 
profile visibility when given the option? 
We conduct our analysis in partnership with a leading online matrimonial platform. 
While there are fundamental differences between online dating and matrimonial 
platforms in terms of the motivation of the users, some of the challenges women face 
on both types of platforms are similar. These common challenges include: gender skew, 
congestion, high level of interests/messages that women receive, and odds-based 
riskless approach used by men. Our analysis is based on two interventions implemented 
by the platform in May 2019 and November 2019 in different sub-domains. The first 
intervention – which we term platform-level intervention – restricted the visibility of 
women to counterparties (men, here) based on age, education, income, and marital 
status. For example, a 25-year-old woman's profile was visible to only those men who 
fall in the age range 24-35. Our study's primary objective is to understand if 
interventions whereby profile visibility is reduced to the most likely set of 





operationalizing well-being, we look at three outcomes – the number of incoming 
requests that women see, the matching rate, and the extent to which women initiate 
contact with counterparties.  
In the second intervention – which we term individual-level intervention— rather than 
the platform applying the intervention across the board, women were given the option 
to restrict these dimensions (age, income, education) selectively for themselves. 
Women users could thus exercise these choices on the day of registration, potentially 
without understanding the reason for why these measures may help or could make these 
changes at any point in time, thereby reflecting “learning” that may accrue on the 
platform itself. To enhance identification, we are able to compare subdomains on the 
platform where these interventions were implemented to others where no such 
interventions occurred, thereby allowing us to quasi-experimental matched samples to 
enhance causal inference. We also conduct a series of robustness checks, all of which 
support the broad set of results we obtain from our primary analysis. 
Our results show that the platform level intervention had the desired effect on women's 
well being. We find that post-intervention, congestion reduced for women, which also 
led to an increase in the efficacy of matching for them. The increase in efficacy could 
be attributed to more appropriate counterparties getting in touch with the focal users. 
We also see that post-intervention, thanks to reduced congestion, women initiate more 
matches. We notice that the intervention has not made men worse off; on average, their 
activity and efficacy of matching remain the same. Closer inspection reveals that 





benefit more. Women with higher educational and occupational attainments also seem 
to benefit more. However, when we specifically look at individual-level interventions 
where women are able to selectively restrict profile visibility, we note that it is only 
women who are older that appear to be enforcing such restrictions, which raises 
interesting implications for platform design, especially in matrimonial and dating 
platforms where gender skew continues to be an issue.  
Our work highlights the challenges that women face on online platforms because of 
existing social norms and platform design. Platform owners have to take a larger role 
in ensuring that women can exercise their choice and are not harassed online. While 
giving the women the option to exercise choice to reduce the congestion may seem like 
an attractive choice, however, our study shows that platform level interventions can 
actually be quite beneficial in reducing congestion and ensuring the well-being of 
women. The challenge remains that only a subgroup of women who are older seem to 
benefit more. The platforms may have to take additional measures for women, who are 
younger, and maybe digitally more vulnerable. Our work here is aimed at increasing 
the awareness of improving the well-being of women on online platforms, if online 
dating and matrimonial platforms have to survive, and flourish.  
Theoretical Background 
Our paper contributes to the literature on gender norms as applicable to three streams 
of prior research: market design of online matching platforms, online harassment and 
digital vulnerabilities, and finally, women's empowerment and well-being on online 





Gender Differences in Online Matching Markets 
There are significant gender differences in preferences on the online matching 
platforms such as dating and matrimonial platforms. In the specific case of matrimonial 
platforms, women register on them to find a marriage partner, unlike men who may be 
in for short-term relationships (Kaur and Dhanda 2014). Matrimonial platforms may 
discourage such behaviors, but they cannot entirely discount such behaviors by some 
users (Agrawal 2015; Seth 2011) . Women tend to value men's present and future 
earning potential, with preferences for someone with higher educational qualifications 
and income (Fisman et al. 2006; Hitsch et al. 2010b). Men also show stronger 
preferences for physical attractiveness than women. Men prefer to marry or date 
someone younger (Agrawal 2015; Fisman et al. 2006; Hitsch et al. 2010a). At present, 
the age for serious consideration for marriage ranges between 22-24 for women and 
26-28 in the case of men. 
Further, most online dating platforms face an asymmetry in the number of users on 
each side of the markets (Yu 2019). It is anecdotally evident that women are in the 
minority in all platforms – this is reflected across both dating and matrimonial 
platforms (Karmegam et al. 2020; Slater 2013). Given the gender skew in the platforms 
and the relative paucity of an appropriate consideration set for men across the few 
women that are present on the platform, men are likely to be relatively indiscriminate 
in how they reach out to women in order to initiate contact. The lowered transaction 
costs on the platform as well as the possibility for arms-length interactions at first, 
unfortunately, enhance the possibility of this form of indiscriminate behavior. Thus, 





education, occupation, and earning levels, thereby bucking social norms that are more 
prevalent in offline matrimonial settings. Given the gender skew, it is also likely that 
men engage in an odds-based approach, whereby they send out more contact requests 
to women, regardless of inherent fit, with the view of increasing the odds of receiving 
a positive response (Yu 2019). Though the efficacy of this approach is suspect, it 
remains a strategy espoused by men on the platform and also has the unfortunate effect 
of setting off a vicious cycle of increasing the congestion on the platform, enhancing 
the search costs for women, and reducing their eventual participation as a result of the 
gender asymmetry on the platform.  
Congestion Due to Market Thickness 
In the platforms literature, market thickness refers to the scenario where the likelihood 
of finding a match depends on the availability of other users or agents on the platform 
(Li and Netessine 2020; Roth 2018; Yu 2019). Market thickness has been studied 
extensively in the context of matching in the labor markets. The technology, 
availability of users at both ends, the urgency to form a match, make this market thick. 
Thick markets come with challenges given the short time in which agents need to 
conduct due diligence on agents at the other end, send out interest to match, and finally 
complete the matching process. Thick markets suffer from congestion (Li and 
Netessine 2020). Congestion could occur due to multiple reasons - inefficiencies 
induced by technology-aided tools like recommendation systems, search frictions 





Past research shows that recommendation systems promote diversity (Fleder and 
Hosanagar 2009), enable targeting, and help users discover an appropriate match. 
However, the recommendation systems in online dating and matrimonial platforms 
could exacerbate the situation arising from gender skew. The platforms promote new 
users and more attractive users, thereby increasing the congestion for the users who 
register afresh. Congestion could also occur due to search frictions. When there are too 
many alternatives, and information to consider, users may have to engage in multiple 
searches and more complex evaluations, leading to higher cognitive effort (Hagiu and 
Jullien 2011). When users are presented with many choices, it could lead to information 
overload and hinder the decision-making process (Ghose et al. 2014). Finally, 
congestion externality by low-productivity users could reduce contacts between other 
pairs of users who might be better-matched but could miss out on this match given the 
presence of other entities on the platform  (Shimer and Smith 2001). The group of men 
using the odds-based approach could act as these “low-productivity” members on the 
market, effectively increasing the cost of congestion asymmetrically for women. Given 
the presence of this congestion, how are women on the platform affected?  We address 
this question next.  
Women's Well-being on Online Platforms 
In a recent study on the gender pay gap in Uber, Cook et al. (2018) identify three 
reasons for the prevailing pay gap. First, men are willing to drive in areas with higher 
crime and drinking bars, unlike women who are likely to focus on safety. Second, men 
are far more experienced, and on average, spend more time driving than women. Third, 





women's well being in the offline settings manifest in the online settings, even when 
men and women are on the same side of the equation in gig platforms. Some of the 
concerns heighten in the online world, as women are far more vulnerable while using 
digital technologies compared to men. Ransbotham et al. (2016) identify the 
mechanisms that make a certain set of users more digitally vulnerable, which include 
increased visibility, interconnectedness, and decreased costs of transactions. Increased 
visibility on the online matching platforms comes with consequences; it provides 
information access to users, who are unlikely to be in the focal user's consideration set 
for initiating any transactions. The focal users would have preferred to keep the 
information hidden to such entities or users. Though interconnectedness offered by 
technology increases the scale of desirable social interactions, it also increases the 
vulnerabilities, including cyberbullying, cyberstalking, and technostress (Lowry et al. 
2016; Tarafdar et al. 2013). Finally, online social transactions tend to lower costs for 
all participants, which leads to large sets of users indulging in apparently utility-
maximizing behavior without considering the consequences, which appears 
particularly true for men on online dating and matrimonial platforms. The above factors 
have led to a scenario where women continue to be experience behavior similar to 
harassment on these platforms.  
In a survey by Pew research online dating apps, 28% of the women reported having 
been contacted by someone in a ‘harassing’ manner.6 It may not always be intentional 








other externalities also tend to harm women's well-being in online platforms. There is 
a common concern about being lied to or deceived on online dating platforms compared 
to traditional dating (Couch et al. 2012). Due-diligence is paramount, and women put 
much premium in the due-diligence effort by trying to learn facts about a potential 
partner before initiating a conversation (Finkel et al. 2012; Shukla and Kapadia 2007). 
There is likely to be technostress for women on online dating platforms - stress that the 
user experiences due to their usage of apps of information systems (Ayyagari et al. 
2011; Tarafdar et al. 2007). The literature on technostress argues that the form tends to  
be context-specific and can manifest in multiple ways (Tarafdar et al. 2013), with the 
consequences which may include -  reduced overall efficacy and enhanced burnout by 
system usage. Online dating platforms have significantly reduced the disinhibition 
amongst the women in initiating the first step. However, given the high level of traffic 
for women, the situation of dual-task interference (DTI) manifests (Jenkins et al. 2016). 
DTI is a cognitive limitation that results in significant performance loss. In our context, 
the DTI occurs when women cannot initiate any match, as there is constant traffic of 
incoming requests. Thus, the overall market design, social norms, and gender norms 
put considerable stress on women's well-being on online platforms.  
The onus is on platform designers to evolve market design elements and provide 
features, making women feel safe and helping them realize the benefits of online 
platforms, thus contributing immensely to the well being of women users. We highlight 
three such elements, which would improve women's well-being on online dating and 
matrimonial platforms: reduce congestion and thus reduce search frictions, improve the 





Congestion can be reduced in multiple ways. One of the options is by adopting gender 
gating (Yu 2019), where the platform either incentivizes more women in joining or 
disincentivizes the other side from joining. Platforms like Bumble allow only women 
to initiate a match, thus reducing the congestion for women. However, some of these 
options may not be feasible for all platforms, especially with matrimonial platforms 
where users may have narrow preferences along multiple dimensions - religion, 
language, caste, or sub-caste. We specifically look at an intervention that would restrict 
profile visibility based on generally accepted gender preferences, or widely followed 
social norms. For example, women prefer to marry someone who is not too old and has 
educational and occupational accomplishments similar to or better than theirs. As 
explained earlier, the reduction of congestion is likely to reduce the search friction and 
improve the overall efficacy of matches. Such market design elements would empower 
the women to take the first step, as they are not bogged down by the congestion, and 
see the platform as a safe space for finding matches.  
To summarize, we consider if changes in the market design or features on online dating 
and matrimonial platforms improve the well-being on the platform by reducing 
congestion, improve efficacy, and empowering women to initiate matches. We argue 
that minimizing search frictions and easing the vulnerabilities by reducing harassment 
can benefit women on online platforms. In place of formal hypotheses, we allow the 
empirical analysis to provide us with guidance. In the next section, we outline the 






Intervention 1 – Platform Level Intervention 
Data and Methodology 
To conduct this research, we partnered with a leading online matrimonial matching 
platform in India. Like most of the other platforms, our partner platform is also 
grappling with the challenges associated with the gender skew. While our partner 
platform is growing consistently and adding subscribers daily, the gender skew issue 
has persisted, even if it has not worsened over the years. The platform regularly 
conducts experiments by rolling out features or intervention in one of the sub-platforms 
it operates. For our analysis, we relied on a quasi-experimental intervention design on 
the platform. Figure 6 presents the quasi-experimental design. The platform rolled out 
the intervention in sub-domain B in May 2019. Sub-domain A is closely related to sub-
domain B in terms of geographical proximity and cultural factors. It is a regular practice 
for the platform to use both the domains interchangeably to roll out features and 
compare outcomes.  
The intervention restricted a specific set of users who could view the focal woman 
user's profile based on four conditions: age, education, income, and marital status. The 
terms for restrictions are provided in Table 12. For example, a 25-year-old woman's 
profile will not be shown to a man who is 35+. A man whose educational qualification 
is a high school degree or less will not be able to view the profiles of women who have 
better educational qualifications. A man who has been married before will not be able 
to see the profile of women who have never been married previously. Finally, a man 
will also not be able to view those profiles, where the woman earns $3500 Indian 





In Aug 2019, the platform rolled out the intervention across all the sub-domains. Thus, 
the restrictions based on age, education, income, and marital status were applied across 
all users. In a subsequent intervention in subdomain C in Nov 2019, the platform 
provided women the choice to set parameters. The set up for this experiment is parallel 
to the platform-level intervention, where subdomain C served as the treatment group 
and subdomain D as the control. Women had the choice to set values different from the 
default values applicable for platform level intervention. Please refer to figure 8. 
Empirical Approach and Identification 
While a randomized experiment would be an ideal strategy for identifying such 
interventions' causal effect, we had to rely on a quasi-experimental set-up of coming 
up with the matched samples to reduce the bias in the estimates for the intervention. 
We kept the intervention day T, as the base, the pre-treatment group constituted all the 
users who joined the platform between days T-60 and T-45. The post-treatment group 
constituted all those users who joined the platform between days T+15 and T+30. We 
use the data for thirty days of activities post joining the platform. The choice of the 
time-period is to avoid any activity overlap between treatment groups. We construct 
the matched sample from the four groups to limit any ex-ante differences that may exist 
between the users in the control and treatment group before and after the intervention. 
We use Coarsened Exact Matching, which is increasingly becoming the de-facto 
method for creating matched samples in IS literature. We create the matched samples 
by not only matching the users from subdomains A and B but also match the users 
before and after the treatment. We match on observable demographics - gender, age, 





subscription. We originally started with over 70,000 profiles, and finally, end up with 
18,338 profiles. We describe the individual variables next. 
Table 11 provides detailed information on the variables used for analysis. Summary 




For indicators of women's well-being in platforms, we look at three factors - 
congestion, matching efficacy, and empowerment. The first factor, congestion, is 
represented by TotalEIReceived, which is the sum of all expressions of interest (EI) 
received by the focal user in the given time. A high number of EIs received increases 
the overall congestion and, thus, cognitive load for women in platforms. Any reduction 
in the EI received would indicate a reduction in the congestion for women. With the 
intervention, the focal user's profile is likely to be shown to a comparatively smaller 
subset of users, leading to a reduction in EIs received by the focal user. The reduction 
is likely to have cascading effects on the outcomes, including the variables representing 
matching efficacy and empowerment. The second factor, the matching efficacy, is 
represented by TotalIncomingMatch. In this instance. We look specifically at the 
match, which is formed when the focal user A receives an EI from user B, which, when 
accepted, results in a match. An increase post-intervention in the TotalIncomingMatch 
would indicate an improvement in the overall matching efficacy. It would serve as an 
indicator that the interests received by the focal user are from a more appropriate 





which is the aggregate of all EIs sent by the focal person. Reducing congestion is likely 
to empower women users to take the first step and initiate matches.  
Independent Variables 
The two important variables for our study are Treatment and TimeTreatment. 
Treatment is a dummy variable for which 1 represents the treatment group- subdomain 
B, and 0 represents the control group - subdomain A. TimeTreatment is a dummy 
variable for which 0 represents the pre-intervention period, and 1 represents the post-
intervention period. The interaction of Treatment and TimeTreatment is the main 
variable of interest, as it provides the intervention's effect on our dependent variables. 
For our analysis of woman subgroups of interest, we use dummy variables - 
Age26AndAbove, EduHigher, and WithIncome. Age26AndAbove is 1 for those users 
whose age is 26 and above; it is 0 for those users who are 25 and below. EduHigher is 
1 for users who either have a Masters's degree or above or have undergraduate 
professional degrees with high potential, and it is 0 for other users. Users with earn 
income have WithIncome value as 1, and 0 otherwise.  
Controls 
We control factors that may influence the outcomes of interest, including the variables 
used for the coarsened exact matching – gender, age, caste, religion, language, years of 
education, income, and a dummy variable indicating paid subscribers status. We also 
control for the profile operator, which could be the focal person, family member, friend, 
or relative. We include the controls for the city tier, where tier 1 refers to the major 6 





towns. We account for any systematic time effects by controlling for the week of 
joining the platform.  
Regression Analysis 
Our main estimation equation is as follows.  
𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑙𝐵𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖
=  𝛼0 +  𝛼1(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖) +  𝛼2( 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖)
+  𝛼3( 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑥 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖) + 𝛽𝐷𝑖 +  𝛾𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Where WellBeingFactors refers to the three important factors discussed earlier - 
TotalEIReceived, TotalIncomingMatch, and TotalEISent. The intervention's main 
effect is provided by the coefficient 𝛼3, which captures the effect of the profile 
restrictions on the treatment group. We cross-sectionalize the daily panel data on user 
behavior from the 30 days of activity on the platform; thus, the analysis unit is the focal 
user. For the analysis, we control for the demographic attributes of the user - 𝐷𝑖. We 
also control for the specific week when the user signed up on the platform, to capture 
any external influences that may systematically influence all such users, represented 
by𝛾𝑖 . In the regression analysis for the TotalEIReceived, we control for the total days 
the user was active since more active days are likely to lead to further incoming activity 
as more active users are given primacy in the recommender systems. Similarly, for the 
regression analysis of TotalIncomingMatch and TotalEISent for the focal user, we 
control for total days active, and total EIs received. For all the models, we control the 
ProfileViews, a variable that indicates how many times the individual's profile has been 





clustering is based on the location. To a large extent, location determines other factors, 
including - education, occupation, income, and technology usage. In robustness tests, 
we also used models for count data to estimate the treatment effects and obtained results 
that are largely consistent with those reported here in terms of the observed effects.  
Summary Statistics and Main Effects 
Summary statistics for the matched sample for intervention 1 is provided in Table 13. 
Our sample consists of 20% women, exemplifying the gender skews we see in the 
matching platforms. The median age of women for our sample is 25; hence we consider 
the variable Age26AndAbove to further split the sample for women. On average, men 
have lower years of education, 14.78 years compared to 16.04 years for women. 
However, considering the variable EduHigher, over 25% of the men have a Masters's 
degree or above or have undergraduate professional degrees with high earning 
potential. 42% of the women in our sample and 87% of the men report their income. 
Women are more likely to have paid subscriptions in our sample - 11% compared to 
4% in men's case. One important consideration in the matrimonial platforms is the 
focus on the caste preferences. In our sample, 15% of women have indicated that they 
are willing to look for partners outside their own caste, while 51% of women prefer to 
marry within their own caste. The corresponding percentages for men are 25% and 43% 
respectively.  
Table 13 also provides summary statistics on the activities within the platform. On 
average, women receive 40 times more EIs compared to men; in our sample, women 





high level of congestion for women on these platforms. TotalIncomingMatch is 1.65 
for women, which indicates that the matching efficacy for women is very low, around 
1%. The matching efficacy for men is a respectable 13%. Women send out 15.44 EIs 
compared to 37.78 in case of men. Not surprisingly, the average profile views for 
women is 1498.68 compared to 128.64 for men. In the given 30-day period, men are 
likely to be more active in a purposeful way by sending out EIs or accepting EIs. In our 
sample, DaysActive for men is 5.64 compared to 4.59 for women.  
Table 14 reports the estimation for the intervention's main effects, which restricts 
profiles of the focal person being shown to counterparties. Columns 1,2, and 3 provides 
results for congestion variable - TotalEIReceived. We are interested in the coefficient 
for the interaction terms - Treatment and TimeTreatment. We find that post-
intervention, the TotalEIReceived reduces for the overall sample, as seen in column 1. 
A closer look indicates that all the reduction comes specifically for women, as seen in 
column 2. Women received 10.3 less EIs post-intervention. This roughly translated to 
a reduction of 6% of the congestion. We do not see any statistically significant 
relationship for men. The results suggest that there is a significant reduction in 
congestion for women. 
How does the reduction in congestion translate to better outcomes for women, we look 
at other parameters - TotalIncomingMatch and TotalEISent. Columns 4,5, and 6 
provide the results for TotalIncomingMatch. We find that women accept more EIs post-
intervention, significantly improving their matching efficacy. As seen in column 5, 





in women's matching efficacy. Thus, we find that the platform level intervention has 
improved the well-being in the platform by reducing the EI received. The lowering in 
EI received, reduces the overall search frictions for women, thus lowering the overall 
due-diligence costs. The profiles received by women are more appropriate and relevant, 
thus increasing the matching efficacy. We also notice that there is a decrease in the 
matching efficacy for men; it reduces by 0.141. An important question now is if the 
platform-level intervention leads to empowering women to send out more EIs. Results 
from columns 8, do suggest that women do send out 9.235 more EIs post-intervention; 
this suggests an almost 60% increase compared to the average values. There is no 
statistically significant change for men post-registration. Our findings suggest that the 
platform's intervention to reduce the overall congestion, and thus improve the overall 
well-being of women on online platforms, had the desired effect. The congestion 
reduced significantly, leading to increased matching efficacy for women and 
empowered them to send out more EIs. We now look specifically at those set of women 
who are likely to benefit, given that the intervention was along 3 critical dimensions - 
age, education, and income. 
Split Sample Analysis - Who benefits by the intervention 
Table 15a-c provides the split sample analysis for the three groups based on age, 
education, and income using the variables Age26AndAbove, EduHigher, and 
WithIncome. Table 15a provides the results for the TotalEIReceived. As seen in 
columns 1 and 2 of Table 15a, women who are below the age of the median age of 25, 
receive fewer EIs post-intervention. However, even those women above 25, the 





Columns 3 and 4 suggest that only those women, who have higher educational 
qualifications fare better with the intervention, the EI received by the group reduces by 
11.52. Results from columns 5 and 6 suggest that the women who do not have income 
receive far fewer EIs (13.58 less) than those with income. Table 15b provides the result 
for TotalIncomingMatch. Columns 1 and 2 suggest that women who are 26 and above 
see their matching efficacy increase by 1.648, well above the average value of 1.033 
seen earlier in Table 14. While the other women groups see an overall increase in 
matching efficacy, women with income (col 5) and higher educational qualifications 
(col 3) benefit more from the intervention. Table 15c provides the result for 
TotalEISent. Like TotalIncomingMatch, we find that women 26 and above (col 2), with 
higher educational qualifications, send more EIs post-intervention. In summary, the 
platform initiative to improve women's well-being tends to benefit certain subgroups 
more than others. Women who have clearer matching expectations, as evidenced by 
the age, those who have a higher level of educational qualification, and those with 
income, suggesting economic independence tend to benefit more. 
Caste Considerations  
While the focus of our paper is to highlight women's well-being in platforms, however, 
the context remains rooted in the matrimonial setting in India, where caste continues to 
play a significant role. We examine how the caste preferences of women determine 
outcomes for them. The results for caste preferences based on split-sample analysis are 
available in Table 16. Users with caste preference the same as theirs receive fewer EIs 
post-intervention (col 1). The results for users with open caste preferences are not 





with no caste preferences having better efficacy than the average group values (col 3 
and 4). We do not see any significant results for the EIs sent (col 5 and 6). The result 
for caste-based preferences is a mixed bag, with users having narrower caste 
preferences likely benefiting from the reduction in congestion and improvement in the 
matching efficacy. However, there is no empowering effect when it comes to users with 
particular caste-based preferences. 
Robustness Checks 
We also conducted a set of robustness checks to see if the results we obtained earlier 
hold up and complement our analysis. First, we conducted the analysis using various 
count models - Poisson regression, negative binomial regression, zero-inflated Poisson, 
and zero-inflated negative binomial regression models. Stata's "countfit" command 
suggests that zero-inflated negative binomial regression is the best count model for 
analysis specific to women. Given the higher values of zeros for men, the best count 
model for analysis is zero-inflated Poisson. We include the analysis for women in Table 
20. The results are consistent with our main results. For women, TotalEIReceived 
reduces post-intervention (col 1), TotalIncomingMatch representing the matching 
efficacy improves post-intervention (col 2), so does the TotalEISent (col 3).  
In our analysis, we also check if the parameters we identified - congestion, matching 
efficacy, and empowerment varies from time to time from the day of joining the 
platform. We ran the models for 3 days, 7 days, and 14 days, along with the 30 days 
model provided earlier. The results for the models are available in Table 21. The results 





TotalEIReceived. The maximum impact in terms of reduction in congestion is felt in 
the initial three days from joining for women (col 1). The results for the initial seven 
days and 14 days is not significant for the TotalEIReceived. We also see an immediate 
increase in matching efficacy (col 5) and the empowerment in sending EIs (col 9). The 
results suggest that there is an immediate effect as well as a long-term effect on the 
congestion. In the medium term, we do not find much impact as far as the congestion 
is concerned. Whereas the benefits for the matching efficacy and empowerment is 
consistent and keeps growing with time. 
Intervention 2 - Choices Made by Women When Given an Option 
A natural corollary for platform level interventions is to give users the option to make 
the choices to restrict counterparties from seeing the profile. However, as illustrated in 
the past studies, women may not adapt their online behavior to serve their needs best. 
It is widely accepted that women should focus on security and privacy on online apps. 
The social, cultural expectations and privacy concerns reflect in women showing 
different social behaviors on online platforms. Given the perceived risks related to 
privacy, security, and online harassment, women may not realize the full potential of 
online platforms. Bartel Sheehan (1999) observed that even though women appear 
more concerned about their privacy online, but do not adapt their online behavior to 
protect their privacy as men do. 
Identification Strategy 
In intervention 2, though, we have a quasi-experimental set up similar to intervention 





for three such choices. First, women can choose an option that is different from the 
default values. Second, they could choose an option that is either narrower or broader 
compared to default values. Third, they can opt to choose while registering on the 
platform or choose after learning how the platform operates. Given that groups were 
not randomized, the best-case scenario would be if the platform rolled out intervention 
two concurrently in a different subdomain. We would have been able to assess the 
effect of individual choice compared to the baseline, as depicted in Figure 8. Given that 
the platform rolled out the intervention one to all the users, it would be hard to causally 
determine the effect of choices made. Hence for this work, we focus on the question as 
to whether those subgroups of women, who benefit from platform-level intervention, 
make a choice to restrict profile visibility when the option is made available by the 
platforms. For our analysis, we looked at two sub-groups of users - first, those who 
chose on the day of registration; second, those who chose between day two and day 
thirty. The understanding is that these users are different - the first group, have an 
inherent choice structure, and the second group, makes choices after "learning" or is 
responding based on outcomes. To create matched samples using CEM, we compare 
the above two groups with the control group, which constitutes women who do not 
make any choices even after 30 days in the platform.  
Dependent, Independent, and Control Variables 
For analysis about the choices made by the subgroups of women, we consider the 
following variables - 
WomenChoiceOnReg,AgeChoiceOnReg,EduChoiceMadeOnReg,and 





refers to those women who choose to restrict other users on the day of registration; 0 
refers to those who do not make any choice after 30 days. Similarly, for the dummies 
with value 1 in variables AgeChoiceOnReg refers to those users who make a choice 
along the age dimension; EduChoiceMadeOnReg refers to those users who make a 
choice along the education dimension, and; AgeEduIncChoiceMadeOnReg refers to 
those users who make a choice along all three dimensions - age, education, and 
income. In all three instances stated above, 0 refers to users who do not make any 
choice even after 30 days. We use Age26AndAbove, EduHigher, and WithIncome as 
independent variables, the subgroups of users who benefit from first intervention.  
Econometric Specification 
We use the following econometric specification to determine whether those subgroups 
that benefit from intervention 1 make a choice when provided the option.  
Pr(𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 = 1) =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1(𝑆𝑢𝑏𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠𝑖) +  𝛽2𝐷𝑖 +   𝛾𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Here ChoiceFactors refer to the four types of choices discussed earlier - 
WomenChoiceOnReg, AgeChoiceOnReg, EduChoiceMadeOnReg, and 
AgeEduIncChoiceMadeOnReg. SubGroups refer to Age26AndAbove, EduHigher, and 
WithIncome. We control for demographic factors, as well as the week of joining the 
platform. In the panel version of the model, we consider the ChoiceFactors, but with a 
variation. We consider the choices that were made in between for age, education, all 
factors combined. In the panel probit model, the dummy variable stays as 1 for the 
remaining period once the choice is made. We include user fixed effects and lag the 





TotalEIReceived, ProfileViews, and TotalMatches, the sum of the total incoming and 
outgoing matches. Outgoing matches refer to the scenario, where the counterparty 
accepts the EI sent by the focal person.  
Summary and Results 
The second set of research questions focuses on whether the subgroups of women who 
benefit from platform level interventions make choices to restrict the counterparties 
when given the option. As discussed earlier, we look at the effect on the treated group 
alone. The summary statistics for the treated group is available in Table 17. This group 
constitutes 55% of women in the age group of 26 and above, 91% with higher 
educational qualifications, and 39% with income. Our sample consists of 87% of 
women who never married before. 51% of users make a choice related to age, 
education, or income. Users retain the default value for the marital status in all instances 
- those who never married before, restrict their profile visibility to only those who never 
married before. It is similar for those who were separated, divorced, or were widowed. 
16% of users make a choice related to age only on the day of registration, and 13% of 
the users make a choice related to age within day 30. 8% of users choose to restrict 
users based on education while registering, and 25% of the users choose between day 
2 and day 30. Surprisingly, very few users choose to restrict users based on income 
alone; hence we do not consider that factor for our analysis. 3% of the users choose to 
restrict users from viewing their profile based on all three parameters - age, education, 





The results from the probit model are available in Table 18. Recall we created a 
matched sample of users who chose to restrict profile visibility and compared them 
with users who do not choose even after 30 days. For example, for column 1, the 
matched sample was created by comparing users who made a choice on registration, 
with those who did not make any choice even after 30 days. The results from columns 
1-4 suggest that women who are age 26 and above are more likely to choose to restrict 
profile visibility on registration and make choices related to education on registration. 
Women with income are unlikely to make choices either related to education or make 
choices on all parameters on the day of registration. Thus, the results suggest that 
women who benefit from the interventions are less likely to choose to restrict profile 
visibility while registering their profile. 
Now we consider the scenario where users may make a choice between days 2 and 30 
after registration. We opt for the panel probit model in Table 19 to see as to which 
groups make a choice. In this instance, users choose based on "learning" from their 
activities on the platform. Recall we created the matched sample by comparing users 
who made a choice in between to those who never made a choice even after 30 days. 
We specifically look at three choices - age, education, and all three, including income. 
As seen in columns 1-3 in Table 19, women aged 26 and above are likely to choose to 
restrict across all three parameters - age, education, and income. Women with income 
are likely to restrict counterparties along the dimension of education (col 2). 
Paradoxically, women with higher educational qualifications are unlikely to restrict 
users based on education. To summarize, only women aged 26 and above, a subgroup 





registration. The same subgroup of women is also likely to benefit from learning on the 
platform and make choices that are likely to benefit them. The choices made by the 
subgroups could be attributed to certain imminence or urgency associated with the 
process for this age group. Women aged 26 and above are also quite certain about their 
preferences, quickly narrow down on the type of matches they would like to 
communicate on the platform. Income or the educational qualification of women, do 
not seem to be playing a role in women making choices for their own well-being on 
online matching platforms. 
Regarding the second intervention, we ran the panel probit model with no lag, 2 days 
lag in Table 22, and get results consistent with the results we obtained in our analyses 
in Table 19.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
Online matrimonial platforms are built on the expectation that men and women will be 
able to navigate the complex yet necessary social processes that lead to a successful 
marital match but through reduced transaction costs online. Yet, the reality is that these 
platforms, similar to dating platforms, have vastly higher numbers of men relative to 
women, representing a significant gender skew. How does this gender skew affect the 
well-being and user experience of women on the platform, especially when they are at 
the receiving end of significant attention? Does the gender skew increase the cognitive 
costs women face, thereby preventing them from receiving the same level of benefits 
that men may receive? We address these questions in this paper but through the lens of 





The approach we take is to reduce the negative effects of congestion and market 
thickness that women face by changing the choice structure made available to users. 
Prior work in online dating has used this approach by controlling the choice sets 
presented to users on the basis of age, location, and the number of profiles available 
per day (Jung et al. 2020; Yu 2019). In our case, we use market design that reduces the 
visibility of a focal profile belonging to a woman, based on age, education, and income, 
thereby affecting choice structure with a view to relieving the effects of congestion. 
We contend that choice structure should just be based not only on partner preferences 
but also on reducing the choice set by ex-ante eliminating those users that are likely to 
fall outside socially acceptable norms for an acceptable match. Partnering with a 
leading matrimonial platform in India, we designed our interventions based on this 
approach, thereby raising questions on whether an appropriately modified choice 
structure does indeed provide much-needed relief to women on the platform. Beyond 
market design per se, we theorized that these modifications to the platform will help 
reduce the effects of unwanted attention that women tend to face on matrimonial 
platforms and thus minimize the extent to which they may experience vulnerability, 
while also enhancing their engagement and matching outcomes on the platform. To the 
extent that empowering women on such platforms serves both economic and social 
goals, our interventions can be termed successful if they do show significant benefits.  
Our results show that women do benefit significantly from the platform's intervention 
– once the congestion faced by women who have newly joined the platform reduces, 
the overall efficacy of matching improves, and women feel empowered to initiate 





greater for women who are arguably in the most attractive segment of the market – 
educated women above the age of 26 who earn more than the median income on the 
platform. While younger women do see a far higher reduction in congestion, they do 
not benefit as much in terms of the follow-up action related to an increase in efficacy, 
or the initiation of new matches. Thus, a mere reduction in congestion is not enough 
for certain subgroups to see improved matching or greater engagement with the 
platform – this brings up interesting opportunities for the platform in terms of how it 
can specifically enhance the value proposition for women across multiple age groups 
and demographics. Interestingly, when women are provided agency in terms of 
allowing them to manipulate these parameters, we find that education and income do 
not appear to correlate with a decision to increase the restrictions on who can view their 
profiles. However, older women appear to be more inclined to make further changes 
on these dimensions, either on the day of registration or later.  
To the extent that the new baseline, implemented through the platform-level 
intervention, is able to meet the requirements for most women, we infer that market 
design has helped in addressing a pressing issue faced by managers in the firm.  Our 
conversations with the platform operator reveal a sense of urgency amongst the senior 
management in addressing the gender skew problem. In the recent past, the platform 
had run aggressive advertisement campaigns focusing on messages about women 
empowerment and their safety, with the objective of getting more women to register on 
the platform. However, these advertisements have to be matched with an appropriate 
set of market design parameters that help reduce the social costs that women face – 





activities that have existed in Indian society for many years, there is an increased 
recognition that simply porting the process online is not enough. Factors that affect the 
well-being and user experience of women on such platforms, thanks to the easing of 
transaction and search costs as well as the scale that technology allows, have to also be 
concurrently managed through appropriate platform design.  
Our findings in this paper thus have both theoretical and practical implications. First, 
our results show that the platform needs to reduce the congestion in a thick market to 
enhance the wellbeing of women participants on the platform. However, mere 
reduction of congestion may not be a sufficient condition; some users with age and 
experience may benefit more. Platforms may have to follow up with other interventions 
to empower women. Our work can be extended to challenges faced by women in other 
platforms as well. Online platforms may intervene by redirecting the flow of work by 
giving priority to women, thus empowering them. For example, ride-hailing platforms 
could prioritize allocating women drivers in areas with specific requirements in terms 
of safety, traffic, and opportunities – whether women will avail of these opportunities 
when provided agency remains an open question.  
Our work here is subject to limitations. First, although we have a quasi-experimental 
set up with matched samples across platform subdomains that are separate, the ideal 
option would have been to conduct a randomized experiment. However, such 
randomized experiments in settings such as ours with enhanced sensitivity and cultural 
implications are difficult to operationalize. Therefore, to the extent possible, using 





have reduced the possibility of bias emerging from selection issues. That said, we 
acknowledge that we cannot fully rule out the influence of unobserved variables. 
Second, at this stage, we do not have the counterparty information. Having that 
information will help us understand if the intervention has shifted the demographics of 
incoming requests and matches. Unfortunately, this additional data remains unavailable 
at this time. Third, we acknowledge the endogeneity issues in our analysis on the 
individual intervention; we are working with the platform to implement a variant of an 
intervention that would address these issues.  
In conclusion, our work addresses an important theoretical question on the effects of 
reducing congestion for women to facilitate their overall well-being on online 
platforms. This remains a problem with important practical implications for online 
matching platforms grappling with gender skew issues, especially in socially sensitive 
areas like matrimonial matchmaking and dating. Our study suggests that such 
interventions do work, but do not equally benefit all sections of women. Online 
platforms must have a comprehensive strategy to address the effects of gender skew. If 









Chapter 4: Status (dis)Advantage: Effect of Stakeholder 




In the last few decades, a large number of economic activities that were traditionally 
managed offline have moved online, typically through the medium of Internet-based 
digital platforms. Within these activities that have been transferred online, those that 
are easily codifiable and modular are more easily “platformatized”. In contrast, 
activities that exist in heavily institutionalized offline settings have not made this 
transition to a platform-based model with as much ease. Furthermore, when they do 
make the transition, it is not clear that all the salient aspects of the original offline 
activity also transfer online or play the same role. Effectively, as the platform-based 
model gains traction and more activities move online, a clearer understanding of how 
this transition affects the underlying dynamics of the original setting is needed, so as to 
better manage both the newly online process as well as to aid the transition process. 
Examining these transitions in some detail is necessary especially in heavily 
institutionalized contexts since many institutional norms may not transfer online. 
Factors that are influential offline, like status, social norms, and quality signals, may 
behave in very different ways when moved to an online platform-based setting. In this 
paper, we study the transition of one such heavily institutionalized context and 
specifically investigate how traditional markers of status and social norms operate 
online. To the extent that status, social norms, and gender play a very different role 





may change when moved from a purely offline model to a platform-based one. In this 
paper, we study these transitions in a relatively under-explored institutional setting 
within contemporary IS research – matrimonial matching for arranged marriages in 
India.  
 Matrimonial matching remains popular in Indian society, and operates within 
the broader institution of arranged marriages. In the last two decades, online 
matrimonial matching platforms have emerged as a way to take the offline process 
online. These platforms share some features with online dating platforms that have been 
examined in the IS literature (Karmegam and Gopal 2019). They are highly prevalent 
in Indian society and increasingly have become mainstream. The process of arranging 
marriages in most Asian societies is heavily institutionalized, with several widely 
accepted norms that guide how such matches are made. These norms have been 
discussed in the popular press but include, the central role played by the parents of 
grooms and brides in decision-making, the presence of strongly endogamous 
preferences to marry within the same community, and clearly defined roles and 
expectations from women (Agrawal 2015; Allendorf and Thornton 2015; Desai and 
Dubey 2012; Seth 2011; Titzmann 2015). These norms are particularly relevant in the 
Indian context, where the existing offline matching process reinforces them across most 
communities in the sub-continent. Given their primacy, matrimonial matching 
platforms have mimicked these offline aspects, by highlighting factors like religion, 
caste, and community online. However, whether these institutional norms continue to 
hold remains an open question within the platforms literature as well as in online 





 In this paper, we address this broad question of the relevance of offline social 
norms in the online world, but focus on three specific factors that have been implicated 
in prior work studying Indian marriages within the sociology literature (Allendorf and 
Pandian 2016; Desai and Andrist 2010; Seth 2011; Yeung et al. 2018). First, decisions 
about marriage in collectivist societies like India are made in multi-stakeholder 
contexts where family members have equal influence. In particular, parents occupy an 
exalted position, such that a matching process managed by a parent is viewed as being 
more legitimate, and therefore of higher status, all else being equal (Agrawal 2015; 
Kamble et al. 2014; Mathur 2007; Medora et al. 2002; Zaidi and Shuraydi 2002). Others 
in the community respond positively when considering a potential match through 
parents or family members, while self-managed matrimonial arrangements are viewed 
with less legitimacy. However, does this status extend online? In matrimonial 
platforms, the system allows each individual profile to designate an operator of the 
profile during registration, where it is possible to denote parents as the operator. In 
contrast to dating apps, matrimonial platforms allow family members or parents to 
operate the profile and manage online interactions. Thus, the first research question we 
address is: do profiles managed by parents on the platform experience the same high 
status that is seen offline, in terms of markers for better profile appeal including the 
overall matches achieved?  
 Marital preferences in India are significantly shaped by endogamy (Desai and 
Dubey 2012; Fuller and Narasimhan 2008b), i.e., preferences for staying within the 
community as defined through religion, community, kinship, or caste. Within these, 





disrupt internal unity and homogeneity within a group, thereby leading members of the 
group to regulate marriages either through sanctions or through instilling a strong sense 
of group identity (Ahlawat 2015; Kalmijn 1998). In offline settings, therefore, 
deviations from caste norms in the case of marriage are frowned upon and typically 
met with rigid disapproval. However, prior research in dating shows that when moved 
online, people tend to relax social norms more easily (Bapna et al. 2016a; Hitsch et al. 
2010b). The access to a diverse set of individuals, as well as the reduction in transaction 
and search costs online, help relax norms that are otherwise prevalent offline. We study 
if these dynamics are true in the case of matrimonial matching as well but on the critical 
dimension of caste. Thus, the second research question we address is: does deviation 
from caste-based group social norms in the context of online matrimonial matching 
lead to lower/higher profile appeal? If not, is the negative effect of this deviation from 
social norms mitigated by the presence of high-status profile operators, such as the 
parent?  
Finally, we consider the important issue of gender. It is accepted that, like other 
Asian societies, Indian society is patrilineal and patriarchal (Seymour 1999). In the 
specific case of marriage, men typically have greater agency and leeway in terms of the 
choices they can make, while women, on the other hand, have lesser agency in terms 
of identifying potential partners, and deviations from social norms are less acceptable 
in general. During the matrimonial matching process, there are more clearly defined 
norms for communication, coordination, and preferences in the case of women, relative 
to men. When this process moves online, do these gender-based norm differences carry 





technology can induce greater parity in terms of how men and women interact, thereby 
reducing the extent to which typical offline gender-based differences manifest when 
online. On the other hand, if institutional norms associated with gender and marriage 
are resilient, these differences will exist online as well. We examine this issue through 
our third research question: is there a difference between men and women in how 
deviation from social norms and profile operator status (parental control) leads to 
higher/lower profile appeal in online matrimonial platforms? 
We conduct our analysis on data gathered in collaboration with a leading Indian 
online matrimonial platform. The platform provided us with data for all those users 
who registered on the platform between October 2016 and January 2017. The dataset 
included profile information, partner preferences, number of potential matches that 
were contacted by each individual, the responses received from others on the platform, 
as well as the total matches (realized dyads) formed. Our econometric analysis, 
conducted on this extensive dataset, is aimed at understanding the effects of the profile 
operator, deviations from caste-based group norms, and gender on matching outcomes, 
i.e., dyads formed where two individual profiles are mutually linked.  
One of the challenges in our work here is to establish a caste-based group norm, 
which is necessary to measure the extent to which an individual deviates from it. We, 
therefore, introduce a novel measure of group norms, based on caste-based endogamy, 
which uses the partner preferences each individual provides to the platform when they 
register. We use these partner preferences set at the time of registration to create a 
preference vector over all other castes within the platform at the group (caste) level. 





preference vector to calculate the deviation from group norms. This gives us the ability 
to measure the effects of deviation for an individual from the group norms, and thus 
indirectly the strength of each individual’s endogamous preferences on the platform.  
Further, we also face the issue of endogenous selection in the case of profile 
operator, i.e., the person that is selected to manage the profile is collectively determined 
by the family. Therefore, the effect of this decision on the realized matches on the 
platform is likely biased. The ideal option here would be to assign the profile operator 
to a profile exogenously but clearly, this is unrealistic and infeasible (Jung et al. 2019). 
Therefore to address this issue, we use two different types of matching methodologies 
– coarsened exact matching (Blackwell et al. 2009) and twin analysis using exact 
matching – wherein observable factors like age, religion, caste, education, and 
occupation are same except for the profile operator status (Jaffe et al. 1993). This 
allows us to create a sample with two equivalent subsamples of profiles that are mostly 
identical, except for the profile operator variable that is different, allowing us to reduce 
the potential bias from selection. 
The results of our analysis show that there are indeed significant differences in 
terms of how these norms influence the effectiveness with which new matches are made 
on the platform. We observe that unlike the offline context, profiles managed by family 
members or parents are less likely to achieve matches on the platform. Furthermore,  
deviations from caste-based group norms, in general, leads to more matches or higher 
profile appeal, again providing some evidence for how offline norms may not apply in 
full measure online. However, the interactive effect of deviation from group norms and 





limits to how much offline norms can be disregarded within the marital matching 
process. Interestingly, we see these effects accentuated in the case of women – the 
negative effect of parental operation of the profile is particularly negative for women, 
relative to men. Deviations from group noms by women is also viewed positively by 
others on the platform. In general, we see that many institutional norms that are applied 
rigorously offline are not as influential online, showing that as institutional settings 
transfer online, a new set of norms are likely to emerge that are nevertheless hybrids of 
existing offline norms. Our work furthers a deeper understanding of how these changes 
occur from platformization, especially in the context of social practices that have deep 
roots in tradition, social norms, and institutional order.  
 Our work here contributes to the extant literature on digital platforms, but by 
taking a different perspective – we consider how aspects of a social process with strong 
traditions and norms are changed when moved to an online platform model. To the 
extent that technology and platforms can contribute to significant changes in social and 
economic processes, our work shows how new dominant logics may emerge online 
even in very institutionalized domains like marital matching in India. There are several 
other such institutionally dense settings that are being transferred to platform models, 
such as the process of raising venture capital funding, the acquisition of MBA degrees 
online, and the process of providing therapies for chronic diseases on platforms (Ahlers 
et al. 2015; Arbaugh et al. 2009; Talboom-Kamp et al. 2016). In all of these cases, it is 
possible that the traditional sources of status, quality, and influence may change when 
moved online, which has implications for individuals who join the platform as well as 





relatively straight-forward contexts, we believe that the next wave of platforms is likely 
to tackle increasingly complex and institutionally dense contexts. Our work here is 
aimed at furthering our understanding of these complex transitions, from an 
institutional and platform perspective.  
Theoretical Background 
Platforms, Institutions, and the Arranged Marriage Process 
In the past decade, there has been an exponential increase in the development of digital 
platforms to support diverse economic and social activities (Constantinides et al. 2018). 
Our focus here is on online matching platforms, also referred to as multi-sided markets, 
which facilitate transactions between individuals or organizations that otherwise would 
have difficulty finding each other (Rochet and Tirole 2003). Matching platforms rely 
on network effects (Parker and Alstyne 2005) and reduce market frictions by lowering 
search and transaction costs. Successful matching platforms have thus far focused on 
contexts where transactional complexity is reasonably straight forward, and market 
frictions can be clearly reduced. Over time, more complex settings have started to move 
to a platforms model, such as the use of platforms for dating (match.com) and for 
receiving quick advice from physicians online (healthtap.com). However, as the 
underlying activity becomes institutionally dense and socially complex, the appeal of 
the online platforms model has to be balanced against the feasibility of transferring 
much of the relevant set of institutional and social norms online. Consider, for instance, 
the process of acquiring venture capital (VC) investments for startups – clearly, the VC 
literature shows that the process of investing in a startup is complex, and embedded in 





carries significant risk (Gompers and Lerner 2001). Many institutional norms operate 
in this environment that make the process of acquiring venture capital particularly 
complex and time-consuming (Guler 2007). While some platforms have emerged in 
this area to help reduce market frictions (crunchbase.com, for instance), the overall 
process remains largely offline. Alternative models like equity crowd-funding 
platforms also exist (Ahlers et al. 2015), but many institutional elements that define the 
VC-entrepreneur relationship are typically lost. In general, institutionally dense 
contexts are not easily ported to a platforms model, and when they are, it is likely that 
many of the salient features of the original offline activity are significantly modified. 
Given this background, we look at a setting that remains highly institutionalized, with 
well-established social norms – Indian arranged marriages.  
 It is worth first defining what we mean by highly institutionalized contexts here. 
Social scientists have characterized institutions as an enduring or recurrent feature of 
social life (Mohr and White 2008). Institutions thus can refer to specific types of 
conventions or practices that have been put in place to manage social interactions and 
have acquired legitimacy over time. These include the set of activities, values, norms, 
social structure, and role systems that define a functional area, field, or activity 
(Greenwood et al. 2002). Institutions thus are a fundamental and pervasive feature of 
social existence. The institution of arranged marriages, a widely accepted mode of 
matchmaking in many parts of the world (Hamon and Ingoldsby 2003), fits well within 
this broader definition of an institutionalized activity (Gupta 1976; Mohr and White 
2008). In the Indian context, in particular, the system of arranging marriages remains 





and social norms that confer legitimacy on those using the institution to find suitable 
matches for themselves or close family members (Ang and Cummings 1997; DiMaggio 
1988; Dimaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977). While there may be some 
variations in terms of how specific communities use the institutional process to find 
matches, there is considerable homogeneity in the baseline processes across the country 
that reflect adherence to a common set of institutional beliefs and norms. We briefly 
describe the main steps of the traditional, offline process of match-making, as practiced 
in India below. 
The Arranged Marriage Process – Offline Form 
The process of finding a match is typically initiated when individuals reach 
marriageable age, i.e. 26-28 years for men and 22-24 years for women (Desai and 
Andrist 2010; Seth 2011). Once the process is initiated, the informal network consisting 
of immediate family members, friends, and community members is activated and 
involved in the search process. Information about the individual and their appropriate 
partner preferences are conveyed orally or through a detailed bio. The process of 
selecting a suitable match usually involves multiple criteria that includes personal 
compatibility, looks, education, occupation, and other economic factors, as well as 
factors like religion, language, caste, and sub-caste. Endogamy along the line of 
religion and caste is pervasive and is used as the primary filtering criterion before other 
factors are considered (Agrawal 2015; Fuller and Narasimhan 2008b; Seth 2011; 
Titzmann 2013). In some instances, families may choose to widen the search by 
approaching marriage brokers or offline matrimonial agencies, placing a matrimonial 





and Dhanda 2014). Once a profile meets the specified criteria, initial contact with the 
counterparty family is established. Background checks are performed in parallel to 
assess the personal character of the counter-party and, most importantly, to verify 
family background and reputation (Kaur and Dhanda 2014; Seth 2011).  
Once the pre-screening process is completed, a formal visit is arranged whereby 
the two families meet each other while the prospective partners are allowed to interact 
to assess mutual compatibilities. If all goes well, the process converges here either in 
terms of proceeding to the next stage or choosing to stop any further interactions. At 
this stage, the process is close to finalization. If the families decide to move ahead with 
the alliance, a new and complex process of negotiation commences about logistics 
relating to the actual marriage ceremony. In Indian weddings, the costs of the 
ceremonies are typically borne by the families and not the individuals per se. An 
engagement ceremony is conducted to formalize the arrangement. The entire 
matrimonial matching process culminates in the marriage ceremonies and rituals that 
last for a couple of days to several days, depending upon the community. Across the 
match-making process, there are two important institutional factors that differentiate 
the method from alternative modes by which marriages are contracted in other parts of 
the world – the presence of parents or family members as active decision makers and 
the presence of strong endogamous preferences along caste. In addition, there are 
clearly demarcated social norms based on gender that are prevalent in Indian society 
that influence the matrimonial matching process as well. We briefly discuss these 





Parents and Family Members as Stakeholders 
In collectivist societies like India, even today, parents or family members often assume 
the primary or co-equal role of selecting marriage partners for their children (Yeung et 
al. 2018), so as to ensure close identification with the family and to discourage focus 
on the autonomous self (Allendorf and Pandian 2016; Seth 2011). The interest of the 
family is given primacy and going against the wishes of family is considered anathema 
in decisions involving career and marriage. Marriages arranged thus are considered a 
union of families, not merely individuals, with implications for the entire family 
(Mathur 2007). As discussed above, parents are involved in every aspect of the 
marriage process and parental judgment carries significant weight, even though in more 
recent years, there is greater collaboration between parents and their children during 
the matching process (Agrawal 2015; Fuller et al. 2008; Mathur 2007). As an 
institutional mechanism, parents also play a significant role in the enforcement of the 
normative and coercive conformance to societal norms related to marriage (Meyer and 
Rowan 1977). They ensure that the symbols and rituals related to marriages for their 
community are strictly followed, thereby providing strong legitimacy within the 
extended kin network for both the marriage as well as new entrants into the family.  
The notion that parental involvement provides for legitimacy and consequently, 
higher status, is well accepted in traditional and collectivist societies like India. Status 
in such systems is acquired by individual actors or groups by virtue of accumulated 
acts of deference, and their position in the social hierarchy (Sauder et al. 2012). Parental 
figures and family “elders” thus acquire this high status in social engagements, and in 
particular in the domain of marital matching.  Prior research in status argues that status 





between entities when there is a high degree of uncertainty (Podolny 1994). Parental 
involvement in the search for a marital partner is typically associated with higher status. 
Given the high levels of uncertainty and the sensitive nature of the social process, there 
is great value given to parental involvement since these potential alliances come with 
higher assurances of familial acceptance, greater probability of an eventual positive 
outcome, and the ostensible weight of experienced judgment brought to the process. In 
other words, alliances where parents or families are viewed as being co-equal decision-
makers are associated with higher status (Jensen 2008), and are considered less risky 
(Benjamin and Podolny 1999), and more attractive, all else being equal.  
Endogamy with Respect to Caste and Religion 
Arranged marriages in India are characterized by endogamy,  which refers to the 
practice of marriage within a group and is an indicator of group cohesion as well as a 
mechanism of social isolation from other groups (Gordon 1964; Rosenfeld 2008). 
Kalmijn (1998) argues that marriage patterns are determined by two major social 
forces. First, the preferences expressed for certain characteristics in a spouse, which are 
influenced by the homogenous network of the individual. Second, the influence of other 
members of the social group, such as the extended kinship networks. “Mixed” 
marriages may disrupt internal unity and homogeneity within a group, thereby leading 
members of the group to regulate marriages either through sanctions or through a strong 
sense of group identity. In India, endogamy primarily tends to perpetuate through caste 
and religion, with language and sub-caste being secondary factors. Caste is determined 
by birth and transitions from one caste to another are not allowed by definition (Hutton 





members of other castes, an implicit hierarchy of castes (with Brahmins being viewed 
as the highest caste group), preferred professions or occupations within a caste, and 
finally, a strong preference for marrying within the caste, i.e. caste-based 
endogamy(Hutton 1963).  
 While some of these norms based on caste have been loosened in modern times, 
such as those associated with professions and eating,  other conventions continue to 
survive, including those associated with marriage (Bradford 1985; Deolalikar and Rao 
1992; Dhar 2013; Gupta 2000). In particular, Banerjee et al. (2013) found that caste 
preferences continue to guide the choice of a spouse in modern India. Individuals 
conform to caste norms to blend in with others and avoid sanction associated with 
violations of group norms, i.e. deviation from expectations of marrying within the set 
of acceptable castes. These expectations are reinforced through coercive and normative 
means by members of the extended institutional environment, including the extended 
family network, friends, and co-workers (Ahlawat 2015; Ahuja and Ostermann 2016). 
Thus, endogamy based on caste persists since deviations for endogamous norms are 
difficult even for the educated and modern professional (Banerjee et al. 2013).  
Gender-Based Norms 
In Indian society, women typically are dependent on men in specific social and cultural 
spheres. The patrilineal and patriarchal nature of society (Seymour 1999) drives the 
process  by which families and social groups find a marital match for women, relative 
to men. Women are identified as custodians of family and caste status (Desai and 
Andrist 2010; Srinivas 1978) and thus are more likely to be expected to conform to 





deviations from caste-based norms are perceived to be higher and more impactful for 
women; these extend even to affluent and educated women with significant 
professional achievement (Fuller and Narasimhan 2008a). In essence, from a risk 
aversion perspective as well as a viewpoint that reinforces their traditional status as 
dependents on their male relatives, women are treated differently when it comes to 
marriage. The role of parental involvement is more pronounced for women, while 
deviations from group norms are less observed. Indeed, recent evidence from a 
nationally representative sample shows that 95% of women surveyed in India were 
married within their caste(Desai and Dubey 2012), significantly higher than men.  
In summary, gender-based variations are commonly observed in the Indian 
marriage market, in particular within the offline match-making context. Furthermore, 
the primary role of parents and the presence of caste-based endogamy is prevalent in 
the offline setting. In taking the matrimonial matching process online, service providers 
have found several ways to replicate these institutional aspects. We describe these 
platforms in the next section, before we provide arguments for why the online context 
may change the institutional set-up significantly.  
Online Matrimonial Platforms – Moving the Search Process Online 
Online matrimonial platforms started purely as a listing service, following the model 
of newspaper matrimonial columns (Agrawal 2015). Over time, the form and 
functionality of these online services have evolved into the familiar matching platform 
format. There are several firms in the marketplace that offer forms of matching 
platforms for specific communities, accounting for approximately 6% of the marriages 





Shaadi.com, Bharatmatrimony, and Jeevansathi, command over 90% of the market 
(Garg and Narasimhan 2013). Consistent with the matching platform model in other 
domains, the features on these platforms adhere to the “search, matching, and 
interaction” (SMI) framework (Ahuvia and Adelman (1992), suitably adapted for the 
matrimonial search task. Search aids provide for information gathering by allowing 
users to provide information about themselves on their profile pages. The matching 
process aids decision making through the use of a proprietary algorithm that 
recommends prospective partners. In addition, the platforms provide features that 
enable users to conduct custom searches by specifying additional criteria. Finally, there 
are options for enhancing interaction with others through the use of built-in chat 
features or by the sharing of phone numbers and email addresses. Thus, these platforms 
share many features with similar contexts like dating platforms, with some notable 
exceptions associated with the institutional factors that are unique to the matrimonial 
setting, which we describe briefly next.  
Capturing the Role of Parents and Family 
One of the most striking aspects of online matrimonial platforms is the embedding of 
the family in the overall matching process. Unlike dating apps, the registration process 
here can be initiated by the individual as well as the family member with no restrictions, 
thus closely mirroring the offline setting. The platform allows, indeed requires, each 
profile to be associated with an “operator” who could be the parent, family member, or 
sibling of the individual seeking a match, instead of the individual per se. Similar to 
dating apps, users provide detailed personal information about age, height, weight, 





education, occupation, and income, which may be verified in certain cases using 
national ID data. Additionally, users are also asked to provide information about their 
families, such as the type of family ("orthodox," "traditional," "moderate, "liberal"), 
affluence ("middle class," "upper-middle class," "rich", "affluent"), and structure 
("nuclear," "joint family"). In addition, the platform provides an “about me” section 
where open-ended text on other relevant information can be provided. Past research 
suggests that when a family member manages the profile, the information provided on 
the profile emphasizes the family rather than the individual (Agrawal 2015; Kaur and 
Dhanda 2014), which is consistent with the offline norm where parental involvement 
is considered desirable. To further the sense that parents are involved, the platform 
allows the option of specifying the parents’ contact details as the primary means to 
initiate further interaction. Of course, individuals can choose to manage their profile 
independently, which is reflected in the profile information and represents a deviation 
from what is observed in the offline context.  
Capturing Caste-Based Endogamy 
Caste remains one of the crucial deciding factors in finding a match and therefore, there 
is considerable functionality devoted to capturing these nuances. There is a separate 
section for religious background in profile descriptions, where the user specifies the 
religion, caste, and sub-caste details. Religion is a required field, but caste and subcaste 
remain optional. The platform provides a list of the most visible and populous castes in 
the form of a drop-down menu. In addition to the main caste, the user can also choose 
one of the sub-castes nested within the main caste. Users can also specify partner 





to generate a set of recommended partners for every profile. The platform does not 
place any restrictions on partner preferences set by the user. Thus, the user can deviate 
from the group norms by not conforming to the caste-based preferences provided by 
his or her immediate caste or community. Conformance or deviation here is not binary 
and may involve nuances. For instance, the user could specify a set of “acceptable” 
castes from which responses will be entertained or elicited. Further, users could set up 
their preferences such that only members of their own caste are selected by the 
recommendation system, thereby allowing for strict endogamy. At the other extreme, 
the user could completely deviate from prevalent norms by specifying “caste no bar” 
as the caste preference option. Thus, the platform provides the ability to not only be 
completely endogamous in preferences but also express no endogamous preferences.  
Reinforcing Norms for Women on the Platform 
Online matrimonial platforms are sensitive about perceptions of customers with respect 
to gender and are therefore careful to not include any particular design elements or 
features that reinforce offline norms for women. Consistent with other online platforms, 
the policy to remain gender-neutral is espoused on the platform. That said, however, 
offline norms pertaining to gender do manifest in two ways. First, women appear to 
have lower levels of agency on the platform, relative to men, consistent with norms that 
are observed in offline settings. This lower levels of agency manifest empirically in 
less engagement in the matching and interaction phases on the platform (Seth 2011; 
Titzmann 2013), as well as a reluctance to be the first party to reach out to counter-
parties (Karmegam and Gopal 2019). Second, profiles of women show clear trends in 





family values (Titzmann 2015). For instance, in the “about me” sections, women tend 
to use terms like “family-oriented individualism”, in an effort to reconcile “modern” 
and “traditional” elements during the matrimonial matching process. Profiles of men 
rarely present these hybrid descriptions and tend to focus mostly on what they expect 
from spouses. Thus, we see that offline norms about gender continue to persist. 
Whether they lead to better outcomes for women online remains an open empirical 
question.  
The Incomplete Transfer of Institutional Norms Online  
The three institutional aspects of the offline matrimonial matching process outlined 
above clearly differentiate these from other contexts like dating, but it is unclear if they 
seamlessly transfer to the online context. Alternatively, it is possible that the openness 
afforded by technology platforms as well as newer dominant logics that exist online 
changes the underlying process. We theorize about these effects next.  
In an offline arranged marriage, the existing patriarchal structure working 
through active parental involvement is never questioned or doubted, even in the 
presence of professional or economic achievement (Abraham 2010; Mathur 2007; 
Titzmann 2015). However, prior work in institutional bundling, observed in the context 
of online education, suggests that parental involvement online may not be as effective 
(Macfarlane 2011; Wellen 2013). Specifically, institutional bundling suggests that 
when traditional tasks move to new channels or models, it is possible for the underlying 
task to be “unbundled” so that different institutional and social norms become relevant 
not for the whole activity but for specific tasks. In the case of online education, 





administration and student management has often been institutionally unbundled and 
handed over to platform operators or for-profit entities (Gehrke and Kezar 2015). If 
handled well, this unbundling may not affect the student experience but changes the 
institutional role played by academic administrators (Marginson 2013). The higher 
status enjoyed by faculty remains in place but is limited to teaching and research.  
Analogously, matrimonial platforms engender a process of institutional 
unbundling of the marital search process into separate tasks. The first task of 
identifying a candidate set of counterparties can be unbundled from the subsequent 
processes of due diligence and deeper conversations about compatibilities. The task of 
creating a candidate set, performed on the platform, may be better handled by 
individuals rather than parents or families; the high status that parental involvement 
engenders is then deployed subsequently after some initial matching has been carried 
out by the individuals. Extending this argument, parental involvement even in the early 
stages of the search process could actually be detrimental, since counterparties may 
choose to interact during this stage of the process with the actual individual directly. 
Thus, even though parental involvement does represent high status, the process of 
unbundling has shifted the value of parental involvement away from the early stages of 
the marital search online, diminishing the effect of this factor.  
We argue that a similar dynamic could lead to a reduction in caste-based 
endogamy online as well, for three reasons. First, broader societal changes in Indian 
society, aided by modernization, could lead to a reduction in the normative value of 
endogamy per se, which manifests more visibly online  (Ahuja and Ostermann 2016; 





(DI) theory suggests that as societies move along the trajectory from traditional to 
modern, there is an associated increase in individualism, autonomy, and regard for 
women's autonomy and rights (Allendorf and Thornton 2015; Thornton et al. 2015). 
Viewed collectively, these social forces could show up in online matrimonial platforms 
as systematic deviations from group caste-based endogamy, i.e., those deviating from 
group norms are not sanctioned but appear more attractive, all else being equal.  
In addition to societal changes, at the individual level, online platforms afford 
greater privacy and security, relative to the offline process. Thus, users are less 
constrained by group norms; prior work in dating shows that online users tend to be 
more disinhibited and exhibit preferences and actions that go against accepted social 
and institutional norms (Bapna et al. 2016a; Jung et al. 2019). Thus, on average, 
deviations from group norms may simply be more acceptable online, compared to the 
traditional offline process where there is greater social visibility and a greater threat of 
sanctions. Finally, the entry of online dating apps in India has helped shape user 
behavior and change the dominant logic operating in the country with matters relating 
to romance and marriage (Das 2019). Indeed, many Indians consider dating apps as a 
precursor to and possible form of matrimonial matchmaking (Baruah 2018). Dating 
platforms have an obviously more liberal ethos and institutional logic, compared to 
matrimonial platforms, and individuals may carry the same ethos to the matrimonial 
platform. Thus, while deviation from group norms may be disapproved in the offline 
settings, in online platforms, the spillover from dating apps is likely to push towards 





mechanisms, we argue that less endogamous preferences with respect to caste online 
will lead to greater effectiveness on the platform in terms of finding matches. 
Finally, we consider how the role of endogamy and parental involvement may 
differentially affect women on the platform. On the one hand, it is well established that 
women in Indian society are likely to be viewed as needing more protection, are not 
expected to initiate conversations with unknown men about marriage and are viewed 
as representative of family honor. As a result, there is greater risk-aversion displayed 
on average with respect to women, in particular with matters relating to marriage. 
Indeed, some of these dynamics extend to women in general, as seen in the context of 
dating apps where men are expected to “make the first move” (Filipovic 2013). Thus, 
if these norms perpetuate online, we would expect profiles for women operated by the 
individual herself to be less attractive to others, since these represent deviation from 
the norm and thereby, greater uncertainty about how the rest of the matching process 
will unfold. Similarly, deviations from caste-based preferences are likely to be less 
appreciated in the case of women, relative to men.  
On the other hand, it could be argued that online platforms have created a level 
playing field where such gender-based norms do not apply as strictly. Even in online 
dating, it is far more acceptable for women to initiate the first move, thereby breaking 
with social stereotypes (Filipovic 2013; Hitsch et al. 2010b). Gender-based differences 
are prevalent but are reducing in other platform contexts, such as with Uber drivers 
(Cook et al. 2018) where there is no differential pay across genders. Thus, it is possible 





and women in terms of how deviation from the norm is either rewarded or sanctioned, 
even though such variations continue to exist offline.  
In summary, we consider how three institutional norms that are prevalent in the 
offline matrimonial matching process in India are able to transfer to the online 
platforms context. We argue that there are likely to be significant differences in how 
these institutional factors operate online. In lieu of formal hypotheses, we allow the 
empirical analysis to provide us with guidance. In the next section, we outline the 
dataset that was assembled to test these arguments in some detail.  
Data and Methodology 
Research Site - Online Matrimonial Platform  
To address our research questions, we partnered with one of the leading online 
matrimonial platforms in India. The platform has been active for the last two decades 
and caters to users based within India as well as members of the Indian diaspora. In 
terms of coverage, it represents most religions, castes, and regions and thus typifies the 
diversity in India. Users can access the platform from PC or mobile browsers, and also 
through mobile apps. Users can register themselves on the platform without paying any 
fee and can perform basic search and match functions. The paid version of the platform 
provides additional features, including the ability to view phone numbers and 
horoscopes of other users, send personalized messages & SMS, and instantly chat with 
prospective matches. During registration, users provide their profile information and 
partner preferences, as described above. The platform uses proprietary matching 
algorithms to recommend profiles based on the user's expressed preferences. The 





mechanisms to weed out non-serious users to ensure the quality and integrity of the 
platform.  
For our analysis, we identified new users who joined the platform in the four 
months between October 1st, 2016 and 31st, January 2017. We were able to collect 
demographic data for this set of users, and also had access to a daily panel of behavioral 
and transactional data on the platform for each user. We describe the details of some of 
these variables in the following section. For the majority of users, most of the activities 
on the platform tend to occur in the initial 3-4 weeks, which is consistent with evidence 
from matrimonial platforms (Karmegam and Gopal 2019) while also clearly 
differentiating this context from online dating, where the activity on the platform lasts 
much longer since there is no clear and final objective (Jung et al. 2019). This 
difference in activity levels and timelines is not trivial but informs much of our 
analyses, as we focus our attention on the first 30 days when most users are active and 
engaged.  
Variable Definitions 
Table 23 provides detailed information on the variables used for analysis. We first 
describe the dependent variables used in our analysis. 
Dependent Variables  
We use three measures as the dependent variable - TotalProfileView, TotalReceiveEI, 
and TotalEIAccept. Each of these three variables represent, in varying degrees, the 
extent to which a specific profile is found to be appealing by counterparties on the 
platform, allowing us to capture the extent to which institutional norms and deviation 





focal person's profile on the platform. This measure is arguably the weakest, and the 
most passive, representation of profile appeal. Profile views may not lead to further 
action from the counterparties, even though they are viewed by interested 
counterparties; hence, we use this variable in a specific form of robustness described 
later.  
As our primary dependent variables, we consider the other two constructs. 
TotalReceiveEI represents the count of expression of interests (EI) received by the focal 
user in the platform in the given period. An EI represents purposeful action in that it is 
the first step in initiating a match with another user on the platform, through the 
generation of an internal platform-based message (similar to the messages that are 
generated on platforms like LinkedIn). TotalReceiveEI denotes the first stage of the 
eventual matching process, when the focal user A receives an EI from counter-party 
user B. Since it relates to an actual and visible expression of interest, it represents a 
stronger measure of the extent to which the profile of focal user A is found to be 
appealing.  
Beyond the initial EI received by the focal user, we also consider 
TotalEIAccept, which represents an actual matched dyad within the platform. Defining 
a match in the online setting is a challenge, more so in the search and match process 
that online dating and matrimonial platforms enable, since the eventual outcome is 
rarely visible, i.e. the actual start of the dating relationship or marriage is not observed. 
Multiple match formulations have been used in the past - in the dating context, (Hitsch 
et al. 2010b) identified a successful match when users exchange phone numbers or 





sequence of at least four messages between any two users. In our context, we use the 
match parameter as defined by Karmegam and Gopal (2019). The match could occur 
in two ways. In the first scenario, focal user A receives an EI from user B, which, when 
accepted, results in a match. In the second scenario, a focal user A can initiate a match 
with user B by sending an EI. When user B accepts, a match is formed. Since we are 
interested in the extent to which the focal profile is appealing, we use the process as 
defined in the second scenario described above. We measure the total number of 
positive responses to the EIs sent by the focal user to others on the platform in a given 
period, referred to as TotalEIAccept, which represents the formation of a dyad on the 
platform and is completed by the counter-party’s decision to accept the issued EI. 
Hence, TotalEIAccept is the strongest measure of the profile appeal of the focal user in 
matrimonial platform. 
Independent Variables 
We focus on three variables as part of our study - profile operator, group norm 
deviation, and gender. The profile operator or PO is a dummy variable where 1 
represents profiles where the individual’s parents are listed as the profile operator, and 
0 when the individual operates the profile. With respect to gender, we classify the 
profiles based on the gender of the individual and use sub-sample analyses as described 
later. The third central variable pertains to measuring group norm deviation, i.e. the 
extent to an individual chooses to deviate from endogamy. In order to measure this 
deviation, we require a measure of endogamy, representing group norms. There is no 
clear measure available in the literature, and hence we developed a novel measure of 





Measure for Caste-based Endogamy and Deviation from Group Norms 
During the registration process, new users provide their caste information as well as 
express partner preferences along the dimension of caste. Users have the option of 
choosing multiple castes whose members are acceptable to them as potential 
matrimonial partners. Each user therefore uses a set of options provided in a drop-down 
menu to select the set of castes suitably. We aggregate these preferences for each user 
upto the caste, thereby constructing a network where each node is the caste, and the 
edges are the total number of members of that caste who have identified members of 
another caste (node) as acceptable partners. This network thus captures, at the level of 
the castes, the aggregate preferences expressed by members of that caste, which 
represents the group norms. Endogamy can thus be measured as the baseline 
preferences expressed in this network by individual castes on the platform. In Figure 9, 
we provide a partial caste network to describe the construction of this network, based 
on five castes chosen as exemplars - Agarwal, Kashyap, Arora, Khatri, and Bhatia. The 
aggregate caste preferences are directed edges from one caste node to another. In this 
instance, 7051 members from the Agarwal caste have expressed preferences for 
matches from their own caste. Additionally, some members of this caste have indicated 
that members of other castes are acceptable, including 42 for Khatri, 24 for Kashyap, 
62 for Arora, and 13 for Bhatia. With a full caste network, we can thus create a caste 
preference vector for each caste over all other castes.  
To measure any single individual’s deviation from group norms, we can simply 
calculate the nominal distance from that individual’s preferences for partners to the 
group’s preferences. We do this using the cosine similarity metric, which provides a 





We refer to this as the individual's Similarity index. The value of the Similarity Index 
lies between 0 and 1: a person showing conformance to group norms will have the 
smallest distance from the caste preference vector, with values closer to 1. In contrast, 
a person deviating from group norms will have a value closer to 0. While this measure 
approximates the deviation from group norms, we need to normalize the deviation 
across castes, since members of a caste can vary on how endogamous they are on 
average. For example, a specific Similarity Index in caste A may not necessarily be 
comparable to the Similarity Index in Caste B, as members of caste A could be more 
inherently liberal, while those in caste B could be more conservative. Thus, to 
normalize, we calculate the mean and standard deviation for each caste’s Similarity 
Index and identify those individual profiles that are one standard deviation away from 
group means. These users who deviate from the group norms are presumed to be less 
endogamous compared to others within their caste. We use a dummy GNDev and set it 
to 1 for those falling outside one standard deviation and set it as 0 for others. In 
summary, the combination of the Similarity Index and GNDev gives us an objective 
measure of endogamy as well as the deviation from group norms exhibited by the 
specific individual.  
Controls  
We control for factors that may influence the outcomes of interest like – individual 
information (age, gender, photo availability in profile, paid subscriber, location tiers), 
educational background, occupation details, and family background (religion, caste, 
subcaste). We also account for any systematic time effects by controlling for the week 





is sometimes based on idiosyncratic beliefs and norms within specific communities that 
show up during different times of the year. For instance, specific communities avoid 
making any decisions related to marriages during certain weeks in a year, based on the 
moon calendar (Polome 1997).  
Regression Analysis 
 
Empirical Approach and Identification 
In our analysis, we look at three important institutional markers - group norms, gender, 
and profile operator. The group norms or the caste preferences can be safely assumed 
to be mostly exogenous, since they are determined at the level of the caste and not by 
any individual. In the platform, neither men nor women observe what other men and 
women have specified in their caste preferences, thereby making any strategic choices 
of partner castes unlikely unless directly associated with a desire to be more appealing, 
which is the underlying mechanism we test for. Furthermore, as explained below, we 
use matching methods to create a set of counterfactual profiles for each individual – 
this matching approach helps to account for any bias that may result from the strategic 
setting of preferences. With respect to gender, since we perform subsample analysis, 
we explicitly account for any differences that may exist across how men and women 
operate on the platform. Therefore, while there is selection in that these users have 
opted to join the platform (which remains a limitation in most research on matching 
platforms), the effects of gender can be estimated largely without bias.  
The more immediate threat to causal inferences in our analysis is the choice of 





appropriate matches on the platform. An ideal strategy to identify the causal effect of 
the profile operator on outcomes would be to conduct a randomized experiment, 
whereby users joining the platform are randomly assigned the profile operator status 
(Aral and Walker 2011; Bapna and Umyarov 2015). Given the social milieu in India 
and considering that such decisions are a personal choice, random assignments are not 
feasible nor is any platform likely to impose such restrictions on their users (Jung et al. 
2019; Karmegam and Gopal 2019). We, therefore, use matching methodologies to 
create a pseudo-experimental design so as to reduce the bias from profile operator 
choice. Specifically, we match profiles operated by parents to those that are identical 
but operated by individuals, thereby limiting any ex-ante differences that may exist 
between the profiles which can affect outcomes.  
For our analysis, we use two different types of matching methods - coarsened 
exact matching (CEM) and twins matching, a form of exact matching. CEM helps to 
create a matched sample of similar users, based on observable characteristics 
(Blackwell et al. 2009). CEM is a Monotonic Imbalance Bounding (MIB) matching 
method, which implies that we can ex-ante choose the balance between the treated and 
control groups. CEM approximates a fully blocked experimental design as it comes 
with adjustable parameters that can ensure zero imbalance (Iacus et al. 2012). A fully 
blocked randomized experimental design has lower model dependence, higher power, 
more efficiency, more robustness, and less imbalance (King and Nielsen 2019). CEM 
has been widely adopted in the IS literature for matching (Greenwood and Wattal 2017; 





scoring method (King and Nielsen 2019), as it can be computationally fast even with 
large data sets.  
In our CEM matching procedure, we match the treated “parent” profile to the 
control “individual” profile. We use k-to-k matching with the default null method, 
which performs random matching within each stratum to reduce bias. We match on 
important observable demographic factors related to education, occupation, and family 
background, which are captured as part of the profile information. Post matching, we 
assess the imbalance using the L1 statistic, the difference between the multidimensional 
histogram of all pretreatment covariates in treatment and control groups (Iacus et al. 
2012). The multivariate L1 distance in our case is 0.61, showing fairly balanced groups.  
As an alternative matching procedure, we follow the principles as applied to 
identical twins in Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994), which has been used in contexts like 
patent citations (Jaffe et al. 1993), business establishment locations (Kalnins and 
Lafontaine 2013), and crime controls (Nagin 1999). Twin matching is a form of exact 
or precision matching wherein the values of all the key covariates are matched except 
for the treatment. Those observations which do not have a match are pruned from the 
analysis. In general, twin or precision matching is considered to be the most restrictive 
and conservative; Nagin (1999) describes twin matching as "surest way of accounting 
for a variable that may somehow be biasing the results,", thus being the next best thing 
to random assignment. For our analysis, we identified all the critical parameters 
including age, gender, occupation, education, religion, caste, location, and income, that 
are relevant to decisions pertaining to marriage in the Indian context, and found an 





for the profile operator. We used the CEM command in STATA, which allows for 
twin/precision matching with zero imbalance (Blackwell et al. 2009). The L1 statistic 
with twin matching is zero. The treatment and the control groups are unbalanced since, 
for an individual, there could be an equivalent twin, triplet, or a quadruplet 
counterfactual profile. We describe the main estimation equation next. 
Estimation Procedure  
Our main estimation equation is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1(𝑃𝑂𝑖) +  𝛼2( 𝐺𝑁𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖) +  𝛼3( 𝑃𝑂𝑖𝑥 𝐺𝑁𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖) + 𝛽𝐷𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 +  𝑇𝑤𝑖
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Where Yi refers to dependent variables (matched dyads and incoming EIs), POi is a 
dummy equal to 1 if parents operate the profile, 0 otherwise. GNDevi is a dummy equal 
to 1 if the user is one standard deviation away from the average group norms. Twi are 
twin fixed effects and 𝛾𝑡 are time fixed effects and 𝐷𝑖, demographic control variables. 
Time fixed effects account for systematic changes over time. To simplify the analysis, 
we collapsed the 30-day panel of observations into a cross-sectional dataset, while 
allowing for time fixed effects based on when the user signed onto the platform. This 
approach allows us to examine the effect of the institutional norms as well as deviations 
on the cumulative appeal of the profile within the critical 30-day period.  
In the regression analysis for incoming EIs, we control for total logins by the 
user, since more logins are likely to lead to further activity on the platform, which can 
lead the focal user to show up higher in the recommendation system for other users. 
Similarly, for the regression analysis of relationship dyads for the focal user, we control 
for total logins and the total EIs sent, since both these are likely to increase the 





standard errors. In robustness tests, we also used models for count data to estimate the 
treatment effects - negative binomial regression, and zero-inflated models – and 
obtained results that are consistent with those reported here. These results are available 
upon request from the authors.  
Summary Statistics and Main Results 
Summary statistics shown in Table 24 includes information on all the users in our 
sample, numbering roughly 835,000 profiles that were registered on the platform 
between Oct 1st, 2016, and Jan 31st, 2017. We refer to this dataset as the master sample. 
From this master sample, the matched samples based on CEM and twins matching were 
selected. The summary statistics for these two subsamples are also shown in Table 24. 
As is evident, the gender ratio on the platform is relatively skewed, with 74% male 
profiles, which is typical of matrimonial platforms and is also similar to the gender 
ratios observed in online dating platforms (Jung et al. 2019). In contrast, the gender 
ratio is maintained at parity in the CEM sample, while the ratio varies in the twins 
matched sample. The sample shows differences pertain to other parameters as well, 
which include age, location tiers, paid subscription status, and mobile adoption 
behavior. In terms of profile operator, in the master sample, parents manage 28% of 
profiles, individuals manage 65% of profiles, while friends or other family members 
manage the rest 7%. Parents manage a higher proportion of profiles in the case of 
women at 53%, compared to men at 20%, indicating a higher level of agency for men. 
Beyond gender, in most other cases, there is concordance between the master sample 
and the matched samples. As expected, on the platform, men send more EIs relative to 





profile views relative to men, while there is a small difference in the extent to which 
profiles of either gender appear to deviate significantly from their relative group norms.  
Switching to the regression analyses, we start by first presenting the analyses 
on two outcome measures - the total number of matched dyads (TotalEIAccept) and the 
total EIs received (TotalReceiveEI). The results from the OLS regressions on 
TotalEIAccept are shown in Tables 25 and 26, across both the CEM and twin matching 
samples. Similarly, the results for TotalReceiveEI are shown in Tables 27 and 28. We 
first discuss results for the profile operator, and subsequently those for deviation from 
group norms.  
As shown in Table 25, columns 1-6, the profile operator variable has a 
significant impact on the number of matched dyads that are formed by counterparties 
responding positively to an EI. Profiles where parents are listed as profile operators are 
associated with fewer matched dyads, providing evidence that an offline norm does not 
lead to the same expected result online. There is also a lowering of interest in the 
incoming requests, as seen in Table 27, columns 1- 6. In the CEM sample, parent-
managed profiles receive fewer incoming EIs (roughly 2.5) compared to profiles 
managed by individuals. The higher status accorded to parents and families in this 
milieu notwithstanding, as the process moves online, we see evidence of institutional 
unbundling in that individuals managing their profiles are viewed as being more 
appealing, all else being equal. 
We examine if these effects are different across gender, by splitting the sample 
into men and women in and estimating separate equations, provided in Tables 26 and 





matched dyads across the board for both men and women. The outcomes, however, 
vary when it comes to the incoming EIs for men. In Table 28, columns 1-4, we find 
that for men, having parents as the profile operator leads to a positive and significant 
outcome – these profiles receive more incoming requests compared to the similar 
profiles managed by individuals. In contrast, women receive fewer EIs when parents 
manage the profile, as seen in Table 28, columns 5-8. To summarize, we find that for 
the most part, the high status enjoyed by parents in the matrimonial matching setting 
does not seem influential in online platforms. On average, across most conditions, 
parent-operated profiles lead to worse outcomes for both men and women. The only 
positive effect seen is for men who receive more EIs when parents manage the profile. 
Thus, we see evidence of institutional unbundling in that individuals managing their 
profiles are viewed as being more appealing, all else being equal. 
We now turn to the influence of deviation from group norms on outcomes. 
Recall that we differentiate here between those users whose preferences are consistent 
with their group norms and those who significant deviate from them (GNDev = 1). The 
results in Table 25, columns 2,3,5 and 6 provide the coefficients when the dependent 
variable is the number of matched dyads formed. The results interestingly show that 
when the focal profile deviates from group norms, there is a systematic increase in 
counter-party responses that lead to a matched dyad. Furthermore, profiles for women 
see a higher marginal effect when they deviate from group norms, as seen in Table 26, 
columns 5-8. With respect to incoming EIs, we see similar results – deviation from 
group norms leads to more incoming EIs, as seen in Table 27 columns 2,3,5, and 6. 





compared to than those who do not deviate from the group norms (Table 28, column 
5). Similarly, men also benefit when they deviate from group norms, as seen in Table 
28, columns 1-4. To summarize, deviating from group norms leads to better results, 
across all treatments, demonstrating that unlike the offline setting, where deviating 
from group norms invites sanctions or disapproval, deviating from group norms leads 
to a better outcome in online platforms.  
While we have focused on the direct effects of profile operator and deviation 
from group norms, it is worth examining what their interaction effects may be. On the 
one hand, profiles that are managed by parents and do not deviate from group norms 
are likely to be the most appealing, since this directly reflects the offline institutional 
norms. On the other hand, if a profile deviates from offline norms on both dimensions, 
does the profile receive additional attention on the platform? We examine these by 
studying the interaction effects across both dependent variables. Across all regressions 
we estimate, the coefficients of the interaction terms are negative, indicating that the 
cumulative effect of the profile being run by parents and deviation from group norms 
ends up lowering the extent to which the focal profile receives EIs from others as well 
as is able to gather matched dyads. Interestingly, the coefficients from the CEM sample 
render significant coefficients while those from the twin-matched samples show 
insignificant coefficients. Since the twin-matched samples also include twin fixed 
effects, it is possible that the insignificant coefficients are a result of lower power. 
However, it is worth noting that while individual-run profiles and deviation from group 
norms appear to generate largely positive responses on the platforms, the combination 






As stated earlier, for ease of interpretation, we used OLS for our main models. 
However, the dependent variables we study are essentially count variables. Therefore, 
to establish robustness of the models discussed above, we also fit the following count 
models to our data - negative binomial regression model, zero-inflated negative 
binomial (ZINB) model, and zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) model. The Akaike 
information criteria (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) statistics across 
these models suggest that the negative binomial model has the best fit amongst these 
count models. We therefore provide the results from this model in Table 29, across men 
and women, consistent with the results shown above. The results from the other count 
models are largely similar and are available from the authors on request. The overall 
results are qualitatively consistent with those discussed before. When parents manage 
the profile for men, there are fewer dyads formed in the first 30 days on the platform, 
while deviation from group norms helps the profile form more completed dyads. A 
similar result is obtained from women, as seen in Table 29, column 3. These results are 
mirrored with respect to the number of EIs received from others on the platform, across 
men and women. Finally, the interaction coefficients are not statistically significant for 
the most part, showing consistency with the OLS results.  
Profile Switch 
Our identification strategy has relied on matching across individuals so as to reduce 
bias. An alternative, and arguably more robust way, approach to examine the effect of 
profile operator on outcomes, given deviation from group norms, is consider cases 





platform. This change occurs relatively rarely and could occur in both direction - 
individuals could take over from parents or vice versa. This information is reflected on 
the profile, thereby being exogenous to others on the platform. However, the small 
number of cases where profile operator changes precludes a full regression analyses. 
Instead, in the spirit of exploratory data analysis, we use line charts to examine how 
the change in profile operator may influence the extent to which the profile is found to 
be more or less appealing.  
As discussed earlier, most activities on the platform take place in the initial 3-4 
weeks. Therefore, we used the following process to come up with the control and 
treatment groups. First, we shortlisted those profiles that switched operators from the 
family to the individual. Since we are interested in examining pre- and post-trends from 
the change, we consider all those profiles that switched operators between day 8 and 
day 21 on the platform, thereby allowing us to observe their activities for seven days 
pre-switch and seven days post-switch. The switching profiles are designated as the 
“treatment” group. For this group, we compiled pre-status change outcomes such as 
total logins, total EIs sent and received, total profile views, and the total number of 
relationship dyads formed. Subsequently, we use CEM to find a “control” group of 
profiles that are similar to these profiles but that do not change operators. Unlike the 
matching process described earlier, in this case we match not only based on observable 
demographics but also on the profile-level observed activities before the switch. This 
procedure provides a set of “treated” profiles where operators change, and an identical 
control group where no such change occurs. This process is replicated for those profiles 





the daily outcomes associated with the profiles centered around the switching event, 
similar to the relative time model used in prior research (Greenwood and Wattal 2017). 
We focus on the following outcomes - EIs received, relationship dyads formed, and 
daily profile views. The sample for these graphs is shown in Table 30.  
Figures 10-15 provide the pre/post trends for the profile switch analysis. Each 
graph includes two treatment groups, and their corresponding control groups. Figures 
10 and 11 show profile-level outcomes for incoming EIs for women and men, 
respectively. We observe that for profiles that switch from family to self, there is a 
significant increase in incoming EIs, more so for women. This trend corroborates our 
earlier finding - that self-managed profiles have better outcomes compared to those 
managed by family. Figures 12 and 13 depict trends for the average daily dyads formed. 
With this outcome, a response from the counterparty may not appear on the same day 
but could be delayed, since dyad formation is asynchronous. Thus, there is no clear 
trend for this outcome associated with the profile switch. Figures 14 and 15 show 
pre/post trends for daily profile views, and we see a clear increase in profile views for 
both men and women when the profile operator switches from the family to the 
individual, corroborating our earlier results. To summarize, the profile switch analysis 
corroborates the results we saw earlier with CEM, twin matching, and the robustness 
checks done with count models.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
What happens to highly institutionalized contexts when they are transferred to online 
platforms? This question largely motivated our work in this paper. Certain fields, like 





norms as well as institutional players that help apply normative and coercive pressures 
on those within the industry (Ang and Cummings 1997). However, firms in this 
industry have also been early movers to the online world, though the more 
institutionalized elements of their businesses tend to remain largely offline. As the 
process of “platformization” becomes more common across multiple social and 
economic activities, more activities from institutionalized contexts are likely to move 
online, raising questions about the extent to which the online platform is able to capture 
the full essence of the offline environment. Indeed, in contexts like venture capital, for 
instance, although equity crowdfunding may have replicated specific elements of the 
venturing process, the traditional VC model has continued to persist (Ahlers et al. 
2015)In this paper, we thus address the broader question – do institutional norms and 
markers of status that are influential in the offline setting have the same efficacy online?  
We study this question through the prism of a highly institutionalized setting - 
Indian arranged marriages. Consistent with practices in South-east Asia, East Asia, and 
the Middle East, the institution of the arranged marriage has deep-rooted social norms 
and is typically governed by well-specified social regulations, which may vary across 
countries and cultures but exist in some form across Asian societies (Yeung et al. 2018). 
The literature on Indian marriages, in particular, shows that marital preferences and 
outcomes in offline settings continue to be guided by institutional norms. The entry of 
online matrimonial platforms in the Indian market has enabled the move of the search 
process, at least in the early stages, to the online environment, where traditional offline 
norms have been embraced without tweaking the institutional processes. The 





search process as well as the ability to practice endogamy along religious and caste 
lines- have been preserved and even actively propagated. We thus theorize about 
whether these offline norms are still influential in the platform setting, arguing that the 
move online may actually attenuate, and even remove, their impact.  
Our results show that this is indeed the case – to a large extent, these traditional 
norms lead to less positive outcomes on the platform, in contrast to the offline setting. 
Using data collected through a collaboration with a leading Indian online matrimonial 
platform, we show that the counter-party responses to a profile operated by the parents 
or family is viewed as being less appealing. Similarly, sticking to group norms, in terms 
of endogamy, is also viewed less favorably. Interestingly, these effects are more 
pronounced for women on the platform, indicating further how online norms appear to 
deviate systematically from the more traditional offline setting. Some of this may be 
attributed to the entry of dating apps into the Indian market, given the similar 
demographic segment that both types of platforms tend to target. However, it is worth 
noting that even in India, the online dating ethos is clearly more liberal (Baruah 2018) 
while the matrimonial market remains more traditional. Indeed, the Indian government 
released an advisory to matrimonial platforms in 2017, to ensure that users signed a 
declaration stating that the purpose of their presence on the platform was for 
matrimonial purposes, and not for other reasons like dating (Doshi 2016). Thus, it is 
particularly noteworthy that despite these trends, user behavior on these platforms is 
distinctly different from the offline setting.  
Our conversations with the platform operator firm indicate that while parental 





growing sense that their role is not as central as it would be offline. Recent research 
from sociology also suggests that parents are seen to be increasingly ceding space to 
individuals in the decision-making process, more so in standing behind the individual 
in decisions related to deviation from endogamous norms (Kaur and Dhanda 2014). 
The most striking advantage of online platforms might well be the ability to connect 
with other users that are unlikely to be matched to the focal user in the normal course 
of action offline; indeed, this shows up clearly in the dating context (Jung et al. 2019) 
. In the matrimonial context, this could lead to users deviating from their group norms 
in attempting to, or responding to overtures from, people from other social groups or 
castes. To the extent that platforms reduce the impact of location and transaction costs, 
as well as provide the benefits of relative anonymity and privacy, the relaxation of 
institutional norms online appears reasonable and even desirable. The institutional 
unbundling of the search process, potentially into early-stage and late-stage search, 
allows for these norms to be relaxed even if the later stages of the marriage planning 
show returns to strong institutional norms. Unfortunately, we are not privy to the 
remainder of the marriage process once the users leave the platform, which remains a 
topic for future research.  
One of the contributions of our work here is the development of a network-
based measure of endogamy, using the partner preferences over castes provided by the 
new users on the platform. This measure also helps us identify those users who deviate 
from group norms. In our analysis, we find that with deviation, users have better 
matching outcomes, more so in the case of women. Thus, instead of inviting social 





users. We also looked at the effect of deviating from group norms when parents operate 
the profile. This interaction is possibly the only instance in our analysis where we 
observe some of the deep-rooted traditions manifest themselves. Both men and women 
had lower matching outcomes, and women also had lower incoming EIs with the 
arrangement. In general, we find that "platformization" of this highly institutionalized 
context leads to more "democratization." with traditional institutional markers playing 
a diminished role online. This trend has been noted within the industry as well, as 
captured by this quote from a CEO of an online matrimonial platform in 2015 - "82 
percent of male profiles are posted by the prospective grooms rather than by their 
parents, up from 60 percent five years ago. Among women, the share of self-postings 
is at 56 percent, up from 30 percent five years ago" (Harris 2015).  
Our work here is subject to limitations. First, like most empirical work using 
observational data, there could be several missing pieces of information, which limits 
the extent to which we can rule out alternative mechanisms or explanations. We have 
controlled for most relevant variables that are provided in the user profile page, but we 
cannot rule out the effects of unobserved variables. Second, we do not have the 
information on the counterparties who accepted the EI requests or who sent in the 
expression of interests to the focal users. The counterparty information would have 
given us a complete picture of the demographics of users who responded 
positively/negatively to the profile operator status and deviation from group norms. 
Third, while we implicitly compare online behavior to offline norms, we do not observe 
these offline norms. We base our descriptions of the offline process on the extensive 





Detailed data on the offline process is typically hard to locate at scale and represents 
an avenue for future research. Fourth, while we choose the number of matched dyads 
or number of incoming EIs as a measure of profile appeal, we cannot speak to the extent 
to which these matches are of “high quality”; indeed, in much of this research, the final 
outcome of an actual marriage is extremely hard to observe since the process largely 
moves offline. We recognize this as a limitation which exists even in prior work in 
dating platforms (Bapna et al. 2016a; Jung et al. 2019). Finally, while we account for 
profile operators through matching methods, by going as far as doing the stringent 
twins matching, we recognize that a randomized experiment would be the ideal 
methodology. Given the constraints involved for the platform owners, this is rarely ever 
feasible in the field, especially in institutionalized fields such as these (Jung et al. 2019). 
In conclusion, our work addresses an important question on the transition of 
offline norms with "Platformization" in the case of highly institutionalized contexts. 
Set within the institution of arranged marriages, which have been prevalent in 
traditional Asian societies, we studied whether the factors that are influential offline, 
like status, group norms, and gender norms, continue to be influential in the online 
setting. Our study suggests that offline norms do not translate as seamlessly. Users are 
guided by a liberal ethos as experienced in other online platforms, and the traditional 
signals do not carry the same weight as it does in the offline world. Profiles managed 
by parents do not have the same appeal as the one managed by individuals. User profile 
appeal improved with deviation from group norms. In the case of women, the profile 
appeal increased when they have higher agency, or when they deviate from group 





thus provides a reality check to platforms operating in or planning to enter highly 
institutionalized settings. While the platforms may try to replicate all the offline norms 
in online settings, user's online behavior may discount if not entirely dismiss the 
traditional norms. As the platform models pervade all economic activities, including 
those areas with strong institutional norms, we believe more such work is needed to 
come up with mechanism design, which would improve the overall user experience and 








Table 1: Chp2- Variable Definitions 
Variable Name Definition 
MobileAdopters 1- Immediate Adopters/0- Non Adopters or Late Adopters 
Dependent Variables  
Engagement Outcomes 
TotalLogin (Passive) Total Logins by the user 
TotalEI (Active) Total expression of interest (EI) sent by user 
TotalReceiveEI (Engagement-
Incoming) Total EIs received by user 
Matching Outcomes  
TotalReceiveEIAccept (Direct) Total EIs accepted by the focal user from the EIs received. Leads to formation of dyad 
TotalEIAccept (Indirect) Total EIs accepted by the counter parties from the EIs sent by the focal user. Leads to formation of dyad 




1- If the user does not wish to specify the caste, or parents had inter-caste or inter-religion marriage/0-
Otherwise 
User Controls  
Self If the profile is maintained by the focal user 
Family If the profile is maintained by family 
EduBachDummy 1- If user has a minimum undergraduate degree/0-Otherwise 
T1,T2,T3 Represents city tiers with T1 referring to tier 1 city like Mumbai 
Other Demographic Controls Age, education, occupation, paid subscription, annual income, religion, profile photo availability,  
Other Controls  
TotalEIRead Total EIs read by the counter party from the one sent by focal user 
TotalViewProfile Total views for the focal user's profile page 
 












Overall Men Women Mobile 
Adopters 
Non-Adopters Brahmin Muslim DWS 
   mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd 
Men 0.79 0.41 - - - - 0.79 0.41 0.79 0.41 0.74 0.44 0.85 0.35 0.80 0.40 
EduBachDummy 0.77 0.42 0.73 0.44 0.91 0.29 0.77 0.42 0.77 0.42 0.89 0.31 0.70 0.46 0.72 0.45 
Age 27.52 4.69 27.91 4.72 26.06 4.29 27.52 4.68 27.52 4.70 28.38 5.24 26.24 4.31 27.41 4.72 
Yrsofedu 15.29 1.64 15.15 1.67 15.84 1.42 15.29 1.64 15.29 1.64 15.74 1.49 14.85 1.69 14.93 1.75 
Self 0.67 0.47 0.75 0.44 0.39 0.49 0.72 0.45 0.62 0.49 0.59 0.49 0.74 0.44 0.74 0.44 
Family 0.26 0.44 0.19 0.39 0.53 0.50 0.22 0.41 0.30 0.46 0.34 0.47 0.19 0.40 0.19 0.39 
Muslim 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27 0.05 0.22 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.26 - - - - 0.14 0.34 
Brahmin 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.26 0.10 0.29 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27 - - - - - - 
Paid 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.15 0.08 0.26 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.18 0.06 0.24 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.13 
T1 0.33 0.47 0.32 0.47 0.37 0.48 0.33 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.40 0.49 0.37 0.48 0.33 0.47 
T2 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.26 0.44 0.19 0.39 0.26 0.44 
T3 0.43 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.39 0.49 0.43 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.34 0.47 0.44 0.50 0.41 0.49 
TotalLogin 17.98 43.15 16.46 39.24 23.76 55.19 32.92 56.35 3.04 10.06 20.06 45.23 12.53 30.25 12.19 30.56 
TotalEI 9.14 72.19 10.38 79.74 4.39 28.41 14.63 86.45 3.64 53.74 11.11 81.05 6.18 55.72 8.02 86.75 
TotalEIAccept 0.27 1.67 0.10 0.63 0.92 3.37 0.43 2.14 0.11 0.98 0.39 1.97 0.20 1.57 0.19 1.34 
TotalReceiveEI 8.07 30.42 0.66 2.70 36.34 58.48 11.20 37.90 4.94 19.87 11.16 34.78 3.33 13.94 5.20 20.60 
TotalViewProfile 112.69 372.52 33.76 110.03 413.84 712.48 157.79 463.11 67.59 242.93 149.46 381.38 36.96 140.09 55.49 206.55 
TotalReceiveEIAccept 0.32 2.86 0.24 2.75 0.59 3.25 0.48 3.02 0.15 2.68 0.48 3.81 0.32 5.06 0.24 3.30 
























































































































MobileAdopters 1                             
TotalLogin 0.35 1                           
TotalEI 0.08 0.18 1                         
TotalEIAccept 0.09 0.25 0.09 1                       
TotalReceiveEI 0.1 0.27 0.01 0.41 1                     
TotalReceiveEIAccept 0.06 0.16 0.58 0.25 0.12 1                   
Women 0 0.07 -0.03 0.2 0.48 0.05 1                 
Brahmin -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 1               
Muslim 0 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0 -0.04 -0.08 1             
DWS -0.04 -0.03 0 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 0.06 1           
Self 0.11 0 0.02 -0.04 -0.15 -0.02 -0.3 -0.05 0.04 0.04 1         
Family -0.09 0.03 -0.02 0.05 0.17 0.02 0.31 0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.84 1       
EduBachDummy 0 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.11 0.04 0.17 0.08 -0.05 -0.03 -0.07 0.08 1     
TotalEIRead 0.07 0.2 0.95 0.14 0.04 0.68 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0 0.01 -0.01 0.03 1   


































 Dependent Variable 
  Engagement Outcomes Matching Outcomes 
 Passive              Active                      Direct                      Indirect                 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
MobileAdopters 26.26*** 1.344*** 0.0114 0.0146 
 (0.216) (0.425) (0.0125) (0.00908) 
Women -5.794*** -17.11*** 0.181*** 0.408*** 
 (0.382) (0.713) (0.0218) (0.0153) 
TotalLogin  0.222*** -0.00102*** 0.00466*** 
  (0.00524) (0.000156) (0.000113) 
TotalReceiveEI   -0.00682***  
   (0.000465)  
TotalEIRead   0.0604***  
   (0.000205)  
TotalEI    0.000365*** 
    (6.01e-05) 
Constant -45.16*** -21.60 -0.676 -0.372 
 (14.31) (26.67) (0.787) (0.570) 
User Controls Y Y Y Y 
User Fixed Effects N N N N 
Time Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Observations 126,706 126,706 126,706 126,706 
R-squared 0.238 0.055 0.477 0.192 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 















 Dependent Variable 
  Matching Outcomes 
  Direct Indirect 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
MobileAdopters  0.0115 0.00195 0.0146 0.00675 
 (0.0125) (0.0130) (0.00908) (0.00939) 
Brahmin  0.0310 -0.0300 -0.00461 -0.0543** 
 (0.0227) (0.0310) (0.0165) (0.0225) 
MobileAdopters x 
Brahmin  0.126***  0.103*** 
  (0.0437)  (0.0317) 
Women 0.181*** 0.181*** 0.408*** 0.408*** 
 (0.0218) (0.0218) (0.0153) (0.0153) 
TotalLogin -0.00102*** -0.00103*** 0.00467*** 0.00466*** 
 (0.000156) (0.000156) (0.000113) (0.000113) 
TotalReceiveEI -0.00681*** -0.00681***   
 (0.000465) (0.000465)   
TotalEIRead 0.0604*** 0.0604***   
 (0.000205) (0.000205)   
TotalEI   0.000365*** 0.000365*** 
   (6.01e-05) (6.01e-05) 
Constant -0.682 -0.688 -0.371 -0.376 
 (0.787) (0.787) (0.570) (0.570) 
User Controls Y Y Y Y 
User Fixed Effects N N N N 
Time Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Observations 126,706 126,706 126,706 126,706 
R-squared 0.477 0.477 0.192 0.192 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 











 Dependent Variable 
  Matching Outcomes 
  Direct Indirect 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
MobileAdopters  0.0113 0.00399 0.0146 0.0126 
 (0.0125) (0.0130) (0.00908) (0.00941) 
Muslim  0.0795** 0.0300 -0.0122 -0.0259 
 (0.0334) (0.0405) (0.0242) (0.0294) 
MobileAdopters x Muslim  0.0984**  0.0272 
  (0.0453)  (0.0329) 
Women 0.183*** 0.182*** 0.407*** 0.407*** 
 (0.0218) (0.0218) (0.0153) (0.0153) 
TotalLogin -0.00102*** -0.00101*** 0.00466*** 0.00467*** 
 (0.000156) (0.000156) (0.000113) (0.000113) 
TotalReceiveEI -0.00680*** -0.00680***   
 (0.000465) (0.000465)   
TotalEIRead 0.0604*** 0.0604***   
 (0.000205) (0.000205)   
TotalEI   0.000365*** 0.000365*** 
   (6.01e-05) (6.01e-05) 
Constant -0.719 -0.715 -0.365 -0.364 
 (0.787) (0.787) (0.571) (0.571) 
User Controls Y Y Y Y 
User Fixed Effects N N N N 
Time Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Observations 126,706 126,706 126,706 126,706 
R-squared 0.477 0.477 0.192 0.192 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 





Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




 Dependent Variable 
  Matching Outcomes 
  Direct Indirect 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
MobileAdopters 0.0105 0.0151 0.0141 0.0110 
 (0.0125) (0.0129) (0.00909) (0.00933) 
DWS -0.0441* -0.0103 -0.0221 -0.0449* 
 (0.0255) (0.0330) (0.0185) (0.0240) 
MobileAdopters x 
DWS  -0.0818  0.0553 
  (0.0509)  (0.0369) 
Women 0.182*** 0.182*** 0.408*** 0.408*** 
 (0.0218) (0.0218) (0.0153) (0.0153) 
TotalLogin -0.00102*** -0.00102*** 0.00466*** 0.00467*** 
 (0.000156) (0.000156) (0.000113) (0.000113) 
TotalReceiveEI -0.00682*** -0.00681***   
 (0.000465) (0.000465)   
TotalEIRead 0.0604*** 0.0604***   
 (0.000205) (0.000205)   
TotalEI   0.000365*** 0.000365*** 
   (6.01e-05) (6.01e-05) 
Constant -0.663 -0.659 -0.365 -0.368 
 (0.787) (0.787) (0.570) (0.570) 
User Controls Y Y Y Y 
User Fixed Effects N N N N 
Time Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Observations 126,706 126,706 126,706 126,706 





Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 






  Dependent Variable 
 Engagement - Incoming Request Matching - Indirect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
DWS -0.107*** -0.128*** -0.0267*** -0.0128 
 (0.0238) (0.0308) (0.00756) (0.00976) 
MobileAdopters -0.00109 -0.00408 -0.00226 -0.000300 
 (0.0119) (0.0122) (0.00376) (0.00386) 
MobileAdopters x 
DWS    0.0522  -0.0342** 
  (0.0479)  (0.0152) 
TotalEI -0.0132*** -0.0132*** -0.000815*** -0.000814*** 
 (8.16e-05) (8.16e-05) (2.59e-05) (2.59e-05) 
TotalLogin 0.00254*** 0.00254*** 0.00139*** 0.00139*** 
 (0.000167) (0.000167) (5.31e-05) (5.31e-05) 
Constant -1.660** -1.664** -0.165 -0.162 
 (0.781) (0.781) (0.248) (0.248) 
User Controls Y Y Y Y 
User Fixed Effects N N N N 
Time Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Observations 100,394 100,394 100,394 100,394 





Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 







 Dependent Variable 
 Engagement Outcomes Matching Outcomes 
 Passive              Active                  Direct             Indirect                  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
MobileAdopters 34.17*** 0.756 0.00495 0.0253 
 (0.700) (1.216) (0.0383) (0.0261) 
TotalLogin  0.139*** -0.000894** 0.00297*** 
  (0.0118) (0.000375) (0.000254) 
TotalReceiveEI   0.00162  
   (0.00118)  
TotalEIRead   0.0697***  
   (0.000531)  
TotalEI    0.000118 
    (0.000154) 
Constant -38.17 142.0* 10.32*** 3.117* 
 (48.19) (78.99) (2.486) (1.694) 
User Controls Y Y Y Y 
User Fixed Effects N N N N 
Time Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Observations 19,342 19,342 19,342 19,342 




































 Passive            Active                  Direct             Indirect                  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
MobileAdopters 18.54*** 1.505*** -0.000513 0.00625 
 (0.133) (0.264) (0.00830) (0.00718) 
TotalLogin  0.271*** -0.00105*** 0.00534*** 
  (0.00522) (0.000165) (0.000143) 
TotalReceiveEI   -0.00233***  
   (0.000375)  
TotalEIRead   0.0671***  
   (0.000219)  
TotalEI    0.000851*** 
    (7.63e-05) 
Constant -26.46*** -18.00 -0.341 -0.242 
 (8.804) (16.35) (0.513) (0.444) 
User Controls Y Y Y Y 
User Fixed Effects N N N N 
Time Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Observations 126,706 126,706 126,706 126,706 
R-squared 0.242 0.053 0.480 0.159 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 





Table 11: Chp3- Variable Definition 
 
Variable Name Definition 
Dependent Variables  
TotalEIReceived Total number of expression of interest (EI) received by the focal user 
TotalIncomingMatch Total EIs accepted by the focal user from the ones received 
TotalEISent Total number of EIs sent by the focal user 
Intervention 2 (Choices could be made on day of registration 




Equal to 1 if women make choice on the day of registration, 0 
otherwise 
AgeChoiceMadeOnReg/AgeChoiceMadeInBetween Equal to 1 if women make age choice, 0 otherwise. 
EduChoiceMadeOnReg/ EduChoiceMadeInBetween Equal to 1 if women make education choice, 0 otherwise. 
AgeEduIncChoiceMadeOnReg/AgeEduIncChoiceMadeInBetween 
Equal to 1 if women all three choices- age, education and income, 0 
otherwise. 
Independent Variables  
Treatment Equal to 1 for treatment group, 0 for control group 
TimeTreatment Equal to 1 for pre-intervention registrations, 0 for post-intervention 
registrations 
Age26OrAbove Equal to 1 if user’s age is 26 or above, 0 otherwise 
EduHigher  Equal to 1 if user has professional degree or higher, 0 otherwise 
WithIncome Equal to 1 if user works and has income, 0 otherwise 
User Activities Controls 
 
DaysActive Total number of days where user initiated purposeful action 
ProfileViews Total number of times, the focal user’s profile was viewed 
Other Demographic Controls Age, marital status, location, religion, caste, subcaste, profile photo 











Table 12: Chp3- Intervention Design 
 
Intervention Dimension Personal Information for Men Women whose profile is visible 
Education High School education or under High School education, Undergraduate degrees 
Marital Status Unmarried Unmarried 
Widowed/Divorced/Awaiting Divorce Widowed/Divorced/Awaiting Divorce 
Age 20-29 10 years younger to 1 year older 
30-39 10 years younger to 2 years older 
40-49 10 years younger to 3 years older 
50-59 15 years younger to 4 years older 
>=60 15 years younger to 4 years older 
Annual Income Any Value Upto 0.2M local currency higher 







Table 13: Chp3- Summary Statistics 
Variables 
Overall Women Men 
mean sd mean sd mean sd 
Age 28.95 4.43 26.11 3.73 29.66 4.31 
Age25AndBelow 0.21 0.41 0.51 0.50 0.13 0.34 
Age26AndAbove 0.79 0.41 0.49 0.50 0.87 0.34 
Women 0.20 0.40 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Paid 0.05 0.22 0.11 0.31 0.04 0.19 
Yrsofedu 15.03 1.68 16.04 1.35 14.78 1.66 
EduHigher 0.76 0.43 0.79 0.40 0.75 0.43 
WithIncome  0.78 0.41 0.42 0.49 0.87 0.33 
SameCastePref 0.45 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.43 0.50 
CasteNoBar 0.23 0.42 0.15 0.36 0.25 0.43 
PartnerPrefSet 0.87 0.34 0.90 0.31 0.86 0.34 
LocationIndia 0.95 0.23 0.98 0.13 0.94 0.24 
MaritalStatusSingle 0.96 0.19 0.96 0.20 0.96 0.19 
Treatment 0.53 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.53 0.50 
TimeTreatment 0.62 0.48 0.59 0.49 0.63 0.48 
TotalMatches 1.78 5.96 4.65 10.47 1.07 3.80 
TotalEISent 33.31 180.02 15.44 61.05 37.78 198.69 
TotalEIReceived 33.57 100.66 152.84 179.76 3.76 12.21 
TotalIncomingMatch 0.73 3.02 1.65 5.33 0.49 2.01 
TotalOutgoingMatch 1.06 3.74 3.00 6.74 0.57 2.23 
DaysActive 5.43 5.62 4.59 5.35 5.64 5.67 
ProfileViews 386.75 880.71 1419.73 1498.68 128.64 274.10 
Shortlist 5.72 25.81 6.16 20.18 5.61 27.03 







Table 14: Chp3- Main Effects 
 
  Dependent Variables 
 TotalEIReceived TotalIncomingMatch TotalEISent 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  Overall Women Men  Overall Women Men  Overall Women Men 





 (1.792) (7.149) (0.505) (0.149) (0.321) (0.107) (7.152) (3.275) (9.240) 
TimeTreatment -7.294*** -27.54*** -0.745*** -0.685*** -1.518*** -0.469*** 0.0743 -2.877 -7.967** 
 (1.143) (4.552) (0.179) (0.101) (0.255) (0.0719) (3.612) (2.543) (3.466) 
Treatment x TimeTreatment -2.439*** -10.30*** -0.0787 0.0646 1.033*** -0.141*** -3.888 9.235*** -3.375 
 (0.868) (3.804) (0.185) (0.121) (0.347) (0.0503) (4.892) (3.285) (4.445) 





    (0.00316) (0.00358) (0.00790) (0.316) (0.0489) (2.692) 
DaysActive -2.341*** -5.886*** -0.292*** 0.136*** 0.456*** 0.0681*** 8.351*** 4.364*** 2.522 
 (0.120) (0.444) (0.0449) (0.00947) (0.0330) (0.00637) (0.485) (0.292) (1.618) 
ProfileViews 0.110*** 0.120*** 0.0370*** 0.00225*** 0.000748 0.00411*** 0.107*** 0.0143** 0.737*** 
 (0.00211) (0.00243) (0.00266) (0.000406) (0.000461) (0.000545) (0.0396) (0.00615) (0.167) 
Constant 63.16*** 177.0*** 2.388 0.871** 4.723*** 2.462*** 91.75*** 27.74*** 267.5*** 
 (6.083) (13.30) (2.164) (0.356) (0.766) (0.224) (32.67) (9.615) (57.90) 
User Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Dummies for Registration 
Week Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 18,338 3,666 14,672 18,338 3,666 14,672 18,338 3,666 14,672 
R-squared 0.858 0.833 0.695 0.249 0.273 0.338 0.200 0.231 0.440 
 
  
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on location 





Table 15: Chp3- Split Sample Analysis 
 
Table 15a: Split – Sample Analysis (Important subgroups) - TotalEIReceived 
  Dependent Variable - TotalEIReceived  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Age25AndBelow  Age26AndAbove  EduHigher=1 EduHigher=0 WithIncome=1 WithIncome=0 
Treatment x TimeTreatment -15.16*** -10.55** -11.52*** -6.606 -6.042 -13.58** 
 (4.937) (5.218) (4.305) (10.68) (5.771) (5.978) 
Constant 91.68*** 170.4*** 166.9*** 175.4*** 93.66*** 189.7*** 
 (21.49) (23.41) (14.04) (25.05) (28.16) (14.82) 
User Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Dummies for Registration Week Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 1,870 1,796 2,910 756 1,540 2,126 
R-squared 0.849 0.843 0.828 0.865 0.828 0.841 
 
Table 15b: Split – Sample Analysis (Important subgroups) - TotalIncomingMatch 
  Dependent Variable - TotalIncomingMatch  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Age25AndBelow  Age26AndAbove  EduHigher=1 EduHigher=0 WithIncome=1 WithIncome=0 
Treatment x TimeTreatment 0.423 1.648*** 1.069** 0.916** 1.404** 0.973*** 
 (0.285) (0.553) (0.427) (0.434) (0.642) (0.308) 
Constant 2.802*** 3.768*** 4.677*** 3.868*** 4.528*** 5.612*** 
 (1.034) (1.094) (0.831) (0.841) (1.028) (1.279) 
User Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Dummies for Registration Week Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 1,870 1,796 2,910 756 1,540 2,126 








Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on location 





Table 15c: Split – Sample Analysis (Important subgroups) - TotalEISent 
  Dependent Variable - TotalEISent 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Age25AndBelow  Age26AndAbove  EduHigher WithIncome Paid 
Treatment x TimeTreatment 2.079 17.66** 10.86*** 15.93* 13.93** 
 (2.204) (7.354) (3.489) (8.638) (5.283) 
Constant 14.32 21.92* 26.47*** 14.76 13.97 
 (9.473) (12.74) (7.406) (13.34) (16.78) 
User Controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Dummies for Registration Week Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 1,870 1,796 2,910 1,540 405 





Table 16: Chp3- Caste Choices and its Effect on Outcomes 
  TotalEIReceived TotalIncomingMatch TotalEISent 














Treatment x TimeTreatment -13.10** -18.30 0.659* 2.473* 4.093 17.75 
 (5.593) (14.47) (0.338) (1.406) (2.770) (13.67) 
Constant 248.1*** 54.49 2.992** 7.221** 19.18* 60.15*** 
 (29.25) (41.22) (1.346) (3.161) (11.08) (18.80) 
User Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Dummies for Registration Week Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 1,879 558 1,879 558 1,879 558 




Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on location 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on location 










WomenChoiceOnReg 0.51 0.50 
AgeChoiceMadeOnReg 0.16 0.37 
EduChoiceMadeOnReg 0.08 0.28 
AgeEduIncChoiceMadeOnReg 0.03 0.17 
AgeChoiceMadeInBetween 0.13 0.34 
EduChoiceMadeInBetween 0.25 0.43 
AgeEduIncChoiceMadeInBetween 0.10 0.30 
Age 26.84 5.73 
Age26AndAbove 0.55 0.50 
Paid 0.09 0.28 
Yrsofedu 15.48 1.66 
EduHigher 0.91 0.29 
WithIncome 0.39 0.49 
MaritalStatusSingle 0.87 0.34 




















Table 18: Chp3- Probit Model – Choices made on the day of registration 
  Dependent Variables - Choices Made 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  WomenChoiceOnReg AgeChoiceMadeOnReg EduChoiceMadeOnReg AgeEduIncChoiceMadeOnReg 
Age26AndAbove 0.161* 0.0268 0.346* 0.238 
 (0.0862) (0.118) (0.198) (0.256) 
EduHigher 0.0797 -0.173 0.0327 -0.284 
 (0.230) (0.325) (0.439) (0.524) 
WithIncome -0.151 -0.170 -0.439** -0.596** 
 (0.0933) (0.129) (0.204) (0.297) 
Constant -1.852*** -2.106*** -14.03*** -10.78*** 
 (0.465) (0.605) (1.639) (1.689) 
User Controls Y Y Y Y 
Dummies for Registration 
Week 
Y Y Y Y 
Observations 1382 666 411 321 
Pseudo-R: 0.169 0.166 0.499 0.442 
 
  Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on location 





Table 19: Chp3- Panel Probit Model – Women Making Choices from Day 2 
 Dependent Variables - Choices made from day 2 onwards 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 AgeChoiceMadeInBetween EduChoiceMadeInBetween AgeEduIncChoiceMadeInBetween 
Age26AndAbove 0.873*** 0.291*** 0.534*** 
 (0.130) (0.0994) (0.139) 
EduHigher -0.00565 -0.624*** -0.0953 
 (0.177) (0.162) (0.189) 
WithIncome -0.0626 0.253*** -0.0911 
 (0.121) (0.0972) (0.128) 
TotalEISent_lag 0.00447*** -0.00130 0.00299* 
 (0.00156) (0.00143) (0.00161) 
TotalEIReceived_lag 0.000870 0.00101 0.00133 
 (0.00106) (0.000958) (0.00113) 
TotalMatches_lag -0.0130** -0.00183 -0.0105* 
 (0.00557) (0.00534) (0.00633) 
ProfileViews_lag -7.64e-05 0.000195 -0.000191 
 (0.000184) (0.000171) (0.000199) 
lnsig2u 3.223*** 1.884*** 3.254*** 
 (0.0500) (0.0500) (0.0498) 
Constant -6.391*** -1.835*** -6.829*** 
 (0.207) (0.176) (0.222) 
User Controls Y Y Y 
Dummies for Registration Week Y Y Y 
Observations 60,884 60,884 60,884 









Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on location 








Table 20: Chp3- Count Model for Main Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  TotalEIReceived  TotalIncomingMatch TotalEISent 
Treatment 0.0527*** -0.439*** -0.290*** 
 (0.000118) (0.00783) (0.0336) 
TimeTreatment  -0.175*** -0.798*** -0.405*** 
 (0.000672) (0.0111) (0.0226) 
Treatment x TimeTreatment -0.0331*** 0.662*** 0.673*** 
 (0.000436) (0.00631) (0.0648) 
TotalEIReceived  -0.000619*** -0.00267** 
  (0.000182) (0.00120) 
DaysActive -0.00646*** 0.144*** 0.147*** 
 (0.00110) (0.0122) (0.0164) 
ProfileViews 0.000362*** 9.89e-05** 0.000220* 
 (8.85e-07) (4.46e-05) (0.000128) 
Constant 4.422*** -0.0473 1.892*** 
 (0.00525) (0.0970) (0.151) 
User Controls Y Y Y 
Dummies for Registration Week Y Y Y 








Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on location 







Table 21: Chp3- Model based on days (3 days, 7 days, and 14 days) for Women 
  TotalEIReceived TotalIncomingMatch TotalEISent 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 3 days 7 days 14 days 30 days 3 days 7 days 14 days 30 days 3 days 7 days 14 days 30 days 
Treatment 1.537 1.681 1.520 5.701 -0.308 -0.576** -0.654*** -1.044* -1.586 -3.011*** -4.055* -7.526** 
 (3.659) (5.818) (8.527) (12.75) (0.0653) (0.0235) (0.00522) (0.111) (0.585) (0.0326) (0.333) (0.517) 
TimeTreatment -11.92* -17.32** -22.84** -27.54*** -0.308 -0.609 -0.874 -1.518 -1.087 -1.985 -1.306 -2.877 
 (1.466) (1.235) (1.205) (0.254) (0.125) (0.230) (0.321) (0.632) (0.531) (0.683) (0.525) (2.841) 
Treatment x 
TimeTreatment -3.897* -3.629 -3.464 -10.30* 0.314* 0.541*** 0.594*** 1.033** 1.658* 3.009** 4.644** 9.235* 
 (0.392) (0.602) (0.767) (1.114) (0.0265) (0.00555) (0.000427) (0.0162) (0.179) (0.0875) (0.205) (0.821) 
TotalEIReceived     -0.00399 -0.00394 -0.00437 -0.00542 -0.0560 -0.0675 -0.0852 -0.123 
     (0.00404) (0.00214) (0.000860) (0.00150) (0.0229) (0.0121) (0.0225) (0.0593) 
DaysActive -3.856* -5.176* -5.620** -5.886*** 0.508** 0.534** 0.494** 0.456* 4.229* 4.423** 4.375** 4.364*** 
 (0.539) (0.417) (0.156) (0.0566) (0.0149) (0.0238) (0.0292) (0.0416) (0.365) (0.240) (0.283) (0.0492) 
ProfileViews 0.142** 0.135** 0.128*** 0.120*** 0.000788 0.000718 0.000708 0.000748 0.00934 0.00974 0.0110 0.0143 
 (0.00503) (0.00273) (0.00169) (0.000440) (0.000707) (0.000356) (0.000170) (0.000263) (0.00381) (0.00158) (0.00291) (0.00806) 
Constant 82.91* 103.8* 132.2* 177.0* 1.892* 2.364** 2.895*** 4.723** 1.509 2.942 4.557 27.74 
 (10.84) (16.04) (18.65) (23.29) (0.212) (0.105) (0.00297) (0.242) (0.720) (2.092) (2.117) (7.472) 
User Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Dummies for 
Registration 
Week Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 3,666 3,666 3,666 3,666 3,666 3,666 3,666 3,666 3,666 3,666 3,666 3,666 
R-squared 0.836 0.842 0.839 0.833 0.128 0.171 0.210 0.273 0.186 0.203 0.199 0.231 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on location 





 Table 22: Chp3- Panel Probit Models with No Lag and Two Days Lag 
  AgeChoiceMadeInBetween EduChoiceMadeInBetween AgeEduIncChoiceMadeInBetween 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 No Lag 2 days lag No Lag 2 days lag No Lag 2 days lag 
              
Age26AndAbove 0.518*** 0.715*** 0.268*** 0.288*** 0.521*** 0.564*** 
 (0.112) (0.144) (0.0965) (0.112) (0.125) (0.152) 
EduHigher -0.0149 -0.0293 -0.573*** -0.760*** -0.0959 -0.120 
 (0.158) (0.200) (0.154) (0.272) (0.170) (0.204) 
WithIncome -0.0237 -0.0745 0.232** 0.259** -0.0915 -0.104 
 (0.105) (0.135) (0.0943) (0.112) (0.116) (0.138) 
Paid 0.310* 0.651*** -0.156 -0.136 0.473** 0.602*** 
 (0.176) (0.224) (0.167) (0.225) (0.187) (0.221) 
TotalEISent 0.00211 0.00639*** -0.00108 -0.00156 0.00295* 0.00319* 
 (0.00142) (0.00168) (0.00137) (0.00208) (0.00153) (0.00176) 
TotalEIReceived 0.000357 0.000968 0.000996 0.00119 0.00134 0.00156 
 (0.000951) (0.00126) (0.000924) (0.00120) (0.00104) (0.00122) 
TotalMatches -0.00681 -0.0147** -0.00291 0.000693 -0.0104* -0.0115 
 (0.00498) (0.00607) (0.00468) (0.0104) (0.00595) (0.00701) 
ProfileViews -1.28e-05 -7.04e-05 0.000183 0.000200 -0.000195 -0.000252 
 (0.000165) (0.000221) (0.000163) (0.000208) (0.000183) (0.000216) 
lnsig2u 2.842*** 3.475*** 1.722*** 2.071*** 3.011*** 3.564*** 
 (0.0489) (0.0513) (0.0493) (0.0519) (0.0489) (0.0503) 
Constant -5.375*** -6.805*** -1.773*** -1.871*** -6.308*** -7.690*** 
 (0.181) (0.232) (0.169) (0.278) (0.197) (0.242) 
User Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Dummies for Registration Week Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 62,848 58,920 62,848 58,920 62,848 58,920 




Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on location 





Table 23: Chp4- Variable Definitions 
Variable Name Definition 
Dependent Variables  
TotalEIAccept  Total number of expression of interest (EI) accepted by counter parties from the EIs sent by the focal 
user 
TotalReceiveEI  Total EIs received by focal user 
TotalProfileView Total number of times the profile of the focal user is viewed by others in the platform 
Independent Variables  
PO (Profile Operator) Equal to 1 if the profile is managed by parents, 0 is managed by the individual 
GNDev(Group Norm Deviation) Equal to 1 if the user is one standard deviation away from the average group norms, 0 otherwise. 
Refer to the endogamy definition section on how the group norms are calculated 
User Activities Controls 
 
TotalLogin Total number of login sessions for the focal user 
TotalEI Total number of EIs sent by the focal user 
User Controls  
Mobile Adopters If the users has adopted the mobile channel from day one of the registration 
EduBachDummy 1- If user has a minimum undergraduate degree/0-Otherwise 
Paid 1 If the user is a paid subscriber, 0 otherwise 
T1,T2,T3 Represents city tiers with T1 referring to tier 1 city like Mumbai 











Table 24: Chp4- Summary Statistics 
Variables 
Overall Sample CEM - Sample Main Twins - Sample Main 
Overall Women Men Overall Women Men Overall Women Men 
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd 
TotalEIAccept 0.65 2.90 1.80 5.23 0.25 1.12 0.83 3.49 1.79 5.59 0.33 1.26 1.26 4.59 1.9 5.74 0.28 1.15 
TotalReceiveEI 15.87 48.49 57.77 82.22 1.47 5.07 20.89 54.83 57.03 82.16 2.18 6.45 42.62 86.34 69.03 102.73 2.45 8.01 
TotalViewProfile 203.27 573.89 606.05 978.27 64.86 196.84 260.21 621.52 580.72 928.28 94.22 243.53 575.77 1128.76 867.58 1347.41 131.92 352.45 
PO = 1 (Parents) 0.28 0.45 0.53 0.50 0.20 0.40 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.47 0.5 0.51 0.5 0.41 0.49 
PO = 0 (Self) 0.65 0.48 0.40 0.49 0.74 0.44 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.53 0.5 0.49 0.5 0.59 0.49 
GNDev 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.28 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.26 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.22 0.07 0.25 
Gender (Men) 0.74 0.44 - - - - 0.66 - - - - - 0.4 - - - - - 
EduBachDummy 0.78 0.41 0.90 0.30 0.74 0.44 0.82 0.38 0.91 0.28 0.78 0.42 0.85 0.36 0.94 0.24 0.71 0.45 
Age 27.45 4.89 26.20 4.63 27.87 4.91 27.48 4 25.58 3.71 28.46 3.78 24.65 3.13 23.2 2.41 26.86 2.79 
Yrsofedu 15.40 1.62 15.87 1.44 15.24 1.65 15.54 1.56 15.82 1.34 15.39 1.65 15.63 1.42 15.89 1.08 15.23 1.74 
MobileAdopters 0.68 0.47 0.71 0.45 0.67 0.47 0.68 0.47 0.73 0.44 0.65 0.48 0.68 0.47 0.72 0.45 0.61 0.49 
Paid 0.09 0.29 0.14 0.35 0.08 0.26 0.09 0.28 0.06 0.24 0.1 0.3 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.21 
T1 0.33 0.47 0.36 0.48 0.32 0.47 0.34 0.47 0.32 0.47 0.35 0.48 0.25 0.43 0.22 0.41 0.3 0.46 
T2 0.24 0.43 0.25 0.43 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.43 0.25 0.44 0.23 0.42 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.35 0.13 0.34 
T3 0.43 0.50 0.39 0.49 0.44 0.50 0.42 0.49 0.42 0.49 0.42 0.49 0.61 0.49 0.63 0.48 0.57 0.5 
TotalLogin 25.75 52.71 32.98 57.71 23.26 50.64 28.51 56.41 28.82 50.05 28.35 59.44 32.24 62.3 35.45 63.87 27.37 59.52 
TotalEI 14.78 113.31 7.08 42.67 17.43 128.83 14.26 103.59 7.09 47.13 17.97 122.87 9.2 50.2 6.86 36.22 12.75 65.86 













Table 25: Chp4- Main Effect – Matched Dyads (All users) 
  Dependent Variable - Expression of Interest Acceptance (Matched Dyad) 
 Coarsened Exact Matching Twins Matching 
 All All 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
PO  -0.252*** -0.250*** -0.239*** -0.141* -0.133* -0.120* 
 (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0120) (0.0740) (0.0740) (0.0768) 
GNDev   0.190*** 0.260***  0.940*** 1.030*** 
 
 (0.0220) (0.0300)  (0.190) (0.242) 
PO x GNDev   -0.148***   -0.220 
 
  (0.0432)   (0.365) 
Total Login 0.00714***  0.00710*** 0.0117*** 0.0117*** 0.0117*** 
 (0.000112) 
 (0.000112) (0.000845) (0.000844) (0.000844) 
Expression Sent 0.000430***  0.000409*** 0.0134*** 0.0133*** 0.0133*** 
 (5.57e-05) 
 (5.57e-05) (0.000935) (0.000934) (0.000934) 
Constant 0.756***  0.746*** 0.0574 0.0470 0.0232 
 (0.256) 
 (0.256) (2.402) (2.400) (2.400) 
User Controls Y Y Y    
Time Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Caste Fixed Effects Y Y Y    
Twin Fixed Effects     Y Y Y 
Observations 302,284 302,284 302,284 14,879 14,879 14,879 










Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





Table 26: Chp4- Main Effect – Matched Dyads (Split Samples) 
  Dependent Variable - Expression of Interest Acceptance (Matched Dyad) 
 Men Women 
 CEM Twins Matching CEM Twins Matching 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
PO  -0.0944*** -0.0878*** -0.0505* -0.0440 -0.521*** -0.494*** -0.257** -0.224* 
 (0.00492) (0.00511) (0.0265) (0.0277) (0.0317) (0.0330) (0.117) (0.121) 
GNDev  0.128*** 0.169*** 0.127* 0.161** 0.283*** 0.453*** 1.422*** 1.714*** 
 (0.00933) (0.0127) (0.0655) (0.0779) (0.0600) (0.0820) (0.309) (0.417) 
PO x GNDev  -0.0882***  -0.102  -0.361***  -0.624 
 
 (0.0183)  (0.127)  (0.118)  (0.596) 
Total Login 0.00314*** 0.00314*** 0.00372*** 0.00372*** 0.0210*** 0.0210*** 0.0160*** 0.0160*** 




-0.000432*** 0.000917*** 0.000917*** 0.0167*** 0.0167*** 0.0335*** 0.0335*** 
 (2.16e-05) (2.17e-05) (0.000278) (0.000279) (0.000338) (0.000338) (0.00181) (0.00181) 
Constant -0.0991 -0.101 0.123 0.114 2.596*** 2.594*** 0.328 0.261 
 (0.111) (0.111) (1.151) (1.151) (0.678) (0.678) (3.328) (3.329) 
User Controls Y Y    Y Y   
Time Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Caste Fixed Effects Y Y    Y Y   
Twin Fixed Effects    Y Y    Y Y 
Observations 199,146 199,146 5,902 5,902 103,138 103,138 8,977 8,977 
R-squared 0.280 0.280 0.585 0.585 0.214 0.214 0.450 0.450 
 
  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





Table 27: Chp4- Alternate Outcome – Incoming Requests (All Users) 
  Dependent Variable - Incoming Expressions of Interest 
 All 
 Coarsened Exact Matching Twins Matching 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
PO  -2.519*** -2.501*** -2.465*** -4.010*** -3.932*** -3.907*** 
 -0.0951 (0.0951) (0.0987) -0.546 (0.545) (0.566) 
GNDev   2.232*** 2.457***  8.876*** 9.059*** 
 
 (0.180) (0.246)  (1.402) (1.782) 
PO x GNDev   -0.478   -0.447 
 
  (0.355)   (2.691) 
Total Login -0.0876*** -0.0882*** -0.0882*** -0.0706*** -0.0707*** -0.0707*** 
 -0.000915 (0.000916) (0.000916) -0.00619 (0.00618) (0.00618) 
Constant 12.74*** 12.64*** 12.63*** -6.903 -7.003 -7.051 
 -2.102 (2.102) (2.102) -17.71 (17.67) (17.68) 
User Controls Y Y Y    
Time Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Caste Fixed Effects Y Y Y    
Twin Fixed Effects    Y Y Y 
Observations 302284 302284 302284 14,879 14,879 14,879 









Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 28: Chp4- Alternate Outcome – Incoming Requests (Men and Women) 
  Dependent Variable - Expression of Interest Received 
 Men Women 
 CEM Twins Matching CEM Twins Matching 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
PO  0.226*** 0.202*** 0.171* 0.199** -6.433*** -6.125*** -6.193*** -5.947*** 
 (0.0194) (0.0201) (0.0945) (0.0988) (0.227) (0.236) (0.848) (0.878) 
GNDev  0.471*** 0.318*** 0.669*** 0.816*** 9.197*** 11.14*** 14.06*** 16.27*** 
 (0.0368) (0.0501) (0.233) (0.278) (0.429) (0.587) (2.248) (3.027) 
PO x GNDev  0.325***  -0.442  -4.096***  -4.727 
  (0.0722)  (0.455)  (0.846)  (4.331) 
Total Login 
0.00830*** 0.00829*** 0.000354 0.000375 0.0194*** 0.0194*** 
-
0.0472*** -0.0472*** 
 (0.000194) (0.000194) (0.00126) (0.00126) (0.00266) (0.00266) (0.00925) (0.00925) 
Constant -2.604*** -2.596*** -0.256 -0.294 21.73*** 21.70*** -5.669 -6.176 
 (0.436) (0.436) (4.103) (4.103) (4.849) (4.849) (24.19) (24.19) 
User Controls Y Y   Y Y   
Time Fixed 
Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Caste Fixed 
Effects Y Y   Y Y   
Twin Fixed 
Effects   Y Y   Y Y 
Observations 199146 199146 5,902 5,902 103,138 103,138 8,977 8,977 
R-squared 0.576 0.576 0.890 0.890 0.814 0.814 0.909 0.909 
 
    
  





Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 29: Chp4- Robustness Check – Count Models 
  Count Model -Negative Binomial Regression 
 Men Women 
 TotalEIAccept TotalReceiveEI TotalEIAccept TotalReceiveEI 
  1 2 3 4 
PO  -0.180*** 0.177*** -0.236*** -0.0199*** 
 (0.0145) (0.00909) (0.0141) (0.00667) 
GNDev  0.511*** 0.575*** 0.386*** 0.380*** 
 (0.0307) (0.0217) (0.0333) (0.0166) 
PO x GNDev -0.0346 -0.0935*** -0.00162 0.00438 
 (0.0463) (0.0315) (0.0489) (0.0241) 
TotalLogin 0.0163*** 0.0185*** 0.0201*** 0.0131*** 
 (0.000161) (0.000125) (0.000234) (0.000101) 
TotalEI 0.00429***   0.0257***  
 (0.000123)   (0.000521) 
 
Constant -2.422*** -0.507*** -0.994*** 3.193*** 
 (0.0164) (0.00968) (0.0174) (0.00757) 
 /lnalpha 1.365*** 1.068*** 1.243*** 0.0206*** 
 (0.0102) (0.00521) (0.00782) (0.00408) 
User Controls Y Y Y Y 
Time Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 


































Men 0 318 322 
  1 25 21 
Women 0 211 210 







Men 0 112 112 
  1 20 18 
Women 0 82 82 
























































































































































Figure 11 – Chp4- Profile Switch (Men – Incoming EI) 
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